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This thesis is about two ways in which we use mathematics to understand the non-
mathematical world: in particular, mathematical explanation and mathematical 
representation. In chapters 1 and 2, I motivate the project by suggesting that, in addition to 
shedding light on the nature of explanation and representation, it is necessary to develop 
accounts of these two world-oriented uses of mathematics in order to evaluate competing 
considerations in favour of, and against, mathematical realism. In chapters 3 and 4 I discuss 
extra-mathematical explanation. In chapter 3, I consider and reject four recent accounts of 
mathematical explanation. In chapter 4 I discuss and endorse what I call the modal account 
of extra-mathematical explanation. I argue, in line with Jansson and Saatsi and contra Baron, 
Colyvan and Ripley that such an account does not require countenancing counterpossibles, 
I discuss in virtue of what a mathematical fact can play this role and I address whether or not 
extra-mathematical explanations are causal. In chapters 5 and 6 I discuss mathematical 
representation. In chapter 5 I consider two fundamental challenges to developing an account 
of mathematical scientific representation: the first is Callender and Cohen’s claim that there 
are no special problems of scientific representation and the second is a set of influential 
objections owing to Frigg and Suárez that take aim at accounts of representation that appeal 
to the notion of structural similarity. In chapter 6 I argue that two recent accounts of 
mathematical representation are, in fact, complementary and, more generally, that 
mathematical representation is a special kind of epistemic representation. I draw on some 
work from epistemology to address, and argue against, Pincock’s claim that in order to 
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This thesis is concerned with shedding light on two ways in which we use mathematics to 
navigate the world: our uses of mathematics to explain and to represent. The project has 
twin motivations. The first concerns a relatively recent turn in the debate over the ontology 
of mathematics. Recent debates about whether or not we have good reason for believing in 
the existence of mathematical objects have taken as their starting point the uses that we put 
mathematics to in understanding the non-mathematical realm. Just as it is necessary to invoke 
atoms and bosons in order to organise sense experience, this Quinean thought goes, so must 
we invoke mathematical objects. The assessment of these arguments has turned recently 
away from the mere fact that mathematics is used in our scientific theories and towards 
increasingly delicate questions about how mathematics is used. As a consequence, 
mathematical explanation and mathematical representation now play a crucial role in these 
debates. The second motivation concerns questions about explanation and representation 
themselves, quite apart from ontological concerns: questions about whether or not there is 
something core that makes all explanations explanatory and all representations 
representational and how mathematical explanation and mathematical representation relate 
to explanation and representation simpliciter.  
 
0.1. The metaphysical commitments of world-oriented mathematics 
 
According to mathematical realism, or Platonism, mathematical objects exist.1 According to 
one recently popular line of thinking, mathematics plays an explanatory role: furthermore, this 
special kind of role is connected in the right way to ontological commitment such that 
mathematics playing an explanatory role constitutes a reason to endorse mathematical 
realism. According to nominalism about mathematics, mathematical objects do not exist. A 
line of thinking pulling away from realism and towards nominalism says that mathematics 
only plays a role in representing facts about the world: mathematics does not play a role in 
explaining aspects of reality – rather, it is merely a language in which we can speak about 
objects that exist. 
																																																						
1 This form of realism should be distinguished from a weaker variant, which I will call truth-value realism. 
According to truth-value realism, there are mathematical truths. Whether or not one can consistently assent to 
the truth of mathematical statements whilst remaining agnostic regarding the existence, and nature, of 
mathematical objects standardly taken to be their truth-makers is a fraught question that I will occasionally turn 
to. Another way of drawing up the realist/non-realist divide, along the lines of objectivity, will be discussed 
briefly in §1.1. 
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It is a much improved state of affairs that the debate has moved from the discussion of the 
fact that our scientific theories contain terms that (purport) to refer to mathematical objects 
to a discussion of the different roles that mathematics can play in our scientific theories. Yet, 
too often, disagreements about the kind of role mathematics is playing in this or that case 
seem to amount to a butting of intuitions: it is unclear exactly what the criteria are for 
demonstrating that mathematics is playing a certain role in a certain case and equally unclear 
what our reasons are for thinking that the role being played is one that is linked up in the 
right way to ontological considerations. This thesis takes as its jumping off point the very 
natural thought that both of these thorny questions can be better navigated when equipped 
with existing accounts of scientific representation and explanation. Even though some recent 
contributions to the literature still make do without appealing to any developed account of 
these phenomena and appeal only to general, symptomatic, features of explanations such as 
their generality (e.g. Baker 2017), the literature has in general also quite recently taken a 
similar turn towards developing accounts of these phenomena.2 This is a positive 
development, one that this thesis contributes to by adjudicating some of the disagreements 
that have emerged and by putting forward some positive proposals that compare favourably 
to what has come before.  
 
0.2. Easy and natural mathematical metaphysics   
 
It is worth briefly mentioning, and then putting to one side, some other considerations 
offered in favour of mathematical realism. Schaffer offers the following argument for 
realism: 
 
 Here, without further ado, is a proof of the existence of numbers: 
  1. There are prime numbers. 
  2. Therefore there are numbers. (Shaffer 2009: 357) 
 
According to easy arguments for mathematical realism, our assent to the truth of claims like ‘3, 
5 and 7 are prime numbers’ secures realism near-trivially. A natural thought, however, is that 
the plausibility of such arguments is likely to rise and fall with the plausibility of easy 
arguments in ontology generally and on the good standing of the recent move in analytic 
																																																						
2 Only some such accounts are developed with ontological considerations in mind. 
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metaphysics away from discussion of existence towards questions of fundamentality.3 
Opponents of easy arguments argue that there is no entitlement to reading sentences like 
‘there are prime numbers’ at face-value, and that doing so borders on begging the question 
against nominalist opponents (Contessa 2016), whilst proponents of the arguments suggest 
that it is the nominalist opponents who beg the question by suggesting a reading of such 
sentences that does not involve their truth (Thomasson 2013). There are also responses to 
such arguments that do not involve matters of dialectical burden and question-begging: for 
example, it should perhaps be treated as an open question as to whether or not the truth of 
such sentences does indeed entail the existence of mathematical objects (for two contrasting 
strategies for answering it negatively see Azzouni 2004 and Nutting 2017).  
 
Related to easy arguments are arguments that appeal to a distinctive kind of naturalism about 
mathematics. On one plausible line of thinking, the sorts of reasons that speak in favour of 
believing a mathematical claim are those offered in mathematics. This form of mathematical 
naturalism is most prominently discussed and endorsed by Penelope Maddy (Maddy 1997; 
Maddy 2007; Maddy 2011). There are distinct views about what this sort of mathematical 
naturalism entails: in the most recent iteration of her views on these matters, Maddy 
maintains that descriptive facts about mathematical practice are neutral between Arealism 
(roughly nominalism) and Thin Realism, the view that all there is to say about objects like 
sets and numbers is what set theory and number theory have to say about them (Maddy 
2011: 103-112). On this sort of line, only facts about mathematical practice (or, perhaps, only 
the facts discovered in mathematical practice) are the right kind of facts to settle questions 
about realism and nominalism, but these facts yield an indeterminate answer. There are many 
aspects of this approach that are attractive. Those of this persuasion will, of course, think 
that the answer to the question ‘do our world-oriented uses of mathematics justify any kind 
of realism?’ is straight-forwardly ‘no’. None of this, however, speaks against the development 
of descriptive accounts of mathematical explanation and representation: Maddy’s naturalist 
should be interested in this project as an investigation into the kinds of things that we do 
with mathematics and how we do them. 
 
																																																						
3 Here’s this approach captured in a slogan: “Metaphysics so revived does not bother asking whether properties, 
meanings, and numbers exist. Of course they do! The question is whether or not they are fundamental” (Shaffer 
2009: 347). See also Correia & Schieder 2012. This is not to say that easy arguments are only offered by those 
who are part of the program that Shaffer characterises: Thomasson, I take it, thinks that existence questions 
are worth asking and that easy arguments are successful ways of answering them (Thomasson 2013). 
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0.3. Anti-exceptionalism as a working hypothesis 
 
The second theme running through the thesis is largely orthogonal to questions about 
mathematical ontology. This concerns questions about how mathematical explanation and 
representation relate to other forms of explanation and representation. 
 
I will adopt, as a working hypothesis, anti-exceptionalism about mathematical explanation 
and mathematical representation.4 Exceptionalism about mathematical representation is the 
view that the phenomena of mathematical scientific representation is such that it cannot be 
understood using our current best theories of representation, with exceptionalism about 
mathematical explanation glossed analogously. Adopting anti-exceptionalism as a hypothesis 
to be tested consists in asking: can the special mathematical cases of explanation and 
representation be helpfully understood by appealing to current theories of explanation and 
representation? I argue that, contra the assumptions of many of the commentators discussed 
in this thesis, there is reason to believe that the anti-exceptionalist hypothesis is correct. To 
be an anti-exceptionalist is not to deny that there are any idiosyncratic features of the 
phenomena that one is anti-exceptionalist about: holding that explanation in both biology 
and chemistry ultimately involves describing the world’s causal structure does not commit 
one to thinking that biological causal explanation and chemical causal explanation function 
identically. By identifying the common core between mathematical and non-mathematical 
explanation and between mathematical and non-mathematical representation, light can also 
be shed on where these types of explanation and representation differ. 
 
Exceptionalism and anti-exceptionalism are views about a particular kind of explanation (or 
representation) and their truth is determined by the relationships between the kind of 
explanation (or representation) under consideration and other kinds, and accounts of, 
explanation (or representation). One might be an anti-exceptionalist about extra-
mathematical explanation but an exceptionalist about normative explanation, an anti-
exceptionalist about theory choice in logic but exceptionalist about theory choice in 
metaphysics, and so on. A second kind of view concerns explanation (or representation, or 
theory choice, etc.) simpliciter. These views address the question of whether or not there is a 
single, fully general, account to be given of all the practices that we call ‘explanation’ (or 
																																																						
4 Other anti-exceptionalist projects include anti-exceptionalism about theory choice in logic, according to which 
(roughly) the norms of theory choice in logic are also those that govern theory choice in scientific disciplines 
(Hjortland 2017; Maddy 2002; Williamson 2013b; Williamson 2017). 
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‘representation’, or ‘theory choice’, etc.). This much broader question cannot, and so will 
not, be resolved in this thesis. Nevertheless, the anti-exceptionalist accounts offered of 
mathematical explanation and representation do offer more support for some of these 
general views than they do for others. This picture will emerge once the details of the views 
are spelled out and I will return to this question in more detail in the conclusion.  
 
0.4. The applicability of mathematics 
 
Here is one final positioning of this thesis in an existing debate and literature. Part of this 
thesis is concerned with understanding mathematical scientific representation. How does this 
relate to the long-standing problem of what Wigner calls the unreasonable effectiveness of 
mathematics (Wigner 1960)? The project of chapters 5 and 6 should be understood as 
addressing something of a more basic question than Wigner’s. The question of the 
unreasonable effectiveness of mathematics takes as data that there are very many successful 
uses of mathematics and, often combining this with historical claims about the distinct 
development of the mathematical tools and their subsequent deployment in scientific 
practice, asks for an explanation as to why this seemingly unreasonable thing has occurred. 
Developing an account of what it is for a piece of mathematics to count as a representation 
of something non-mathematical is largely orthogonal to whether or not it is unreasonable that 
successful mathematical representations like these are commonplace. I am inclined towards 
the view that the perceived unreasonableness of mathematics ought to be tempered both by 
the existence of many unsuccessful applications of mathematics and by the fact that whether 
or not it is surprising, unreasonable, or in demand of an explanation that mathematics ends 
up being effective turns on what our priors are.5 What is important is that questions about 
what makes it such that a piece of mathematics represents something non-mathematical is 
largely orthogonal, and prior, to whether or not it is miraculous, or unreasonable, that this is 






5 Bangu and Pincock have each recently developed this first idea in two different ways (Bangu 2016: 26-28; 
Pincock 2012: 169-190). 
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0.5. Chapter précis  
 
Chapter 1: Indispensability, representation and explanation 
 
In the first chapter, I provide the recent philosophical context in which this thesis’ focus on 
explanation and representation is situated. In doing so, the aim is to further motivate the 
paying of closer attention to the way in which mathematical explanation and mathematical 
representation function. According to the Quine-Putnam indispensability argument, the fact 
that our best scientific theories indispensably contain terms that purport to refer to 
mathematical objects is sufficient to justify belief in such objects. I discuss a line of response, 
pressed by, amongst others, Penelope Maddy and Joseph Melia. According to this response, 
the standard indispensability argument fails because it does not to distinguish between the 
various roles that mathematics plays in our best scientific theories and it is reasonable to 
think that only some roles are ontologically committing. This sets the scene for the rest of 
the thesis, in which two particular roles played by mathematics in our best scientific theories 
are interrogated: explanation and representation.  
 
Chapter 2: The enhanced indispensability argument and inferential conservativeness 
 
In the second chapter I begin the discussion of the enhanced indispensability argument, an 
argument that appeals to the purported explanatory capacities of mathematics. This chapter 
constitutes an argument for the claim that the enhanced indispensability argument, cannot 
be assessed without an account of how mathematics plays this explanatory role. This claim 
may, of course, be quite fairly described as common-sense. However, the mathematical realist 
claims to offer reasons for thinking that their opponent is already committed to thinking that 
the inference from the existence of mathematical explanations of non-mathematical facts to 
mathematical realism is licit in virtue of some of their prior commitments. I consider two 
arguments (the argument from inferential conservativeness and the argument from abductive 
maximalism) along this line and argue that they both fail. I then set the scene for chapter 3 
by discussing some canonical examples of extra-mathematical explanation and some criteria 






Chapter 3: Extant accounts of extra-mathematical explanation 
 
In the third chapter, I appeal to the criteria and case studies introduced at the end of the 
second chapter to evaluate existing accounts of extra-mathematical explanation in the recent 
literature. I first discuss two accounts of extra-mathematical explanation that are anti-
exceptionalist in character: that is, attempts to extend existing accounts of explanation to the 
extra-mathematical cases. I first consider Baker’s schematic extension of the deductive-
nomological account of explanation and Lyon’s extension of Jackson and Pettit’s 
programming account of explanation. I then discuss two more recent potential accounts of 
extra-mathematical explanation that are exceptionalist in character. I consider the abstract 
dependence account, recently proposed by Pincock and the constraint account, proposed by 
Lange. I argue that although both accounts succeed in capturing some of the distinctive 
features of extra-mathematical explanation, they are ultimately problematic.  
 
Chapter 4: The modal account of extra-mathematical explanation 
 
In the fourth chapter, I motivate and endorse a positive proposal. I first discuss and discount 
some reasons for thinking that extending causal accounts of explanation to the extra-
mathematical case is a prima facie non-starter. After motivating appealing to Woodward’s 
interventionist account of causal explanation, I make salient the relevant features of this 
account and demonstrate that it can shed light on extra-mathematical explanation. I then 
draw on forthcoming work by various commentators to argue (in line with Jansson & Saatsi 
and contra Ripley, Colyvan & Baron, and Chirimuuta) that extending Woodward’s account 
in this way does not require appealing to counterpossibles. I then suggest that appealing to 
the structural nature of extra-mathematical explanations can explain in virtue of what a 
mathematical fact can play the same role played by the invariant generalization in paradigm 
causal explanations. Before concluding, I consider the causal status of extra-mathematical 
explanations. 
 
Chapter 5: Scientific representation and epistemic representation 
 
In the fifth chapter, I begin my discussion of the ways in which we use mathematics to 
represent by introducing some case studies of both mathematical and non-mathematical 
scientific representations. I then address some questions about scientific representation more 
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generally. In particular, I consider two challenges found in the literature on scientific 
representation that threaten to undermine the accounts considered and assessed in chapter 
6. I first consider Callender and Cohen’s claim that there is no special problem of scientific 
representation (and a fortiori no special problem of mathematical scientific representation). I 
second consider Suárez and Frigg’s challenges for accounts of representation that give a role 
to structural relations between vehicle and target (which, to give a minor spoiler, includes the 
accounts of mathematical representation discussed in chapter 6). I argue that the Suárez-
Frigg objections can be avoided if accounts of representation make use of structural relations 
to account for the degree of faithfulness of a representation and not to explain the vehicle’s 
status as a representation. I suggest that a form of Contessa’s epistemic representation account 
has these features. The concluding picture is one in which a vehicle represents its target in 
virtue of standing in a (perhaps basic) denotation relation with its target, a vehicle is an 
epistemic representation of its target in virtue of a user providing an interpretation of the 
target in terms of vehicle objects and a vehicle is a faithful epistemic representation in virtue 
of standing in a structural relation with its target.  
 
Chapter 6: Distinctively mathematical epistemic representation 
 
In the sixth chapter, I consider accounts of distinctively mathematical scientific 
representation: Pincock’s mapping account and Bueno and Colyvan’s inferential conception. 
I argue for the anti-exceptionalist conclusion that mathematical representation can be 
accommodated by the epistemic representation framework, set out in chapter 5. I set out 
and offer solutions to two potential problems with such an accommodation, and also suggest 
that (contra Bueno and Colyvan) the mapping account and inferential conception share a 
common core and may be complementary. The resulting picture of representation is as 
follows: scientific representation is a subspecies of (partially) faithful epistemic 
representation and distinctively mathematical scientific representation is a subspecies of 
scientific representation. Distinctively mathematical scientific representation is therefore a 
form of epistemic representation: as a result, anti-exceptionalism about distinctively 
mathematical representation is true. I then discuss the metaphysical ramifications of the 
structural account of mathematical representation: in particular, I appeal to notions of 
epistemic understanding to argue against Pincock’s claim that in order for one to understand 
a mathematical representation, one must believe its mathematical content. 
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In the conclusion, I return to the themes of mathematical ontology and anti-exceptionalism 



































Indispensability, representation and explanation 
 
In this chapter, I provide the recent philosophical context in which this thesis’ focus on 
explanation and representation is situated. In doing so, the aim is to further motivate the 
paying of closer attention to the way in which mathematical explanation and mathematical 
representation function. According to the Quine-Putnam indispensability argument, the 
(purported) fact that our best scientific theories indispensably contain terms that refer to 
mathematical objects is sufficient to justify belief in such objects. I discuss a line of response, 
pressed by, amongst others, Penelope Maddy and Joseph Melia. According to this response, 
the standard indispensability argument fails because it does not to distinguish between the 
various roles that mathematics plays in our best scientific theories and it is reasonable to 
think that only some roles are ontologically committing. This sets the scene for the rest of 
the thesis, in which two particular roles played by mathematics in our best scientific theories 
are interrogated: explanation and representation. 
 
In the first section I make some brief historical remarks about what has come to be known 
as the Quine-Putnam indispensability argument and discuss various formulations of the 
argument. In the second section I discuss Field’s programme and place it in the context of 
this thesis. In section three I will present a formulation of a recent response to the 
indispensability argument, owing to Maddy and Melia amongst others, according to which 
the argument fails because it does not distinguish between the various roles that apparent 
reference to mathematical objects plays in our scientific theories. In section four I argue that 
the success of the Maddy/Melia response to the indispensability argument depends on the 
nature of the explanatory and representational roles played by apparent reference to 
mathematical objects. I attempt to make precise the component views that make up 
representationalist nominalism and make the case that descriptive accounts of mathematical 
explanation and representation must be developed if the view is to be assessed. In section 
five I respond to a challenge to the kind of view discussed in section four, owing (in different 
formulations) to Colyvan and Pincock. I then conclude. 
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1.1. The Quine-Putnam indispensability argument 
 
In this section I set out (what has come to be known as) the Quine-Putnam indispensability 
argument.   
 
Consider the following explication of the indispensability argument, owing to Mark Colyvan: 
 
(1C) We ought to have ontological commitment to all and only those entities that are 
indispensable to our best scientific theories. 
(2C) Mathematical entities are indispensable to our best scientific theories. 
Therefore 
(3C) We ought to have ontological commitment to mathematical entities. (Colyvan 2001: 
12) 
 
Something like this argument is often referred to as the Quine-Putnam indispensability 
argument and ascribed to one or other (or both) of Quine and Putnam (Field 1980: 107; 
Maddy 1990b: 29-30; Shapiro 1997: 46; Melia 2000: 45; Yablo 2000: 197; cf. Liggins 2008). 
Whether or not the argument referred to as the Quine-Putnam indispensability argument is 
something that would be endorsed by either Quine or Putnam is a fraught exegetical 
question. I’ll briefly touch on this question here, and then explain why it will not pursued in 
any depth in this thesis. 
 
The conclusion of the above argument has as its conclusion what I referred to in the 
introduction as Platonism. As Liggins persuasively argues, for this reason, the ascription of 
the above argument to Putnam is a misreading (Liggins 2008: 119-123).6 The core of this 
misreading is that Putnam has rather different approaches to the notions of ontological 
commitment and realism to those presupposed by the above argument: I will briefly 
comment on each in turn. Putnam’s notion of realism, at least that appealed to in one of his 
presentations of (what looks like) the indispensability argument, contrasts with both 
Platonism (understood as the view that mathematical objects exist) and truth-value realism 
(understood as the view that (at least some) mathematical sentences are (non-trivially) true). 
Putnam’s notion of realism appeals to notions of objectivity – the notion that mathematical 
sentences are bivalent and that what determines the truth-value of a given mathematical 
																																																						
6 My discussion in this section follows Liggins’ presentation: see Liggins 2008 for further details and references. 
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sentence is “something external […] not (in general) our sense data, actual or potential, or 
the structure of our minds, or our language, etc.” (Putnam 1975: 70). As Liggins notes after 
quoting this same passage, this notion of realism cuts across both Platonism and truth-value 
realism. Consider a view that holds that the truth-value of a mathematical sentence is 
determined by abstract truth-makers, that there are no such abstract truth-makers and that, 
therefore, all mathematical sentences are false.7 This view is non-Platonist, non-truth-value-
realist but realist in Putnam’s sense in that the truth of mathematical sentences is determined 
by “something external”. Hartry Field, for example, is a realist in Putnam’s sense but is taken 
to be a canonical non-realist in the debate surrounding the indispensability argument. 
 
Liggins also provides reasons for thinking that the standard presentations of the argument 
ascribe to Quine a Davidsonian argument that he would not have endorsed (Liggins 2008: 
118-119). However, there is an (additional) worry that the ascription of the above argument 
to Quine is guilty of the same flattening of Quine’s views about ontology that is often found 
in the contemporary metaphysics literature. This is a version of Quine that is perhaps found 
in ‘On What There Is’ (Quine 1953) but largely absent from the Quine of ‘Ontological 
Relativity’ (Quine 1963). According to the standard story, Quine revived the traditional 
ontological project from its Carnapian condemnation (Carnap 1950; Quine 1953) and we 
should understand a properly Quinean approach to ontology as involving using our standard 
first-order logic (with identity) to regiment our scientific theories and reading off those 
objects that are quantified over. This sort of picture seems to be both implicitly and explicitly 
supposed in much work in metaphysics and is also the object of some discontent in the 
metametaphysics literature. This discontent ranges from defences of a broadly Carnapian 
picture against Quinean attacks (Price 2009) to arguments that Quine’s views are 
misrepresented (Nay 2012; Soames 2009; Wilson 2011).  
 
What should be taken from this metametaphysical debate is that it is controversial to claim 
that Quine held that we should, and can, give an answer to the questions of the form ‘does 
x exist?’ by finding out whether or not x is indispensable to (a suitable regimentation of) our 
best scientific theories.8 In this thesis, I will not engage in any deeper exegetical discussion 
of whether or not either Quine or Putnam endorsed any argument resembling what has come 
to be known as the Quine-Putnam indispensability argument. Those interested in this 
																																																						
7 Being slightly more careful: some mathematical sentences, on this view, will be trivially true (such as ‘there 
are no prime numbers between 11 and 13’). 
8 Indeed, the above argument doesn’t even make appeal to the notion of regimentation.   
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narrower question should pursue discussion elsewhere (Resknik 1997; Liggins 2008) and 
those interested in the faithfulness of the neo-Quinean project in contemporary analytic 
metaphysics to Quine’s actual thought should consider the references above. This 
disregarding of exegetical questions is motivated by the fact that discussions of this version 
of the argument in literature over the past couple of decades take as their starting point 
something like Colyvan’s formulation, with consideration of Quine and Putnam’s views being 
a secondary consideration, if they are featured at all.9 The move, then, is from an investigation 
of Quine’s argument to an investigation of an argument with broadly Quinean premises and 
motivations.  
 
The disconnect from Quine’s thought is not complete, however. When defending the 
premises of the above argument, realists often appeal to Quinean notions – even if this is, 
ultimately, distinct from the above argument being one that Quine would endorse. (1C) 
requires unpacking and Colyvan does so by appealing to two Quinean notions, stating that 
“the crucial first premise follows from the doctrines of naturalism and holism” (Colyvan 
2001: 12). Leng’s formulation of the argument that precedes her critical discussion makes 
the incorporation of these Quinean notions explicit:  
 
(1L) (Naturalism): We should look to science, and in particular the statements that are 
considered best confirmed according to our ordinary scientific standards, to discover what 
we ought to believe. 
(2L) (Confirmational Holism): The confirmation our theories receive extends to all their 
statements equally. 
(3L) (Indispensability): Statements whose truth would require the existence of mathematical 
objects are indispensable in formulating our best-confirmed scientific theories. 
(C) (Mathematical realism): We ought to believe that there are mathematical objects. (Leng 
2010: 7). 
 
There are still open questions as to whether or not this is an argument that Quine would 
endorse, even though this formulation makes explicit the fact that it depends on views central 
to Quine’s thought. I take (3L) and (2C) to have identical truth-conditions despite their 
																																																						
9 This move from arguments originally given in their original philosophical contexts to somewhat flattened 
versions of those arguments, which then are discussed and responded to and become canonical, is not unique 
to the Quine-Putnam indispensability argument (see, for example, discussion of philosophical arguments that, 
purportedly, do not appeal to intuitions in their original presentations yet have entered the literature in modified 
forms such that they do (Cappelen 2012)).  
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different formulations: I will mention them interchangeably and take ‘the indispensability 
premise’ to refer to either or both. I also take (1C) to be motivated by an acceptance of (1L) 
and (2L), as Colyvan makes explicit (Colyvan 2001: 18).  
 
1.2. Field’s hard-road response and the indispensability premise 
 
In this section I discuss Hartry Field’s response to the Quine-Putnam indispensability 
argument. Whilst I hope to say something interesting about the modal character of the 
indispensability claim, the primary purposes of discussing Field’s programme are the 
following. First, it is a frequent response to views and arguments in this area that endorsing 
those views and arguments commits one to carrying out (something like) Field’s programme 
– in order for this claims to make sense, it is necessary to have in mind what Field’s 
programme entails and why it is a disadvantage of views if they are committed to carrying it 
out. Responses of this kind tend not to make the strong assumption that carrying out Field’s 
programme is impossible – rather, it is merely that having to demonstrate that the 
programme can be carried out is a hefty theoretical burden. Second, the Maddy-Melia 
manoeuvre that is the focus of the next section sharply contrasts with Field’s approach, even 
though both (in their own ways) involve rejecting the indispensability argument – it is 
necessary to have Field’s approach in mind to make this distinction clear.  
 
Hartry Field attempts to cast doubt on the indispensability premise (Field 1980; Field 1989). 
Field’s programme is an example of a nominalization programme: such programmes aim to 
systematically demonstrate that it is possible to substitute the mentions of mathematical 
objects in our best scientific theories for terms that purportedly refer to some other, 
supposedly less nominalistically-worrying kind of object. If mathematics is dispensable to 
our best scientific theories, then for each mathematized scientific theory there exists a 
nominalistic counterpart, which is just as good as the mathematized theory (with regards to 
predictive power, simplicity, and so on) yet only contains terms that purport to refer to 
nominalistically acceptable objects. Field’s programme makes use of space-time points (Field 
1980), whilst Chihara appeals to what can be constructed (Chihara 1990) and Hellman to 
what structures might have been (Hellman 1989). Field does not offer a nominalization of 
our best scientific theories (circa 1980): rather, he proposes a way to nominalize Newtonian 
gravitational theory, with the hope that doing so both decreases our credence in the claim 
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that mathematics is indispensable and offers tools for nominalizing some of our current best 
science. 
 
Some philosophical problems with such nominalization programmes are shared amongst all 
of the programmes: worries, for example, about whether nominalized counterparts are as 
theoretically virtuous as their mathematical counterparts, even if they are empirically 
equivalent (Colyvan 2001: 78-79) and worries about the nominalist credentials of the objects 
and properties appealed to in lieu of the mathematical objects (Burgess & Rosen 1997: 140; 
Leng 2010: 57-62). Technical worries about the details of such programmes are likely to be 
more diverse. There are many good surveys of problems with such nominalization 
programmes: see Rosen & Burgess 1997 for a thorough overview that discusses Field, 
Chihara and Hellman, and for discussions of Field’s programme see MacBride 1999 and 
Leng 2010: 45-70. It is also important to note the recent work that has been done in this vein 
since the publication of Science without Numbers. For example, Cian Dorr and Frank 
Arntzenius’ offer an extension to non-Newtonian space-time theories and fiber-bundle 
theories (Arntzenius & Dorr 2012). A frequently expressed worry about nominalization 
programs concerns their extension to quantum mechanics (Malament 1982) but recent work, 
too, has been done on casting doubt on this worry (Keming-Chen ms).  
 
In addition to completing a nominalization programme (or at least giving us good reasons 
for thinking that one can be completed), this brand of response to the indispensability 
argument also attempts to explain why it is unproblematic (and in fact useful) to include in 
our scientific theories terms that purport to refer to objects that, in fact, fail to exist.  Field 
argues in favour of the claim that mathematics is conservative. Let a theory T’ be a 
conservative extension of another theory T iff: 
 
 (a) the language of T’ extends the language of T 
 (b) every theorem of T is a theorem of T’ 
(c) any theorem of T’ that is not a theorem of T is not expressible in the language of 
T 
 
A mathematized scientific theory, then, is claimed to be a conservative extension of its 
nominalistic counterpart.10 Field offers both formal and informal arguments for the claim 
																																																						
10 Field’s claim is that mathematics is semantically conservative over nominalistic theories. 
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that mathematics is conservative (Field 1980: 115). For discussion of potential problems with 
the set-theoretic proof of the claim see (MacBride 1999: 448-449) and for an argument that 
the proof, even if successful, cannot do the work that Field requires of it, see Melia 2006.  
 
As has only been signalled above, there is extensive critical discussion of Field’s attempt to 
nominalize Newtonian gravitational theory, his attempt to provide good reasons to believe 
the more general claim about dispensability and his attempt to demonstrate the truth of 
semantic conservativeness. Rather than interrogate any of these critical responses and what 
Field might say in response (a task already carried out in detail in the extant literature 
signposted above), it is worthwhile instead to take stock and ask exactly what this uncertainty 
means as regards our credence in the indispensability premise of the indispensability 
argument.  
 
(3L)/(2C), I take it, is supposed to be something other than a mere descriptive claim about 
our current failure to complete a nominalization programme. Despite recent work, this much 
is uncontroversially true: even if Field has successfully nominalized NGT, this is not part of 
our current best science and even if Dorr and Arntzenius, and Keming-Chen, are successful 
in their efforts, this makes up only a fraction of our current best science. But, of course, the 
indispensability premise does not just state that our current best theories are not yet 
nominalized (although its truth would entail that this will remain the case!). Rather, the 
premise makes the stronger claim that our best scientific theories are indispensably 
mathematized: they are unnominalizable rather than currently unnominzalized. It is difficult 
to find explicit arguments for this modal claim. One strand that can be identified is that the 
current failure to complete the nominalization task is supposed to feature in the argument 
for (3L)(2C) (Colyvan 2001: 89). The standard explications of the notions of indispensability 
only push the question back. For example, Colyvan says that he takes:  
 
‘Dispensability’ to be defined as follows: [A]n entity is dispensable to a theory if there exists 
a modification of that theory resulting in a second theory, functionally equivalent to the first, 
in which the entity in question is neither mentioned nor predicted. Furthermore, the second 
theory must be preferable to the first. (Colyvan 1998: 40) 
 
The same ambiguity between nominalizable and nominalized is present in Colyvan’s 
invocation of the notion of there existing a modification of all our scientific theories (of what 
I have been referring to as a nominalistic counterpart). If the truth conditions of there being 
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nominalistic counterparts to our best scientific theories is that we have such counterparts to 
hand, as it were, then it is false that such counterparts exist. But this, of course, is an 
intentional misreading. What is of relevance is whether or not it is possible to explicitly 
formulate such theories, in virtue of these theories existing in some weaker sense. 
 
What could ground this inference from the current failure of nominalization tasks to the 
stronger modal claim? It should be immediately clear that an inference from the failure to 
complete a task T to the claim that it is not possible (for some strong species of possibility) 
to complete T is not one that we normally take to be licit. The fact that in 1900 no-one had 
completed the task of building a rocket to the moon would not have licensed an inference 
to the claim that no-one could. Nor does it seem viable to say that inferences of this kind are 
permissible if we narrow the scope to formal or mathematical tasks. The move from the 
failure to complete some technical or mathematical task T to the claim that it is not possible 
to complete T is not one that we commonly make.  
 
Perhaps the argument for the modal claim does not rely on a straightforward inference from 
the failure of completion. Rather, the argument might be that it is the best explanation for the 
fact that the task has not been completed that it cannot be completed, in virtue of our best 
theories being unnominalizable. One could propose a disanalogy between the nominalization 
task and the rocket task. For the rocket task, the best explanation for the failure of its 
completion would have been a set of contingent facts about technological and scientific 
progress. However, the nominalist can offer a very good competing explanation for the 
failure to complete the nominalization task. First, completing the task is likely to be incredibly 
difficult. Secondly, it should be noted that those most suited to completing the 
nominalization task are not aiming to do so: 
 
This open research problem is moreover one that has so far been investigated only by 
amateurs – philosophers and logicians – not professionals – geometers and physicists; and 
the failure of amateurs to surmount the obstacles is no strong grounds for pessimism about 
what would be achieved by professionals. (Burgess & Rosen 1997: 70)11 
 
																																																						
11 It is the view, at least of Burgess I imagine, that the very fact that no “professionals” are carrying out the 
open research problem counts as evidence that it is misplaced.  
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Even though Burgess and Rosen are concerned with drawing out problems with current 
attempts to tackle the nominalization task, they too seem to admit that the current failure of 
attempts to do so provides no strong evidence for the strong claim that the task cannot be 
carried out. Such a response should be tempered, of course, by remembering that (at least 
some of) the problems that face nominalization programmes are philosophical, rather than 
technical: such as the delineation of posits of nominalized theories between nominalistically 
acceptable and nominalistically unacceptable.12 
 
What should our considered stance be towards nominalization programmes? Nothing I have 
said in this section casts doubt on the difficulties (both technical and philosophical) that face 
nominalization programmes. However, I think it is less than clear what our resulting credence 
ought to be in (3L/2C). It is clear that we ought not be confident that a nominalization 
programme can be carried out – doubt has been cast that any of our best scientific theories 
have been successfully nominalized. However, it is also not clear that we should be confident 
that the strong modal claim that our theories cannot be nominalized is true either: the 
inference from the current failure to the necessity of failure is shaky.  
 
How to resolve this problem of unclear credence in the indispensability premise is not 
straightforward. If, as the argument says when read strictly, we should believe in objects that 
are genuinely indispensable to our best scientific theories then we should reserve judgement 
about our ontological commitments if we should reserve judgement about claims about 
indispensability, as it seems we should. If, as the realist might suggest in response, we should 
affirm the existence of any objects that are purportedly referred to by our current scientific 
theories, then any notion of indispensability drops out of the picture: whether or not such 
reference is dispensable, our current best scientific theories certainly do currently contain 
terms that purport to refer to mathematical entities.   
 
This is all to say that there are additional reasons to trying to address the indispensability 
argument differently, in addition to the primary reason standardly given for moving away 




12 The distinction between outstanding technical difficulties and philosophical difficulties is not a sharp one. 
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1.3. The Maddy-Melia response  
 
In this section I discuss a recent prominent response to the Quine-Putnam indispensability 
argument that do not turn on the viability of a nominalization programme.  
 
According to (what I will call) the Maddy-Melia response, it is insufficient for the realist’s 
needs that terms that purportedly refer to mathematical objects indispensably feature in our 
best scientific theories. Rather, it must be the case that the mathematical objects purportedly 
referred to by these terms play a particular kind of role: a role roughly analogous to that 
played by unobservable physical objects.13 Considerations of indispensability simpliciter play a 
less prominent role: if the Maddy-Melia response is correct, then it is necessary but 
insufficient that terms that purport to refer to mathematical objects are indispensable to 
formulating our best scientific theories. If such objects play a different, lesser, role than that 
of unobservable physical objects, then terms referring to these objects can be indispensable 
without this being ontologically committing. (The notion of indispensability remains 
important, of course, in the sense that if (something like) Field’s programme can be 
completed, then mathematical objects do not indispensably play any role in our scientific 
theories). 
 
That an object can be purportedly referred to by a term that is indispensable to one of our 
best scientific theories, and yet rationally not believed in, gained traction after Maddy 
introduced an influential objection to the indispensability argument.14 An important part of 
this move is the rejection of confirmational holism. Across two papers (Maddy 1992; Maddy 
1994), Maddy sets out an example that demonstrates that an object can be appealed to in our 
best explanations of some observed phenomena without this motivating belief in that object 
from practising scientists. Maddy notes that in 1860, the atom became “the fundamental unit 
of chemistry” (Maddy 1994: 394), whilst it was not until 1913 that it was “accepted as real” 
(ibid): Colyvan notes that “renowned scientists such as Poincaré and Ostwald remained 
sceptical of the reality of atoms until as late as 1904” (Colyvan 2001: 92). In addition to this 
																																																						
13 This is motivated by the assumption that all interlocutors are scientific realists, of a certain kind. I discuss 
this assumption in much more depth in chapter 2. 
14 It is important not to infer from this that Maddy is a nominalist. Various time-slices of Maddy have been 
realists of various kinds, for various reasons. This ranges from realism on the basis of the possibility of set-
perception combined with Quinean motivations (Maddy 1990a), to a form of realism on the basis of a kind of 
naturalism with respect to mathematics as opposed to science (Maddy 1997), to her most current stance that 
both that nominalism (or what she calls Arealism) and Thin Realism (an idiosyncratic kind of truth-value 
realism) are consistent with mathematical practice, or ‘the facts of mathematical depth’ (Maddy 2011).  
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case, Leng (via Maddy) discusses appeals in scientific theories to so-called ‘idealised objects’, 
such as continuous fluids and frictionless planes (Leng 2002: 399; Maddy 1992). The standard 
suggestion is that purported reference to such objects can be useful, but not true: 
 
If we remain true to our naturalistic principles, we must allow a distinction to be drawn 
between parts of a theory that are true and parts that are merely useful. We must even allow 
that the merely useful parts might in fact be indispensable, in the sense that no equally good 
theory of the same phenomena does without them. Granting all this, the indispensability of 
mathematics in well-confirmed scientific theories no longer serves to establish its truth. 
(Maddy 1992: 281) 
 
That our theories indispensably contain terms that purportedly refer to objects, such that 
commitment to the existence of objects is not secured by this fact, does not tell us much 
about what these different kinds of roles are, nor how to sharply distinguish the two sets of 
objects. There is, also, controversy about whether or not confirmational holism is required 
for the indispensability argument, exactly what confirmational holism comes to (Morrison 
2017) and whether or not any version of confirmational holism is both plausibly true and 
able to play the role required for the indispensability argument (Field 2016: P-31; Morrison 
2011). 
 
There is reason to think, though, that the core insight of the examples given by Maddy and 
Leng (and others) comes apart from questions about the precise formulation of 
confirmational holism and its role in the indispensability argument. The insight seems to be 
that not all objects purportedly referred to by the terms of our scientific theories play the 
same kind of role and, as the examples attempt to illustrate, it is an open question as to 
whether or not all of these roles are such that a posit playing this role generates ontological 
commitment to that posit. For these reasons, recent debate has moved away both from the 
plausibility of the indispensability premise and the confirmational holism premise to asking 
something of a comparative question. This question is: do posited mathematical objects play 
the same kind of role in our scientific theories as unobservable physical objects (or: does the 
use of terms that purportedly refer to mathematical objects play the same kind of role in our 
scientific theories as the use of terms that purportedly refer to unobservable physical 




A recent non-Fieldian nominalist view answers ‘no’ to this question: mathematical objects 
play a merely representational role in our scientific theories, perhaps much as idealized objects 
are apparently appealed to in order to express facts about the objects that are the genuine 
subject matter of our theories. This response – which I will refer to as ‘representationalist 
nominalism’ and discuss in more detail in the next section – claims that this contrast in roles 
played by (purported reference to) mathematical objects and unobservable physical objects 
entails a contrast in the ontological attitude we ought to have to these objects. A Platonist 
answer to the question is: ‘yes’ – both mathematical objects and unobservable physical objects 
play a role in explanation and, furthermore, explanation is linked to existence in the 
appropriate way. 
 
1.4. The roles of mathematics 
 
In this section I draw out the ways in which the notions of explanation and representation 
have been appealed to by interlocutors on either side of the debate. I make the case that the 
debate can be aided by the development of accounts of mathematical explanation and 
mathematical representation, the tasks carried out in the remainder of the thesis. 
 
What, then, is the role that mathematics has, taken to be strongly disanalogous to the role 
played by terms that purport to refer to unobservable physical objects? The view has been 
expressed in a diverse number of ways. One way of understanding it is to take mathematics 
as something like a language, or framework, in which a theory’s content is stated or 
expressed: much as we might express a proposition by using a natural language, we express 
content about the world using mathematics (Field 2016: P-33). On this understanding, the 
disanalogy between unobservable physical objects and mathematical objects is stark: the 
former constitute the subject matter of our scientific theories whilst the latter are mere units 
of a language with which facts about this subject matter are expressed. A second way of 
understanding this role is to appeal to notions of indexing. This is a common way of 
understanding the role in the literature (Daly & Langford 2009; Melia 2000; Melia 2002). On 
this line, mathematics plays the role of pointing to physical facts, or to parts of the non-
mathematical world.15 This contrasts with the role played by unobservable physical objects, 
which do more than index parts of the world: they constitute facts, stand in causal relations, 
explain why bits of the world are as they are, and so on. A third way of understanding the 
																																																						
15 ‘Pointing to’ is not much less vague then ‘indexing’. 
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role is by characterising it as representational (e.g., Saatsi 2011). On this way of understanding 
the role, mathematics represents non-mathematical facts: whilst unobservable physical 
objects stand in causal and explanatory relationships to the world, the mathematical content 
stands only in a representational relationship to the world. There is reason to think that these 
three understandings are three ways of coming to understand the same phenomena: indexing, 
as discussed by Daly and Langford, and Melia, seems to have much in common with 
denotation, which in turn has much in common with the idea of mathematics being used as 
a language with which non-mathematical facts are expressed (in as much as we take the words 
of a language to denote their referents) – it is standard, also, to talk of language as 




The most prominent realist response to the Maddy-Melia manoeuvre is to accept that it is 
insufficient that mathematical objects are purportedly referred to by terms indispensably 
appearing in our best scientific theories, but to then press that mathematical objects do in 
fact play the kind of role that licenses belief in these objects. This is a rejection of the view 
alluded to above: that mathematics only plays an expressive, indexing or representational 
role. On this line, there is in fact a strong analogy between the roles played by unobservable 
physical entities and mathematical entities: both figure in our best explanations of observable 
phenomena (Baker 2005; Baker 2009; Bangu 2008; Bangu 2012; Lyon & Colyvan 2008: Lyon 
2011) On this line, even if it is permissible (in virtue of a denial of confirmational holism) to 
affirm the existence of some objects appealed to by our best scientific theories and not 
others, it is not permissible to affirm the existence of unobservable physical objects whilst 
rejecting mathematical objects, in virtue of these two kinds of objects playing the same kind 
of role in our scientific theories. Contra the views discussed above, mathematics is used to 
do more than express non-mathematical facts. This line of thinking results in the enhanced, 
or explanatory, indispensability argument, discussed in detail in chapter 2. The core of the 
debate becomes whether or not there are any cases of mathematical objects playing an 
explanatory role in the same sense that unobservable physical objects do, and whether the 
existence of such explanations genuinely licenses belief in mathematical objects in the same 
way that the existence of explanations of observable phenomena that appeal to unobservable 
																																																						
16 In §5.4 I set out the distinctions between representation qua denotation and other kinds of representation in 
detail. 
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physical objects (is purported to) license inference to the latter objects. The various 
components of this move in the debate are the focus of the next three chapters. For now, 
we can understand this view as consisting in Explanationism (the view that mathematics 
sometimes plays an explanatory role in our scientific theories) and the Explanation 
Conditional (the view that if mathematics sometimes plays an explanatory role in our 
scientific theories, then some form of mathematical realism is justified). Before concluding 
and beginning the discussion of mathematical explanation, in the next section I attempt to 




As noted above, the bifurcation of roles played by different objects in our scientific theories 
is often coupled with the claim that if mathematics only plays a representational or indexing 
role in our scientific theories then our world-oriented use of mathematics does not support 
realism about mathematics. Baker refers to these claims as representationalist nominalism whilst 
Liggins refers to the claim that mathematics plays an indexing/representational role in 
science (and not an explanatory one) as abstract expressionism (Liggins 2014: 600). For ease 
of reference, I will introduce two formulations of these claims: 
 
Representationalism: Mathematics merely plays a representational role in our 
scientific theories.17 
 
Representation Conditional: If mathematics merely plays a representational role 
in our scientific theories, then our world-oriented uses of mathematics do not justify 
mathematical realism (of some kind). 
 
Let representationalist nominalism, then, just be the conjunction of Representationalism and 
the Representation Conditional: the claim that, in virtue of the fact that the antecedent of 
the Representation Conditional is true, our world-oriented uses of mathematics do not justify 
mathematical realism (of some kind). I’ll briefly make some clarificatory remarks about the 
two components and their combination.  
 
																																																						
17 Representationalism, in this context, has nothing to do with Representationalism understood as a view about 
the characteristic properties of the mental and representational content (Dretske 1995; Tye 2000). 
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Representationalism and the Representation Conditional can come apart: one is a claim 
about the nature of world-oriented uses of mathematics and the other is a claim about what 
it is fair to infer from the former claim, if it is true. Baker does not explicitly assent to the 
Representation Conditional, although implicit assent can be read into the fact that he chooses 
to focus on arguing that mathematics plays an explanatory role, rather than arguing that the 
role played by mathematics that is agreed upon by all parties is, in fact, ontologically 
committing.18 The natural thought behind representationalist nominalism is that it is perfectly 
possible for mathematics to play a representational role even if mathematical objects do not 
exist19 (Liggins 2014; Melia 2000; Saatsi 2011; Yablo 2001; Yablo 2012).20 
 
Despite the name ‘representationalist nominalism’, it should be clear that nominalism about 
mathematics is not entailed by the combination of the two claims. In order for the two claims 
to entail nominalism, one would have to add the claim that the only good grounds for being 
a realist about mathematics is to be found in the details of our world-oriented uses of 
mathematics. Field makes a claim of this sort, when he says that “it becomes clear that there 
is one and only one serious argument for the existence of mathematical entities, and that is 
the Quinean argument” (Field 1980) as does Colyvan when he counts himself amongst the 
“mathematical realists […] who think that indispensability arguments offer the only good 
reason for that realism” (Colyvan 1998: 39). As noted in the introduction, however, in this 
thesis I do not consider so-called ‘easy’ arguments, and defending the claim that the 
prospects of realism rise and fall with indispensability arguments in turn requires defending 
the view that easy arguments fail.21  
 
																																																						
18 In a separate discussion, Colyvan explicitly states that mathematics playing a representational role is consistent 
with both realism and nominalism (Bueno & Colyvan 2011: 366). I discuss this in chapter 6. 
19 Being more careful: the representationalist nominalist claim must not be that the fact that mathematics merely 
plays a representational role is a positive reason to think that there are no mathematical objects. Rather, proponents 
ought to be understood as claiming that mathematics playing a representational role is consistent both with 
realism and nominalism. The further step to an endorsement of nominalism requires both an endorsement of 
something like Ockham’s razor (see Leng 2010: 259-260 for an example of this kind of reasoning) and a 
consideration of easy arguments.  
20 It is important not to take from this that these authors all explicitly endorse nominalist views about 
mathematics: as stressed above, one can hold the conjunction of Representationalism and Representation 
Conditional whilst being a realist (for example, if one is a Maddy-style Thin Realist), a nominalist or holding 
that ontological questions are malformed in some sense. Furthermore, although Representationalism can be 
read into all of the discussions cited above, some of the authors have made more recent suggestions that make 
it sound like they, in fact, deny Representationalism but ground their rejection of realism by maintaining that 
the Explanation Conditional is false. 
21 That easy arguments are unsuccessful may well also be entailed by the kind of Quinean world-view endorsed 
by someone like Field at the time of writing Science without Numbers. In this case, a direct argument wouldn’t be 
given for thinking that easy arguments are bound to be unsuccessful – rather, it would fall out of a general way 
of approaching ontological questions. 
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A brief clarification regarding Representationalism. A natural thought is that there is a 
straightforward sense in which Representationalism must be false, and not in the contentious 
sense in which the realist argues that it is false in virtue of mathematical objects playing an 
explanatory role. Rather, there seem to be many other roles played by purported reference to 
mathematical objects, and that this is part of the common ground. Mathematics, as 
emphasised by Field and others, plays a crucial role in facilitating inferences. So, too, in turn, 
might we think that some of these inferences have as their conclusions predictions, generated 
by the theory: the role of prediction, the thought goes, is distinct from the role of 
representation. Again, in turn, these predictions generated (in part) by appealing to 
mathematics are used to adjust the level of confirmation of our theories and, in turn, our 
credences in our theories (for a thorough discussion of the role of mathematics in 
confirmation, see Pincock 2012: 25-41). This, then, is a straightforward argument for 
thinking that Representationalism is false: mathematics is used to facilitate inferences, to 
generate predictions, to confirm theories and to help fix our credences, and this list is unlikely 
to be exhaustive. Therefore, the argument goes, mathematics does not play a merely 
representational role in our scientific theories. 
 
The representationalist nominalist has a route for accommodating this near-platitude about 
the various uses of mathematics, however. The representationalist nominalist should 
concede that mathematics plays these roles, but argue that they are roles that mathematics 
can play in virtue of mathematics playing a representational role. It is in virtue of the fact that 
mathematics is capable of representing the non-mathematical that it is possible to use it to 
facilitate inferences to non-mathematical claims and to generate predictions about the non-
mathematical. Indeed, one way of understanding representationalist nominalist attempts to 
accommodate seeming cases of extra-mathematical explanation (for example, the earlier 
Saatsi (Saatsi 2011)) is to understand it to be the claim that whatever explanatory role 
mathematics has is parasitic on its representational capacities in the same way.  
 
It is an important aspect of the representationalist nominalist view that Representationalism 
doesn’t imply that mathematics is dispensable: the representationalist nominalist explicitly 
eschews Field’s programme and those like it. (This, then, is why Colyvan refers to Field-type 
nominalisms as hard road responses and those that don’t endorse the dispensability of 
mathematics as easy road responses (Colyvan 2010)). Rather, such nominalists often accept 
that mathematics is indispensable for the purposes of expressing facts about the world. Such a 
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view, then, does not involve arguing against realism by aiming to demonstrate that 
mathematics is dispensable: rather, via the Representation Conditional, arguing that even 
though mathematics is indispensable, it is only used for ontologically innocuous purposes – 
the purpose of increasing our expressive capabilities. Although Yablo is not, if we are being 
careful, a nominalist, he captures this aspect of the view well: 
 
Numbers enable us to make claims which […] we […] would otherwise have trouble putting 
into words. (Yablo 2002: 230) 
 
For this reason, then, the representationalist nominalist disagrees strongly with Field’s claim 
that, in virtue of the fact that he is a nominalist he must “deny that it is legitimate to use 
terms that purport to refer to such entities, or variables that purport to range over such 
entities, in our ultimate account of what the world is really like” (Field 2016: 1). For the 
representationalist nominalist, our “ultimate account” may well be expressed using 
mathematics and it may well be necessary to do so, but this does not have ontological 
ramifications. 
 
Whether or not the first component of the representationalist nominalist view is true 
depends on whether or not mathematics plays an explanatory role: whether or not the 
antecedent of the Explanation Conditional is true. Mathematics’ explanatory role will be 
discussed in detail in chapters 3 and 4 so I will not discuss this any further here.  What about, 
then, the correctness of the Representation Conditional? It is difficult to find explicit defence 
of this claim in the literature. This is, perhaps, because the representationalist claim is often 
made in responding to the enhanced indispensability argument: in order to disarm the 
enhanced indispensability argument, the thought goes, it is sufficient to demonstrate that 
mathematics only plays a representational role.  
 
This is, of course, correct: if one wants to disarm the claim that mathematical realism is 
justified on the basis of the obtaining of the Explanation Conditional, then it is sufficient to 
demonstrate that its antecedent is false. Nevertheless, one might still have worries. Why 
should we think that it is safe to infer from the fact that mathematics only plays a 
representational role to the claim that our world-oriented uses of mathematics does not 
justify any form of realism? Take the following passage from Baker and Colyvan’s critical 
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discussion of Daly and Langford’s indexing response (which also doubles as a nice example 
of ‘indexing’ being taken to come to much the same thing as ‘representing’): 
 
According to [the indexing account], mathematical modelling works in much the same way 
as map making or any other representational strategy. The basic idea is nicely illustrated in 
simple cases where mathematics is used to stand proxy for physical properties. The account 
works well in cases such as those Melia used to motivate it, several of which involve facts 
expressing distance relations, for example “a is 63 centimetres from b”. The indexing strategy 
takes as its starting point the very natural thought that the above fact does not hold in virtue 
of the relation between a, b and the number 63; the fact in question is taken to hold by virtue 
of the spatial relationship between a and b, and this is all there is to it; this relationship is 
indexed by the number 63 but the number 63 does not enter into the relationship. (Baker & 
Colyvan 2011: 324) 
 
Yablo expresses a similar sentiment to the one that Baker and Colyvan ascribe to Daly and 
Langford: 
 
The metaphysical issue of whether physical circumstances demand mathematical objects is 
to be distinguished from the representational issue of what it takes to state those physical 
circumstances. Numbers and functions might indeed be indispensable for this purpose. But 
so what? (Yablo 2012: 1013) 
 
and suggests that some commentators are guilty of the slide 
 
from ‘we cannot say-without-numbers what a physically complex world would be like’ to ‘we 
cannot say what a physically complex world-without-numbers would be like’ (ibid: 1014) 
 
Let’s assume, for the rest of this section, that it is true that mathematics only plays the kind 
of role described above: that is, let’s assume that Representationalism is true and that Daly, 
Langford and Yablo are correct. On this line, all cases are like the above, where 63 does not 
enter into the fact being expressed: only a and b and relations between them, with these 
relations being taken to be physical relations. But, what about the fact that 63 plays a role in 
representing a and b and the relations between them? Does 63 enter into this fact?  
 
The role being played by 63 is supposed to be intuitively like the relationship between a map 
and the terrain being represented by the map. The facts expressed by the map (for example, 
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a fact about two roads being parallel to each other) do not hold in virtue of the map (only in 
virtue of facts about the roads) just as, for the representationalist nominalist, the facts being 
expressed using mathematics do not hold in virtue of any part of the mathematical realm but 
only in virtue of how things are with the “physical circumstances”, as Yablo has it. But what 
we are interested in is the fact that the map expresses this fact, even if the fact being expressed 
does not hold in virtue of the map. If pressed to explain the relationship between the map 
and the terrain being represented, we are likely to tell some vague story about the map and 
the terrain being similar in various senses: it is these facts about the map and the terrain, and 
the relations between them, that secures the fact that the map represents the terrain and can 
express the fact about the roads being parallel to each other.22 If indexing or representing is 
supposed to be analogous in this sense, then the realist may claim that we are forced into 
saying that 63 plays the role gestured at in the above passages in virtue of some of the 
relations it stands in. The fact being expressed using 63 does not involve 63, but the fact that 
63 is used to express this fact involves 63. It is important not to slip between these two facts: 
one is a fact about the world being represented by mathematics, the other is a fact about 
representation – about the representation, or expression, of the former fact using 
mathematics. A realist wishing to press back on the Representation Conditional, then, will 
say that surely 63 cannot stand in the kind of relationship it must do in order to be used to 
express a non-mathematical fact unless it exists: non-existents cannot stand in relations with 
existents. This suggests a potential non-explanatory route from our world-oriented uses of 
mathematics to a form of realism: somewhere in-between the indispensability argument and 
the enhanced indispensability argument. 
 
It seems that the truth of the Representation Conditional seems to currently turn on vague 
analogies between mathematics and maps and on what objects must be like in order to stand 
in the kind of relationships involved in indexing and representing. In order to adjudicate in 
a way that is both enlightening and non-question begging, we need to know more about the 
relationships involved in indexing/representing.23 In virtue of what does 63 express the fact 
about a and b and distance relations? Can mathematics play this kind of role without the 
																																																						
22 I discuss the various senses in which a map represents its target in detail in chapter 4. 
23 To be clear, this worry is very different to that expressed by Baker and Colyvan in their discussion. Their 
worry is that demonstrating how indexing works in very simple cases tells us nothing about whether or not 
mathematics is playing this kind of role in the more sophisticated cases found in our scientific theories, with 
the claim being that this is because in the non-toy cases the mathematics is doing more than representing: it is 
doing some explaining (Baker & Colyvan 2011). 
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existence of mathematical objects, or the truth of mathematical claims? These questions 
cannot be answered until more is known about mathematical representation.  
 
Here’s a second reason to be agnostic about the truth of the Representation Conditional. 
Whether or not mathematics’ representational capacity justifies some form of realism is an 
area of disagreement between those developing an account of this role. As mentioned above, 
Bueno and Colyvan claim that their account of mathematical representation is consistent 
with both realism and nominalism (Bueno & Colyvan 2011: 366), whilst Pincock suggests 
that his account requires, or suggests the truth of, a form of realism (Pincock 2012: 217) 
albeit one that stops short of Platonism.24 I consider this question in detail in chapter 6: this 
disagreement is raised here to simply make clear that we are not justified in endorsing the 
truth of the Representation Conditional without argument. If Pincock is incorrect that 
mathematics’ representational role requires a limited form of realism, reasons for thinking 
this must be provided by the representationalist nominalist. It seems clear, then, that how 
we should proceed is by developing an understanding of mathematical representation and 
adjudicating this disagreement between Bueno & Colyvan and Pincock. 
 
The situation is as follows. Some commentators appear to find it so clear mathematics’ 
representational capacity generates no metaphysical commitments that they do not offer a 
defence of the claim. Yet, equally obviously, the most natural way of making sense of talk of 
mathematical objects standing in relations to non-mathematical objects is to take both 
objects as existing. What is needed to adjudicate this discussion is an account of mathematical 
representation. This is the subject matter of chapters five and six.  
 
1.5. Potential road-work 
 
Before concluding, it is worthwhile briefly discussing an obvious response to the kind of 
representationalist nominalist view discussed above. Although the presentation is slightly 
different, the same basic complaint is made by both Colyvan (Colyvan 2010) and Pincock 
(Pincock 2012). The complaint proceeds from the observation that the representational 
nominalist view advises us not to believe our best scientific theories, but to have a different 
kind of attitude towards them. 
																																																						
24 As noted above, Pincock’s argument from our world-oriented uses of mathematics to a limited form of 
realism is more complicated than the kind of reasoning found in the indispensability argument and will be 
discussed in more detail in chapter 6. 
	 36 
 
Colyvan says the following: 
 
In short, there are limits to how much weaselling can be tolerated. J.R.R Tolkein could not, 
for example, late in the Lord of the Rings trilogy, take back all mention of hobbits; they are just 
too central to the story. If Tolkein did retract all mention of hobbits, we could be right to be 
puzzled about how much of the story prior to the retraction remains, and we would also be 
right to demand an abridged story – a paraphrase of the hobbitless story thus far. So too for 
weaselling wherever it arises – at least whenever the weaselling in question is radical enough. 
The problem we are confronting is that when the weasel oversteps the mark and tries to take 
back too much (as would be required to purge The Lord of the Rings of hobbits, or science of 
mathematical entities), we no longer have a grip on what is being said. (Colyvan 2010: 295) 
 
It’s worth briefly making clear what Colyvan means when he uses the term ‘weaselling’ when 
setting out this challenge. Colyvan is targeting Melia’s particular brand of representationalist 
nominalism, which involves the notion of weaselling. To weasel, in this sense, is to make two 
statements, the second of which ‘takes back’ some of what is entailed by the first. Melia 
argues that doing so is commonplace (consider, for example, someone who claims that they 
‘never drink alcohol, but I do drink exactly one beer on my birthday’). The relevant weasel 
here is when someone states something that entails the existence of mathematical objects (or 
states that they believe one of our scientific theories, etc.) but then asserts that they do not 
believe that mathematical objects exist. (Melia 2000; Melia 2002 for statements of the view 
and Knowles & Liggins 2016 for a defence of weaselling against some recent objections.) 
Weaselling is only one way of making sense of mixed-mathematical assertions (like those 
found in our scientific theories), assuming the truth of representationalism and nominalism 
about mathematics, and it is not the only way of doing so. However, the central export 
challenge is more fundamental than merely an objection to Melia’s weaselling account and 
targets any sort of representationalist nominalist view. 
 
Although he does not appeal to Colyvan’s earlier explication, in his discussion of fictionalism 
Pincock raises what seems to be a very similar challenge: 
 
This “export” challenge is to provide rules that will indicate, for a given context, which claims 
can be extracted from the fiction and taken literally as claims about the actual world. My 
argument is that this challenge cannot be met because any set of rules that are detailed 
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enough to do the job will presuppose knowledge of the actual world that we do not have. 
(Pincock 2012: 252) 
 
Here, Pincock is responding to fictionalist accounts. As suggested by the above quote, 
Pincock considers the possibility of candidate rules for extracting from our scientific theories 
some claims that ought to be literally believed, but argues that no such set of rules are feasible 
(Pincock 2012: 252-256). However, there are reasons to think that attempting to offer some 
set of rules with which we can extract some literal content from our scientific theories is 
exactly the wrong way to respond to this challenge – so it is unsurprising that Pincock’s good 
faith attempt to carry out this task on behalf of his opponent fails. The export challenge is, 
in fact, misplaced. As currently characterised, the representationalist nominalist view is that 
there are some truths about the non-mathematical world that, indispensably, must be 
expressed using mathematical vocabulary and predicates, combined with the further claim 
that mathematics playing this expressive (or indexing, or representational) role is consistent 
with us believing only what is expressed using the mathematical vocabulary. Once we are more 
explicit about the view that Colyvan and Pincock are objecting to, it becomes apparent that 
the export objection is misplaced. As the quotes above demonstrate, the demand seems to 
be for the representationalist nominalist to state non-mathematically that nominalistic 
content that, according to their view, can only be expressed mathematically. If this were 
possible, then representationalist nominalism would be false. The export challenge is 
therefore equivalent to stating that a condition on representationalist nominalism’s adequacy 
is that it is demonstrable that representationalist nominalism is false. Liggins nicely suggests 
that this request is “like responding to the claim that some cases are invisible by demanding 
to see them all” (Liggins 2012: 999). Another way of demonstrating the unreasonableness of 
Colyvan’s request is to take the (still currently vague) notion of mathematics as a language 
seriously. The primary purpose of language is to represent, or express, facts about the world. 
It seems reasonable that, even though we can provide translations into other languages, there 
is much content that we express using language that we can only express using language. 
Colyvan’s request seems akin to demanding that, if we wish to claim that language has this 
representational capacity as its primary function, we must be able to express without using 
language that which we express using language. Yet, I suggest, this is plainly an unreasonable 
demand to place on someone making this uncontroversial claim about language. As Yablo 




In order for the objection to be a good one, more must be done to motivate the demand 
that it is possible to state the content of our mathematical theories non-mathematically. It is 
not clear that Colyvan does much to motivate this. Pincock, however, comes closer to 
motivating such a demand, when he suggests that the demand that the representationalist 
nominalist state non-mathematically the content of our best scientific theories is grounded 
by a more basic demand that we must be told what it is that we are to believe. However, 
representationalist nominalists do often offer such a response: namely, that we should believe 
that our best scientific theories are nominalistically adequate (Leng 2010: 180; Balaguer 1998: 
131). A theory is nominalistically adequate if the theory’s nominalistic content is true. The 
representationalist nominalist advises us, then, not to literally believe our scientific theories, 
but to believe that their nominalistic content is true. This, then, should be the response to 
the export challenge. On one understanding, the challenge is question-begging and on 
another, more nuanced, understanding the representationalist nominalist has offered a 
response. 
 
There is, of course, outstanding scepticism about whether or not the notions of nominalistic 
adequacy and nominalistic content can be made sufficiently precise (as Pincock (Pincock 
2012: 253) notes). Amongst these are worries about whether or not the notion of 
nominalistic adequacy can be made precise without appealing to objects that are 
nominalistically unacceptable (such as possible worlds) (Ketland 2011)). There are also, of 
course, attempts to make the notion more tractable in a range of ways that differ in their 
degree of precision, such as Balaguer’s explication in terms of “the physical world [doing] its 
part in making [a theory] true” (Balaguer 1998: 135), Rosen’s explication in terms of concrete 
cores and exact intrinsic duplicates (Rosen 2001), Leng’s in terms of holding that the “non-
mathematical objects are the way they would have to be in order for the theory as a whole to be 
true” (Leng 2010: 199) and attempts to do so by introducing two new modal operators 
(Pettigrew 2012) or by appealing to the notion of grounding (Liggins 2016). 
 
There are two reasons for thinking that these worries should be held sharply apart from the 
export challenge. First, the worry that the notion of nominalistic adequacy might face its own 
problems does not mean that the nominalist fails to give an answer to Pincock’s non-
question-begging version of the export challenge: we are told explicitly what it is that we 
ought to believe, if not the literal truth of our scientific theories. There are problems with 
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nominalistic adequacy that any complete nominalist account of mathematics will have to 
address: but, similarly, realists rarely spell out and defend a particular account of truth when 
they counsel that we ought to literally believe our scientific theories.25 Second, there’s reason 
to think that some of the prominent problems with nominalistic adequacy are misplaced. It’s 
prima facie unclear as to why we ought to find it worrying that the notion of nominalistic 
adequacy cannot be made precise without appealing to abstracta like possible worlds or 
sentences (if, indeed, it is the case that attempts that explicitly aim to do without such notions 
(such as Pettrigrew’s) fail. The indispensability argument belongs to a tradition of 
determining our ontological commitments by considering our best scientific theories and, 
whatever formal features they may or may not have, the explication of philosophical 
concepts like nominalistic adequacy and nominalistic content are not a part of these best 
scientific theories.  
 
There may well be an argument from the fact that we cannot make the content of a 
philosophical concept clear without appealing to abstract objects to a form of realism about 
these objects, but this is distinct from the indispensability argument being considered here. 
Given that nominalistic adequacy is appealed to in spelling out a view in a debate that has 
moved past ontological commitment being linked to the mere mention of an object of a 
particular kind, to use this move to lump the nominalist with commitment to possible worlds 
(assuming, of course, the notion of nominalistic adequacy cannot be explicated without an 
appeal to such prima facie nominalistically-unacceptable objects) seems to be a retrograde step. 
Perhaps, indeed, there is a form of representationalist nominalism to be had about objects 
like possible words and properties and so on, rather than about mathematical objects! 
Whether this threatens an unacceptable regress or suggest a unified picture is an open 




In this chapter I have traced the indispensability argument through the work of Quine, 
Putman and Colyvan and argued that in order for the Melia-Maddy manoeuvre to be 
assessed, the following two tasks must be carried out. First, an account must be given of 
extra-mathematical explanation, in order to assess the realist’s dual claims that mathematics 
																																																						
25 This fact seems especially striking when, on the Platonist lines, the truthmakers of mixed mathematical-
empirical claims are presumably the relations stood in between mathematical and non-mathematical objects. 
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plays an explanatory role and that this role justifies (some form or other of) mathematical 
realism. This is the focus of chapters 2, 3 and 4. Second, an account must be given of 
mathematical scientific representation. This is required in order to assess the claim that the 
representational capacity of mathematics generates no metaphysical commitments. 
Developing an account of mathematical scientific representation is the task of chapters 5 and 
6. As demonstrated by the easy and natural arguments discussed briefly in §0.2 and Field’s 
programme discussed in §1.2, the explanationist route to realism is not the only route to 
realism and, similarly, the representationalist route to nominalism is not the only route to 
nominalism. Nevertheless, given that these two routes to their respective views link up to 
interesting open questions about explanation and representation simpliciter, and given the 
popularity of these two routes in the recent literature, they will be the focus of the rest of 
this thesis. 
 
In the next chapter I consider reasons given in the literature by realists for thinking that the 
route from mathematical explanations of non-mathematical facts need not go via a 
developed account of how these explanations function: that the presence of such 
explanations is sufficient in virtue of some other commitments that the nominalist opponent 



















The enhanced indispensability argument and 
inferential conservativeness 
 
In the previous chapter I argued that two conditionals are in need of assessing. One of these 
(the Explanation Conditional) is that if mathematics plays an explanatory role in science then 
our world-oriented uses of mathematics justify (some form of) mathematical realism. The 
enhanced indispensability argument, the focus of much attention in the recent literature, 
constitutes an inference from the existence of extra-mathematical explanations to the 
existence of mathematical objects. This chapter constitutes an argument for the claim that 
the enhanced indispensability argument cannot be assessed without an account of how 
mathematics plays this explanatory role. This claim may be quite fairly described as common-
sense (cf. Saatsi 2016b, where the point is forcefully pressed that this is how the debate ought 
to proceed). However, the mathematical realist claims to offer reasons for thinking that their 
opponent is already committed to thinking that the inference from the existence of extra-
mathematical explanations to mathematical realism is licit in virtue of some of their prior 
commitments. On this line, the realist’s opponent’s commitment to the inference being licit 
does not depend on any substantive claims about what extra-mathematical explanation is 
like, only on whether there are any such explanations. If this is right, then even though an 
investigation into extra-mathematical explanation might be interesting for the reasons set out 
in the introduction, it is not required for the assessment of the enhanced indispensability 
argument. It is worthwhile exploring this idea. This chapter consists in teasing these 
arguments out and arguing that they fail. 
 
In section one I set out the enhanced indispensability argument, making explicit its salient 
features, and briefly discuss one example of a mathematical explanation of a physical fact.26 
The primary argument given in the literature for thinking that the mathematical realist’s 
opponent is committed to holding that it is permissible to infer from the existence of extra-
mathematical explanations to mathematical realism involves appealing to the purported fact 
that the enhanced indispensability argument is inferentially conservative over the arguments 
																																																						
26 Further examples are set out in §2.7 as part of the set up for the assessment of accounts of extra-mathematical 
explanation in the next two chapters. 
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given for scientific realism. In short, the mathematical realist claims that the enhanced 
indispensability argument uses no inferential resources over and above those required to 
motivate scientific realism, a view that the mathematical realist’s opponent is taken to 
endorse.  
 
In section two I discuss this claim of inferential conservativeness, in section three argue that, 
depending on how it is understood, it is either undetermined by the available evidence or is 
false and in section four respond to objections. In section five I discuss and reject a second 
argument for thinking that the inference from the existence of extra-mathematical 
explanations to the existence of the mathematical objects (purportedly) appealed to in the 
explanation is licit: that, all other things being equal, there is an entitlement to a maximally 
general form of inference to the best explanation (IBE). 
 
In section six I take stock and make the argument that, given that the previous two arguments 
fail, the argument can be progressed by developing an account of extra-mathematical 
explanation. In section seven I set out some case studies of mathematical explanations and 
in section eight I set out some criteria to be used in assessing accounts of extra-mathematical 
explanation. This sets up the discussion of rival accounts of extra-mathematical explanation, 
which takes place in chapters 3 and 4. 
 
2.1. The enhanced indispensability argument 
 
In this section I set out the enhanced indispensability argument for mathematical realism. 
Here is the argument in its canonical form, as introduced by Baker. 
 
(1) We ought rationally to believe in the existence of any entity that plays an indispensable 
explanatory role in our best scientific theories. 
(2) Mathematical objects play an indispensable explanatory role in science. 
(3) Hence, we ought rationally to believe in the existence of mathematical objects. (Baker 
2009: 613)  
 
As discussed in the previous chapter, the enhanced indispensability argument is offered in a 
dialectical context in which interlocutors seem to agree that mathematics playing just any 
indispensable role in mathematics is insufficient to motivate an adoption of mathematical 
realism. Rather, the argument goes, it is the fact that mathematics plays an explanatory role 
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that we have reason to endorse mathematical realism. Although I will discuss some examples 
drawn from scientific practice in §2.7, the reasoning behind the enhanced indispensability 
argument can be seen with a simple example.27 The best explanation of a parent’s inability to 
evenly distribute their 23 strawberries amongst their 3 children involves the mathematical 
fact that 23 cannot be evenly divided by 3 – this mathematical fact, alongside some non-
mathematical facts, explains the impossibility (Lange 2013a: 488). No non-mathematical 
explanations are as unifying, as simple and as general as this mathematical explanation: 
further, without the mathematical fact, we seem to have no explanation at all. Via IBE, the 
thought goes, it should be inferred that the mathematical objects that are the subject matter 
of the mathematical fact (23 and 3) exist and that they stand in the mathematical relation 
appealed to in the explanation. If 23 and 3 exist, then mathematical realism is true.28 
 
In the literature, the truth of (2) is often equated with the existence of mathematical 
explanations of physical facts, like the strawberry explanation. These should be contrasted 
with non-mathematical explanations of non-mathematical facts (for example, explaining the 
start of the Russian Revolution by citing facts about the events that led up to it) and 
mathematical explanations of mathematical facts (for example, a proof that explains why a 
theorem obtains in addition to merely demonstrating that it does).  It is taken to be the case 
that if there are extra-mathematical explanations of physical facts then mathematical objects 
play an explanatory role in science. As I will return to in chapter 4, this step is not so 
straightforward: once we have an account of extra-mathematical explanation in hand, it will 
become apparent that a piece of mathematics can give us information to explanatory 
information without it being the case that it is a mathematical object that is playing an 
explanatory role. What is important, for the moment, is that the mathematical realist takes it 
to be the case that (2) is confirmed by the existence of mathematical explanations of physical 
																																																						
27 Given that the mathematical realist offers no reasons for restricting abductive inference to scientific contexts, 
it’s not clear why the enhanced indispensability argument could not proceed just by appealing to non-scientific 
examples.   
28 The existence of the mathematical objects appealed to in any given extra-mathematical explanation is enough 
to secure mathematical realism, if the view is understood as stating that there are at least some mathematical 
objects. The mathematical realist justifying their position using the enhanced indispensability argument has two 
routes from here. They can either argue that just the mathematical objects that appear in the best explanations 
of non-mathematical phenomena exist and that we lack justification for believing in any others: this would 
mirror the Quinean view that we are only justified in believing in the mathematical objects that are indispensable 
to our best theories, plus those required for rounding out (Quine 1986). The other route is to suggest that the 
enhanced indispensability argument can (indirectly) secure the existence of all mathematical objects. Such an 
argument might claim that the enhanced indispensability argument justifies belief in the objects present in extra-
mathematical explanations, and then a separate argument can be given from the existence of these objects to the 
existence of the wider class of mathematical objects. 
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facts. I set out a range of examples towards the end of this chapter. The existence or 
otherwise of such explanations has no bearing on the arguments discussed in this chapter, 
which concern the first premise of the enhanced indispensability argument. 
 
2.2. The inferential conservativeness argument 
 
In this section I discuss what I’ll call the inferential conservativeness argument. Let an 
argument A be inferentially conservative over another argument B just when A makes use 
of no inferential resources not made use of by B. A claim of inferential conservativeness is 
at the heart of the reasons mathematical realists give for thinking that their opponent ought 
to endorse (1). According to the inferential conservativeness argument, if the nominalist 
wishes to endorse arguments for scientific realism, they must endorse the first premise of 
the enhanced indispensability argument. This is because, the mathematical realist claims, the 
enhanced indispensability argument is inferentially conservative over the standard 
argument(s) for scientific realism. Below, I draw attention to places in the literature where 
mathematical realists present the inferential conservativeness argument. On closer 
inspection, the proposed inferential analogy is glossed far too quickly by the mathematical 
realist.  
 
As the quotes in §2.2.1 will make apparent, the inferential conservativeness argument is 
almost always given in terms of what forms of inference the mathematical realist’s opponent 
already accepts. This reference to the nominalist and the mathematical realist is, clearly, a 
stand-in for talking about a relationship between argument(s) for mathematical realism and 
scientific realism.29 Nevertheless, it clarifies issues to talk about relationships between 
arguments rather than talking about what forms of inference this or that interlocutor judges 






29 So long as scientific realism is understood in a particular way (see §2.2.1) it will always come out as consistent 
to endorse scientific realism but not mathematical realism. What the mathematical realist means is that reasoned 
endorsement of scientific realism entails endorsement of mathematical realism, as the only good reasons for 
endorsing scientific realism are also good reasons for endorsing mathematical realism (so long as there are 
extra-mathematical explanations). 
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2.2.1. The inferential conservativeness argument in the literature 
 
Contemporary mathematical realists take as their opponents those who wish to be realists 
about non-observable theoretical entities but non-realists about mathematical objects.30 This 
seems a sensible target: it would be churlish to require from the mathematical realist an 
argument for their view that could be accepted by (for example) a constructive empiricist or 
someone who thinks that our scientific theories are in no sense a source of ontological 
commitment, especially given the indispensability argument’s Quinean origins.31 However, 
this fact about the dialectic is important. It is this fact that the realist takes to justify their 
strategy of not launching an independent defence of IBE in the extra-mathematical case, but 
instead only noting that the intended audience of their arguments already endorse IBE. 
Without offering an independent argument for the acceptability of IBE in the extra-
mathematical case, a lot of weight is placed on the assumption that the nominalist enters the 
debate with a commitment to the inferential resources used by the mathematical realist. 
Accordingly, it is problematic for the mathematical realist if the inferential common ground 
is smaller than is presumed by the mathematical realist. 
 
According to the inferential conservativeness argument, then, the mathematical realist’s 
opponent has a pre-existing commitment to IBE being a valid form of inference which, when 
combined with the existence of extra-mathematical explanations, yields mathematical 
realism. The nominalist opponent is lumped with this inferential commitment, the thought 
goes, in virtue of their commitment to scientific realism. In one of the earliest contemporary 
discussions of the inferential resources appealed to by the scientific realist and mathematical 
realist, Colyvan says: 
 
[The indispensability argument] puts pressure on the marriage of scientific realism and 
nominalism […] because the style of argument is one which scientific realists already 
endorse. (Colyvan 2006: 227-8) 
 
This proposed inferential analogy between the nominalist and the mathematical realist is also 
appealed to by Baker: 
 
																																																						
30 Therefore, for the rest of this chapter, the term ‘nominalism’ refers to the view that we are justified in 
believing in (at least some) unobservable physical entities but not in mathematical entities.  
31 Although, as it happens, it isn’t so clear that the constructive empiricist can so easily be a mathematical 
nominalist (Leng 2010: 189).  
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A crucial plank of the scientific realist position involves inference to the best explanation 
(IBE) to justifies (sic) the postulation in particular cases of unobservable theoretical entities. 
(Baker 2005: 225). 
 
Making explicit the intended audience of his argument, he continues: 
 
Of course there are many philosophers who are not scientific realists, and alternative 
positions (notably constructive empiricism) are often based on a rejection of IBE in some 
or all cases. Nonetheless, the indispensability debate only gets off the ground if both sides 
take IBE seriously. (ibid) 
 
For Baker and Colyvan, then, the perceived common ground between the mathematical 
realist and their opponent is that they both take IBE seriously. What does it mean to take 
IBE seriously? On one reading of ‘take IBE seriously’, it is sufficient for taking IBE seriously 
that one endorses it in at least some contexts. That is, if one takes IBE seriously, that it is 
treated as an open question, for a given explanation or a given kind of explanation, whether 
or not IBE is a permissible form of inference. An example of a position that fails to take 
IBE seriously, in this first sense, would one according to which all forms of ampliative 
inference are rationally unjustifiable (whether inductive or abductive), or the narrower view, 
held for example by van Fraassen, that abductive inference in particular is never rational. 
According to van Fraassen, endorsing IBE in any context violates Bayesian 
conditionalization (van Fraassen 1989). Compatibilists (Henderson 2013; Lipton 2004; 
Okasha 2000; Weisberg 2009) claim in response that the two can be reconciled.32 So, an 
incompatibilist about IBE and Bayesianism like van Fraassen is an example of someone who 
Baker takes not to be in the intended audience of his argument. van Fraassen-style 
incompatibalism about abductive reasoning often goes hand-in-hand with non-realism about 
unobservable physical objects. I agree that the mathematical realist need not concern 
themselves with convincing such an incompatibabilist: the realist’s goal is to place 
mathematical entities on a par with theoretical physical entities, which is a strange goal to 




32 There are various routes to making abductive inference and Bayesian conditionalization compatible. For the 
remainder of this thesis, I will simply assume that one of these routes is viable.  
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On the other hand, part of the above passage suggests that Baker has something more 
restrictive in mind: he seems to lump in with constructive empiricists those who reject IBE 
in “some […] cases” (Baker 2005: 225). If it is right that Baker is claiming that the debate 
ought only to be between those who already accept that IBE is a valid form of inference, no 
matter what kind of explanation is under consideration and other features of the context in 
which the explanation is being offered, then his restriction is far too strict. For example, 
someone who generally accepts IBE but rejects it in cases where there is only one explanation 
to hand, or rejects it in very contested domains like metaphysics, is someone who rejects IBE 
in some cases. There can be meaningful and interesting disagreement between those who 
agree that (a) permissible abductive reasoning, in at least some cases, grounds explanationist 
arguments for believing in a particular entity and (b) there are explanations that, on their 
face, look extra-mathematical.  
 
Here is what I take to be the argument underpinning Baker and Colyvan’s comments, and it 
is to the below argument that I shall refer to as ‘the inferential conservativeness argument’:33 
 
1. Scientific realists ought to accept the form(s) of inference used in abductive 
arguments for scientific realism, under pains of their endorsement of scientific 
realism being unjustified. 
2. Mathematical nominalists are scientific realists. 
3. The enhanced indispensability argument is inferentially conservative over the 
abductive argument(s) for scientific realism. 
4. If an agent judges the form(s) of inference used in argument A to be permissible, 
and argument B is inferentially conservative over A, then the agent ought to judge 
the form(s) of inference used in argument B to be permissible. 
5. Scientific realists ought to accept as permissible the form(s) of inference used in 
the enhanced indispensability argument 
																																																						
33 Busch & Morrison (Busch and Morrison 2016) have also recently understood the kind of reasoning offered 
by the realist along similar lines, appealing to the notion of parity between the mathematical and scientific 
realists. Although I find the notion of arguments being inferentially conservative more illuminating, nothing turns on 
this. As will be made clear in §2.3.2, the substance of my response to the realist line of reasoning is distinct from 
Busch and Morrison’s, who aim to undermine parity/inferential conservativeness by making the claim that all 
the arguments for realism about unobservables are made in causal contexts whilst I explicitly ward against 
making this move. It’s also worth briefly noting that I’m sceptical that transforming arguments into a deductive 
form is always helpful. Doing so can flatten the kinds of reasons that philosophers give in favour of views and 
the kind of reasoning that goes on in philosophical debate. (Worrall makes a similar point forcefully when 
discussing probabilistic renderings of arguments found in the scientific realism literature (Worrall ms: 21-27)). 
However, when what is at issue is a delicate dialectical point about what an opponent is or is not already 
committed to, drawing out the line of reasoning explicitly is helpful, so I have done so here. 
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The inferential conservativeness argument, then, is an argument from claims about a 
relationship between arguments to a claim about what particular agents ought to endorse or 
believe. Before assessing the argument, two issues need to be clarified. The first concerns 
the claim that the mathematical realist’s opponent is a scientific realist and the second 
concerns which arguments are referred to by the term ‘the abductive argument(s) for 
scientific realism’. 
 
2.3. Against the inferential conservativeness argument  
 
2.3.1. Are the mathematical realist’s opponents scientific realists? 
 
Many commentators writing on the relationship between scientific realism and the enhanced 
indispensability argument have taken it as read that the mathematical realist’s nominalist 
opponent is, indeed, a scientific realist: the argument then proceeds by drawing analogies 
between the arguments given for scientific realism and the arguments given for mathematical 
realism. Most importantly, this claim is made by Baker and Colyvan, as indicated above. 
However, on many understandings of scientific realism, it must be false that the nominalist is 
a scientific realist. Leng notes that on a common understanding of scientific realism, the view 
entails mathematical realism. This is because our scientific theories “include amongst their 
laws assertions that imply the existence of mathematical objects” (Leng 2005b: 65).34 This 
fact about our scientific theories means that any explication of scientific realism in terms of 
truth or approximate truth will be inconsistent with the nominalism: if our best scientific 
theories are true, or approximately true, then so too are the components that involve the 
existence of mathematical objects.35 Assuming a face-value reading of existential statements, 
the approximate truth of our scientific theories entails the existence of mathematical 
objects.36 This fact is, of course, the only way to make sense of the debate discussed in §1.5 
																																																						
34 Saatsi also notes that “the Platonist could argue […] that the realist is committed to mathematical entities 
purely by virtue of [the truth/approximate truth] characterisation of realism” (Saatsi 2007: 23). I discuss Saatsi’s 
commentary in more detail in the next section. 
35 Perhaps the view that our scientific theories are approximately true could be made compatible with 
nominalism if the claim was understood as saying that our theories’ approximate truth means that the 
mathematical content is true simpliciter whilst the mathematical content is not. Such a route faces problems with 
mixed mathematical-physical content. 
36 The assumption of a face-value reading is a crucial one. Azzouni casts doubt on this face-value reading of 
existential locutions (Azzouni 2004; Azzouni 2010). If this programme can be made to work, meaning that the 
truth of sentences of the form ‘there exists a P’ does not entail that P really exists, then the nominalist can 
countenance both the approximate truth of our scientific theories and the non-existence of mathematical 
objects. Although the feasibility of an Azzouni-style response is of relevance to the nominalist’s chances, it 
	 49 
about nominalistic adequacy. It is unsurprising, then, that it is easy to find many of the 
mathematical realist’s nominalist opponents explicitly eschewing realism (at least when 
construed in terms of truth): for example, Leng states that she defends “an anti-realist view 
of science in rejecting the claim that we ought to believe that our best scientific theories are 
true or approximately true” (Leng 2010: 11).  
 
That nominalists are not scientific realists (at least when this view is understood in terms of 
truth), and that the mathematical realists plausibly faultily ascribe this view (or at least do so 
without nuance), clearly does not mean that there is nothing to the inferential conservativeness 
claim. Rather, the argument should be clarified. Indeed, some other comments from Baker 
and Colyvan bring this out. Baker, for example, says that “a crucial plank of the scientific 
realist position involves inference to the best explanation (IBE) to justify the postulation in 
particular cases of unobservable theoretical entities” (Baker 2005: 225), and Colyvan takes his 
opponent to be someone who is “happy to go beyond what is unobservable and posit 
unobservable entities” (Colyvan 2006: 2). Whether or not the nominalist’s opponent is 
someone who is properly described as a scientific realist, then, is both (a) dependent on one’s 
understanding of scientific realism and (b) irrelevant to the plausibility of the inferential 
conservativeness argument. Baker and Colyvan may well take themselves to be working with 
a conception of scientific realism whereby one can count as a scientific realist by believing in 
particular unobservable theoretical entities, whilst Leng (at least when she eschews scientific 
realism on the basis of its truth entailing mathematical realism) is working with a conception 
that appeals to notions of truth.  
 
What this brings out, however, is that what is at issue is whether or not the inferential 
resources standardly used to justify realism about particular unobservable theoretical entities 
are sufficient to also underpin the enhanced indispensability argument. This fact, combined 
with the fact that (at least some) nominalists explicitly disavow the label of ‘scientific realist’, 
means that continuing to appeal to this term is unhelpful. I will refer to ‘realism about 
unobservables’37 in places that others refer to ‘scientific realism’, to avoid this ambiguity and 
																																																						
seems orthogonal to whether or not the explanatory or representational uses of mathematics can justify 
ontological commitment. Indeed: even if Azzouni is right that the truth of seemingly-mathematically-committing 
sentences doesn’t entail mathematical realism, it may still be the case that such a view is entailed by mathematics’ 
explanatory or representational capacities, once fully analysed. These two routes to realism don’t go 
straightforwardly through the truth of sentences that (on standard, non-Azzouni, readings!) existentially commit 
us to mathematical objects but rather through the roles that mathematical objects play in scientific theories.  
37 Where ‘unobservables’ refers to unobservable physical posits of scientific theories.  
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to avoid the awkwardness of ascribing to the mathematical realist’s nominalist opponents a 
view that some of them eschew.38  The fact that the mathematical realist’s opponents cannot 
be universally construed as scientific realists plays a role in the next section. 
 
2.3.2. The many arguments for scientific realism and realism about unobservables 
 
Here is where we are. The inferential conservativeness argument is the main argument used 
by the mathematical realist to demonstrate that the nominalist ought to (or, rather, already 
does) endorse IBE in the extra-mathematical case, on the basis of their believing in the 
existence of particular unobservable objects on explanationist grounds. In this section I 
distinguish some different realist arguments and argue that the mathematical realist requires 
that the enhanced indispensability argument is inferentially conservative over a particular 
subset of these.  
 
One pressing question when assessing the inferential conservativeness argument concerns 
which arguments for realism about unobservables should be considered: which arguments 
must the enhanced indispensability argument be conservative over? Much as, as 
demonstrated in the discussion above, there are various views that are fairly characterised as 
scientific realist views, there are various related arguments given for these views. There are 
two distinctions that might be useful in delineating the various arguments and views. To 
demonstrate that these distinctions are exhaustive requires more work than can be done here: 
but hopefully the distinction is sufficiently fine-grained for current purposes. The first 
distinction is between local and global arguments, sometimes referred to as a distinction 
between retail and wholesale arguments (Magnus & Callender 2004: 321). Local arguments 
concern particular scientific theories, and can reasonably be characterised as the inferences 
and arguments performed by scientists. Fitzpatrick says that such local arguments take as 
their motivation “the weight of the particular first-order evidence that led scientists to accept 
the claim in the first place” (Fitzpatrick 2013: 3) where an examples of such claims include 
“that there are atoms, that past and present organisms on earth are the product of evolution 
by natural selection, that the continents move laterally on tectonic plates” (ibid). Local 
arguments contrast with global arguments. Global arguments take as their conclusion, rather 
																																																						
38 Another virtue is that whilst the umbrella term ‘scientific realism’ may well contain views like (ontic or 
epistemic) structural realism, ‘realism about unobservables’ does not. It is unclear whether or not the inferential 
conservativeness claim has any purchase at all on the ontic or epistemic structural realist: these are clearly not 
the kinds of realists that Baker and Colyvan take themselves to be targeting.	
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than any particular first-order scientific claim, a claim about scientific theories: that they (or, at 
least, a subset of them) are (approximately) true, for example. Claims like this contrast with 
rival claims about our scientific theories made by the realist’s opponent (for example, that 
they are merely empirically adequate). The no-miracles argument is standardly taken to be a 
global argument of this kind: it argues from one (purported) fact about our best scientific 
theories (that they generate novel successful predictions) to another (purported) fact about 
our best scientific theories (that they are approximately true), on the basis that the latter fact 
is the best explanation of the former fact.39  
 
A second natural distinction is between realist views that deal in the notion of truth and those 
that do not. The former include views, discussed above, that claim that our best scientific 
theories are (approximately) true. The latter are views that deal only in notions of existence: 
a view according to which atoms exist is a realist view (in the sense that it goes beyond what, 
for example, a constructive empiricist is willing to say) yet it does not go as far as to make 
the claim that our best scientific theories are true.40 Many so-called ‘selective realisms’ belong 
to this latter category. As discussed in the previous section it seems as if, whatever sense in 
which the mathematical realist’s opponent is a realist, it cannot be in the sense that they hold 
that our best scientific theories are (approximately) true. 
 
With these distinctions in mind, it should be asked which of these arguments the enhanced 
indispensability argument ought to be inferentially conservative over: would it be sufficient, 
for example, if the enhanced indispensability argument turned out to be conservative only 
over wholesale arguments, or only over arguments that had as their conclusion a claim about 
the properties of our scientific theories rather than about the objects that are the subject 
matter of these theories?   
 
Saatsi suggests that, in considering parallels between the use of IBE by the scientific realist 
and the mathematical realist, we ought to focus on the no-miracles argument, which is 
standardly understood as a global argument, with the conclusion a claim about our scientific 
theories: that they are (approximately true). He says we ought to do so because: 
 
																																																						
39 I won’t engage in evaluation of whether or not any of these routes are successful. It is also important to stress 
that the boundary between local and global arguments is unlikely to be sharp. 
40 Assuming a face-value reading of existential locutions, a realist view that deals in the notion of truth strictly 
says more than the view that deals only in existence.  
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[I]t makes the strongest, overarching use of IBE and all the standard super-empirical virtues. 
Furthermore, this argument does not only defend the reliability of the scientists’ inferences, 
but of inference to the best explanation more generally, as the No Miracles argument is 
justified by virtue of being itself a philosophical inference of the same form. (Saatsi 2007: 
26) 
 
In claiming that the argument that ought to be considered is that which goes further than 
defending “the reliability of scientists’ inferences” (ibid), it seems clear that Saatsi has in mind 
a global argument. There are two reasons why focusing on the global no-miracles argument 
isn’t appropriate.41 The first is that focusing on just this one argument is too narrow in scope. 
If Baker’s claim is (something like) “being a realist about unobservables on explanationist 
grounds requires endorsing a form of IBE that applies also in the extra-mathematical case”, 
then it doesn’t suffice that there is some explanationist argument for realism about 
unobservables that uses IBE in such a way. Baker requires something stronger. It must be 
the case that the enhanced indispensability argument is inferentially conservative over all of 
the good arguments for realism about unobservables. 
 
I take it, though, that the purpose in focusing on the global no-miracles argument is supposed 
to be that if the analogy does not hold up even in the strongest possible use of  by the realist 
about unobservables, then it is safe to infer that the analogy will not hold up in the cases 
where a less powerful form of abductive reasoning is used.42 The second reason, then, that 
we should not inspect the no-miracles argument is that the mathematical realist’s opponent 
cannot endorse the no-miracles argument, understood as a global argument for the 
(approximate) truth of our best scientific theories. This isn’t because endorsing this argument 
leads to endorsing the enhanced indispensability argument, via inferential conservativeness: 
rather, endorsing the no-miracles argument suffices for the truth of mathematical realism for 
the reasons discussed above. 
 
																																																						
41 It is important to note that Saatsi argues that even if we focus on the no-miracles argument, taking as its 
conclusion a claim about scientific theories rather than any particular unobservable posit, the proposed analogy 
between the inferential resources at use here and in the enhanced indispensability argument still does not hold 
up. Given that there is no need to defend the consistency of endorsing the global no-miracles argument but 
not endorsing the enhanced indispensability argument, I do not engage with this aspect of Saatsi’s argument. 
If Saatsi is correct that (in my terms) the enhanced indispensability argument is not inferentially conservative 
over the global no-miracles argument, and I am correct (as argued below) that the realist has not demonstrated 
that it is inferentially conservative over the local arguments, then the case against the inferential 
conservativeness argument is all the stronger. 
42 Given that one type of an argument takes as its conclusion a claim about unobservable objects and the other 
about properties had by scientific theories, it is not clear why we should think this. 
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Recall that in setting up the comparison, Baker says that the “scientific realist position 
involves inference to the best explanation (IBE) to justifies (sic) the postulation in particular 
cases of unobservable theoretical entities” (Baker 2005: 225). It is this use of IBE, then, that 
Baker has in mind. The global no-miracles argument is decidedly not a use of IBE to justify 
the postulation of unobservable theoretical entities in particular cases: it is the use of  to support 
a much more general claim, about our scientific theories. This mirrors, also, the use of IBE 
by the mathematical realist. Mathematical realists typically do not proceed by claiming that 
the existence of some extra-mathematical explanations justifies belief in mathematical objects 
as a class of objects, or that our mathematical claims in general are true: rather, they make the 
narrower claim that  can be used to justify belief in the mathematical entities appealed to in 
the particular extra-mathematical explanations (the truthmakers of the number theoretic 
theorem appealed to in the cicada explanation, for example).43 
 
It is clear in what Saatsi says in the above passage that he has in mind a global form of the 
no-miracles argument. Recall that a local no-miracles argument is that being made when 
reasoning from some particular best explanation of an observable fact to the truth of the best 
explanation and to the existence of the objects referred to in that explanation. In contrast, a 
global no-miracles argument appeals to (something like) a theoretical or philosophical 
explanation of a fact about our scientific theories as a whole: that they achieve novel 
predictive success. This is very much not the kind of explanation at play in cases of local 
abductive inference. In a given case of local abductive inference, the explanation in question 
will often be causal, but it is clear that whatever form of explanation is in question when the 
explanandum is ‘our scientific theories achieve novel predictive success’, it is not causal: the 
(approximate) truth of our scientific theories does not cause them to generate novel predictive 
successes. By requiring that we focus on the global no-miracles argument, Saatsi sets the bar 
too high. One can perfectly consistently be a realist about unobservables, motivated by a 
conjunction of local arguments, yet reject the permissibility of abductive reasoning outside of 
these narrow scientific contexts: i.e., in contexts in which the explanandum is a philosophical 
position like scientific realism or mathematical realism. So, the question must be: in providing 
arguments, that go via explanation, for realism about particular unobservable entities, do 
realists about unobservable entities make use of a form of inference that makes the enhanced 
indispensability argument inferentially conservative over these arguments? 
																																																						
43 See fn.28 for discussion of the relationship between realism about the particular mathematical objects present 
in a given extra-mathematical explanation and realism about the wider class of mathematical objects. 
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If the mathematical realist’s opponent is a scientific realist, then they must be of the kind 
that endorses the existence of particular unobservable entities, rather than of the kind that 
endorses the approximate truth of our scientific theories. Therefore, the arguments that they 
can reasonably be expected to give for their views about unobservable physical entities are 
non-global, local arguments, found in particular scientific contexts. If this is the case, then it 
is false that they endorse anything like the maximally general form of IBE that is appealed to 
in the first premise of the enhanced indispensability argument. The inferences that justify 
belief in particular unobservable physical objects are likely to be piecemeal and not 
susceptible to a general description.  
 
The following comment from Magnus and Callender is instructive: 
 
We acknowledge that it may be possible to get a kind of wholesale argument by discovering 
something in common among all good retail arguments for realism. Without trying to settle 
the larger epistemological issue, we offer a note of caution. Reflecting on the vast 
complexities of various historical episodes in science, there is no reason to think that the 
general assumptions one finds will be at all simple, natural or even non-disjunctive; in short, 
there is no guarantee that the criterion one finds will be either interesting or useful. So 
although it is logically possible to turn a retail argument into a kind of wholesale argument, 
the resulting wholesale argument may appeal to ‘general assumptions’ that are long, 
gruesome and can do none of the heavy lifting that wholesale arguments are usually meant 
to do. (Magnus & Callender 2004: 335) 
 
There is no need to share in Magnus and Callender’s pessimism about uniting local 
arguments to think that the surface level disunity of local realist arguments puts the ball in 
the mathematical realist’s court. In order to demonstrate that the enhanced indispensability 
argument is inferentially conservative over these local arguments for realism about particular 
entities, the mathematical realist must either demonstrate that for each of these arguments, the 
enhanced indispensability argument is inferentially conservative over that particular 
argument or they must identify some common core or structure of all of the local arguments 
and argue that the enhanced indispensability argument is inferentially conservative over it. 
The mathematical realist, it is clear, has not done this. It may well be that there is something 
that unites local arguments, that they all share inferential resources and that these inferential 
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resources just are those appealed to in the enhanced indispensability argument – but this is 
yet to be demonstrated. 
 
It is important to distinguish the response given here to another, similar, response that might 
be given. One alternate route to using the fact that the mathematical realist’s opponent must 
make use of local arguments, rather than anything like the no-miracles argument, to dislodge 
the inferential conservativeness claim would be to attempt to isolate something that is core 
to all of the local inferences and then argue that the inferential conservativeness claim is false 
relative to this core of all local arguments. One such attempt might be to argue that all of the 
local arguments for realism about unobservables appeal to only in causal contexts (Busch 
and Morrison are proponents of this kind of move (Busch & Morrison 2016)).44 There are a 
few reasons why this route isn’t a good idea. The first is a worry about question-begging: as 
Baker notes, “the ‘no noncausal explanation’ thesis is not one to which the nominalist can 
appeal without begging some pivotal questions” (Baker 2005: 229).45 The second are 
concerns about the truth of the claim that arguments for realism about particular observables 
are always deployed only in causal contexts (Colyvan 2001: 45) and the truth of the claim 
that extra-mathematical explanations are not causal. The first worry, here, is that in making 
this claim about the kinds of explanations at play in local cases (the claim that they are always 
causal) threatens to result in another rallying back and forth of cases, each to be defused one 
by one – the realist provides a local case that looks non-causal, the nominalist replies either 
that the context is in fact causal or, in fact, this is not a context in which IBE is licit, and so 
on. The second worry is that, as I discuss in miniature in §4.1 and throughout the rest of 
chapter 4, the claim that extra-mathematical explanations are not causal is, at the very least, 
not quite as straight forward as this response would have it and so it is unwise to make a 
crucial move dependent on this delicate question.  The third, and perhaps most pressing, 
																																																						
44 See, also, perhaps, Field’s preference for intrinsic over extrinsic explanations (Field 1980: 44). 
45 Baker’s point here is that ruling out IBE in non-causal cases begs the question against the realist exactly 
because mathematical objects are non-causal. Perhaps, though, for Baker to press the question-begging charge 
is to misunderstand the dialectic. The mathematical realist says: the inferential resources needed to secure 
mathematical realism just are those that the scientific realist appeals to in their explanationist arguments for 
their view. The Busch & Morrison-style response is: many plausible explanationist arguments for realism about 
unobservables require amongst their inferential resources only the permissibility of IBE in causal cases, not in 
all cases and, therefore, the enhanced indispensability argument is not inferentially conservative over arguments 
for realism about unobservables, because extra-mathematical explanation is noncausal. To point this fact out 
about the inferential resources of various explanationist arguments is not to make the much stronger claim that 
IBE is, in fact, only permissible in causal cases. The claim that explanationist arguments for realism about 
unobservables only require endorsement of IBE in causal cases is consistent both with IBE being applicable in 
extra-mathematical cases and IBE not being applicable in extra-mathematical cases.  
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though is that this route simply does work that is not dialectically required. Once it is pointed 
out that, under pains of not being automatically committed to mathematical realism, the 
mathematical realist’s opponent cannot support their realism about unobservables by 
appealing to the no-miracles argument and instead appeal to a diverse set of local arguments, 
the burden is on the mathematical realist to argue that the enhanced indispensability 
argument is inferentially conservative over these, or over some common core that they all 
share. There is no need to take the further epistemically risky step of identifying some 
common core to all of these local arguments and then arguing that the enhanced 




Here is a first worry about the response to the inferential conservativeness argument offered 
above. It is possible that the realist might respond to the above argument against the 
conservativeness claim by gesturing towards arguments for realism about unobservables that 
do, in fact, seem to rely on a form of abductive reasoning that is analogous to that used in 
the enhanced indispensability argument. A global argument that had as its conclusion that 
the objects that feature in our best scientific theories exist, for example, would be such a 
theory: it is also one that the mathematical realist’s opponent could accept to motivate their 
realism about unobservables (given that it does not appeal to notions of truth). According 
to this argument, the existence of unobservable entities is offered as the best explanation for 
the success of science. 
 
However, as I said above when discussing Saatsi’s response, it will not do to establish the 
realist’s conservativeness claim that there exists an explanationist argument for realism about 
unobservables that appeals to the liberal form of IBE that the mathematical realist requires. 
Instead, if Baker takes his target to be the nominalist who is also a realist about 
unobservables, something stronger must be the case. Remember, the claim to be argued for 
is that if the mathematical realist’s opponent wants their realism about observables to be 
rationally justified, doing so requires using a form of abductive inference that also applies in 
the extra-mathematical case. It must be the case that the only route to realism about 
unobservables is via this sort of global argument that (plausibly) uses the same inferential 
resources as the enhanced indispensability argument. To the contrary, in the scientific realism 
literature it is treated as a live option that there is a plausible local route to realism about 
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unobservable physical entities that, accordingly, does not appeal to the form of abductive 
reasoning that features in the first premise of the enhanced indispensability argument. 
 
This brings to bear, however, a second worry. It is important to note that the argument in 
this section is not the following: IBE, it turns out, is an admissible form of inference only in 
the particular local contexts that feature in arguments for realism about unobservable entities 
and, in virtue of extra-mathematical explanation not being such a context, IBE is not an 
admissible form of inference in the case of extra-mathematical explanation. As noted above, 
the mathematical realist is likely to maintain that arguments of this kind are question-begging, 
just as Baker considers the claim that IBE is permissible only in causal contexts to be question 
begging. Indeed, the inference from the fact that a set of inferential resources are used in 
local arguments for realism about particular unobservables to the claim that these are the only 
permissible forms of inference seems suspect. However, that is not the claim being made 
here. Rather, the claim is merely that the mathematical realist’s nominalist opponent is wise 
to support their realism about unobservables by appealing to a series of local arguments and, 
as such, they have no commitment to an overarching NMA-style endorsement of IBE. It 
may well be that the enhanced indispensability argument is inferentially conservative over all 
of these local arguments (and, as such, the nominalist cannot reject the enhanced 
indispensability argument without being inconsistent46) but the mathematical realist has not 
demonstrated this. Gesturing towards a general endorsement of abductive reasoning is 
unlikely to be a descriptively adequate account of the inferential resources used in the series 
of local arguments. 
 
2.5. The argument from abductive maximalism 
 
So, it seems false that in order to be a realist about unobservable physical entities on 
explanationist grounds, one must endorse a form of argument that the enhanced 
indispensability argument is inferentially conservative over.47 Whether or not any of these 
routes to realism about unobservables  that appeal to weaker inferential resources are 
successful is beyond the current scope: but what has been demonstrated is that the 
mathematical realist’s analogy between arguments for realism about unobservables and 
																																																						
46 Assuming that they accept that there are extra-mathematical explanations. 
47 The caveat that what is relevant is the possibility of being a realist on explanationist grounds is important: Baker’s 
claim is not that it is impossible to both be a scientific realist and a mathematical nominalist (as these views are 
clearly consistent), but rather that the only good arguments for the former view entail that the enhanced 
indispensability argument is a good argument. 
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mathematical realism are on shaky ground. In this section I discuss a second route that the 
realist might take to the conclusion that their opponent already does (or should) endorse a 
form of abductive reasoning sufficient to underpin the enhanced indispensability argument.  
 
This second way for the realist to move from the arguments for realism about unobservables 
to the enhanced indispensability argument is to argue that if one endorses abductive 
reasoning in one context then (absent good defeaters), this entails a commitment to a 
maximally general form of IBE. On this line of reasoning, even if the inferential resources 
used in arguing for realism about unobservables only involve abductive reasoning in 
restricted contexts, the reason that such reasoning is licit in this context is because IBE is 
generally permissible. In short, the realist may well claim that there is a default presumption 
in favour of a maximally general form of IBE, so long as one is not the kind of global sceptic 
discussed briefly in §2.2.1. Similarly, they might argue that the best explanation of the fact 
that abductive reasoning is licit in some cases is the truth of some more general claim about 
a link between explanation, ontology and truth. (I’ll just assume for the sake of argument 
that this last claim is not problematically circular). 
 
The abductive-maximalist’s claim can, of course, only be that there is a defeasible presumption 
of the permissibility of maximally general IBE. There are (at least!) two routes to defeating 
this presumption. The first is to gesture towards the diversity of kinds of explanation that 
can be given. Explanations can be given in a range of scientific contexts and these 
explanations, on the surface at least, seem to be very diverse. Moreover, there are 
explanations that can be given outside of scientific contexts: there are plausibly mathematical 
explanations within mathematics (Kitcher 1984; Mancosu 2001; Tappenden 2005) folk 
psychological explanations (Bennett 1991), moral explanations (Majors 2006) and normative 
explanations (Väyrynen 2013).48 Given the diversity of explanations and explanatory 
contexts, it may well be the responsibility of an abductive-maximalist to give an account of 
what it is that is present across all of the things that we call explanations that makes it such 
that, when we have the best explanation of some phenomenon, it is permissible to infer to 
																																																						
48 Of course, the existence of such explanations might not always be used as a premise in an abductive argument. 
The existence of an explanatory proof of a theorem is not used as a premise in an argument that the theorem 
holds. (However, Maddy’s notion of mathematical depth and the role that it plays in axiom choice has many 
parallels with appeals to the explanatory virtues in theory choice in science (Maddy 2011) so it is not entirely 
clear that explanation plays no justificatory role in mathematics).  
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the truth of that explanation and to the existence of the objects appealed to in the explanation 
(no matter what the explanation is). 
 
There are two prima facie reasons not to place too much faith on this response that draws 
upon the diversity of explanations. The first is that it rests on a delicate burden of proof 
question and I do not know whether there are interesting and decisive ways of resolving 
burden of proof questions. Does the burden of proof lie with the abductive maximalist to 
provide an account of what it is that all explanations have in common that makes IBE 
permissible, no matter what the domain? Or does the burden of proof lie with the opponent 
of abductive maximalism to argue what makes extra-mathematical explanation sufficiently 
different from the uncontroversial cases such that it is not safe to assume that IBE is licit in 
the former case? The second is that, as briefly discussed in the introduction, there is a 
burgeoning recent debate as to whether or not there are, in fact, explanations of various 
different kinds.49 Pursuing this response, then, relies on there, in fact, being various kinds of 
explanation. It is undesirable for this question to rest delicately on the outcome of these 
(reasonably orthogonal) investigations. 
 
Here is a more straightforward way of arguing against abductive maximalism. Abductive 
maximalism is false if there is a case of an explanation being the best explanation of a given 
explanandum yet it being illicit to infer to the truth of the explanation.50 And, indeed, there 
are such cases and they are cases that ought to be familiar from the literature on the Quine-
Putnam indispensability argument. Recall, in the previous chapter, the discussion of the 
motivations for moving from the Quine-Putnam indispensability argument to the enhanced 
indispensability argument. One of the motivations, cited by Baker in the paper in which he 
introduces the canonical form of the enhanced argument (Baker 2005) is that the Quine-
Putnam argument is usually understood as relying on confirmational holism and there are 
reasons to be suspicious of the holist presumption.51 Doubt is cast on confirmational holism 
by cases in which a theory appears to be accepted as the best theory of some domain, but 
																																																						
49 Reutlinger argues that the counterfactual account of explanation can accommodate even metaphysical 
explanation (Reutlinger 2017b), a form of explanation that seems (on the surface) most distinct from regular 
causal explanation. 
50 The sceptic about inference to the best explanation will argue that all situations are like this: in as much as 
the best explanation we have to hand is the best of the explanations that we have conceived of, rather than the best of 
all the logically possible explanations (van Frassen 1980: 143) This kind of case will not be of use here, given 
that all of those engaging in the debate must admit that inference to the best explanation is licit in at least some 
contexts. 
51 As in the previous chapter, I will bracket the debate as to whether or not confirmational holism is in fact 
required for the argument to go through: see Busch 2011 for discussion. 
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belief in the entities that the theory apparently refers to is withheld. It is less frequently noted, 
however, that these case studies also cast doubt on a general link between explanation and 
ontological commitment (what I have been calling ‘abductive maximalism’).52 
 
Recall from §1.3 that historical episodes are marshalled to cast doubt on confirmational 
holism.53 Maddy’s examples and their role in undermining the Quine-Putnam indispensability 
argument have received much discussion in the literature (even if this has subsided along 
with the increased prominence of the enhanced version of the argument): here I only want 
to stress the role that explanation plays in the atom case. The role of this historical episode is 
usually used to cast doubt on confirmational holism (or, at least, on its consistency with a 
broadly Quinean approach). However, if it is the case (as Maddy claims) that the atom was 
the fundamental unit of chemistry in the period 1860-1913 (during which scientists withheld 
belief), then this surely entails that the atom appeared in the best explanations of many 
observable phenomena during this period.54 Indeed, Maddy explicitly refers to “the 
explanatory power or the fruitfulness or the systematic advantages of thinking in terms of 
atoms” (Maddy 1992: 281) and notes that belief was withheld in the face of this. Maddy goes 
on to suggest that only once “directly verifiable” (ibid: 281) were atoms believed in. Both as 
a descriptive, historical claim and as a piece of ontological advice, this surely has its potential 
problems (see Colyvan 2001:  91-92, 98-105 for discussion). However, one need not endorse 
these further claims to agree that if the atom case study tells against confirmational holism 
(as the realist interlocutors seem willing to agree) then it also tells against abductive 
maximalism: the view that, no matter the context or the kind of explanation at hand, an 




52 Despite mentioning these cases in the same breath as introducing the enhanced argument, Baker does not 
seem to realise that the cases also cast doubt on one of the premises of the enhanced argument. An exception 
is Pincock, who appeals to Maddy’s discussion to motivate a restriction on permissible forms of inference to 
the best explanation (Pincock 2012: 215-17). However, the role that the cases play in the dialectic for Pincock 
is different from that which they play here: as noted, Pincock appeals to it in order to abstract away from it 
some general principles uses to place restrictions on permissible uses of inference to the best explanation 
(discussed below), whilst here it is used as a counterexample to abductive maximalism. 
53 As in §1.3 and as with Pincock’s discussion, this draws on Maddy’s discussions of the case (Maddy 1992; 
Maddy 1997). 
54 Maddy also discusses cases where idealized, false assumptions seem to play a crucial role in our best theories: 
“the analysis of water waves [assumes] the water to be infinitely deep”, for example (Maddy 1992: 281). 
However, to appeal to these cases to argue against abductive maximalism requires defending the claim that 
idealizations can play an indispensable explanatory role.  
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There is one tension with using the case study to undermine abductive maximalism in a way 
that is precisely analogous with Maddy’s use of the case to undermine confirmational holism. 
As Maddy notes, and is noted by commentators when discussing her objection (Busch 2011; 
Colyvan 2001; Leng 2010), the way in which the examples cast doubt on holism is by to 
demonstrating that there is a tension between the premise of the indispensability argument 
appealing to naturalism and the premise appealing to confirmational holism.55 56 However, 
in the enhanced indispensability argument, there is no naturalistic premise for abductive 
maximalism (underpinning the first premise) to be in tension with. A proponent of a 
maximally general form of IBE, then, could well put their foot down, as it were, and claim 
that a maximally general form of IBE is permissible and that the scientists described in 
Maddy’s historical case study are simply mistaken.   
 
However, if the proponent of abductive maximalism is going to take the route of maintaining 
that the scientists in question are mistaken, then they ought to provide an argument in favour 
of the view. Without such an argument, it is a natural presumption to take scientific practice 
as a guide. As has been stressed in this chapter, those arguing from the existence of extra-
mathematical explanation to mathematical realism offer little explanation as to why we ought 
to think that all the things that we call explanations are such that they can generate ontological 
commitment. 
 
2.6. Moving forward 
 
What the above reveals is that trying to eke out a commitment to a form of abductive 
reasoning that can do the work in the extra-mathematical case, just using the resources of 
arguments for the existence of unobservables that the nominalist may or may not be 
committed to, is untenable. The range of various views and various arguments in this vicinity 
is too diverse for the mathematical realist to hit their target. Establishing that the enhanced 
																																																						
55 Some presentations (Colyvan 2001: 11) do not separate out the naturalism premise and the confirmational 
holism premise. Presentations that do so (Leng 2010: 7) are more helpful for exactly the reasons that become 
apparent when discussing Maddy’s objection. 
56 There is ambiguity as to exactly what naturalistic premise must be accepted for the counterexamples to have 
their intended effect. Recall that, rather than confirmational holism being in tension with the naturalism premise 
of the indispensability argument as standardly understood (as entailing commitment to only the entities 
appealed to by our best scientific theories), the counterexamples show that confirmational holism is in tension 
with (something like) a broadly naturalistic spirit. An endorsement of a broadly naturalistic spirit, however, is 
decidedly not what the naturalism premise of the indispensability argument states. I won’t pursue this point 
here. Colyvan argues that the atom case can be made consistent with a broadly naturalistic spirit, so long as we 
have a nuanced understanding of what the latter requires (Colyvan 2001: 98-105). 
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indispensability argument is inferentially conservative over every argument that might justify 
realism about unobservables is a tall order and not one that mathematical realists have begun 
to undertake. Furthermore, establishing that the enhanced argument is inferentially 
conservative over a particular argument that might justify some form of realism (as may be 
the case for the global no-miracles argument57) is not enough to lump a realist about 
unobservables with a form of abductive reasoning that can be used in the extra-mathematical 
case. There is also, I have argued, no good reason to endorse a maximally general form of 
IBE and that there appear to be historical case studies that tell against it.  
 
A nominalist may choose to stop here and argue that the mathematical realist has not done 
the work necessary to demonstrate that the nominalist is committed to the right kind of 
abductive inference. This, however, would amount to winning on a burden-of-proof 
technicality. The realist can quite reasonably press that (at least some of) the purported cases 
of extra-mathematical explanation sure look like the kind of local cases in which the nominalist 
is willing to entertain commitment to the entities involved. At best, the realist continues, it 
should be treated as an open question as to whether these cases function in the sort of way 
that licenses ontological commitment. I think this is right. Even if, as I have argued, the 
realist arguments (that their opponents are already committed to thinking that the cases of 
mathematical explanation are the right kind to license ontological commitments) fail, the 
next step for both parties should be to inspect such cases in more detail. 
 
There are two sorts of route to addressing whether or not IBE is permissible in the extra-
mathematical cases. In this section I set these two options offer some considerations in 
favour of taking the route that I do in the rest of the thesis. 
 
The first route is to try and abstract formal restraints from historical case studies. Suggestions 
of this form will isolate properties of a given explanation that make it such that IBE is 
permissible or impermissible: attempts to provide some kind of rule as to when inference is 
licensed in local cases. Pincock’s suggested restriction is of this form.58 In this short section 
I discuss Pincock’s restriction as an example of this strategy. 
 
																																																						
57 Although, as before, see Saatsi’s scepticism (Saatsi 2007). 
58 So, too, is Busch’s requirement that the mathematics that appears in the best explanations of non-
mathematical facts is consistent across theory change (Busch 2011). 
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Pincock uses historical case studies (like the case that Maddy appeals to concerning the 
history of the atom, discussed in §2.5) to motivate the following formal restriction on the 
permissibility of IBE: 
 
Sensitivity: a claim that appears in an explanation can receive support via inference to the 
best explanation only when the explanatory contribution tells against some relevant 
alternative epistemic possibilities. (Pincock 2012: 214) 
 
There are two things wrong with this formal requirement. The first is that it does not appear 
that it can do the work that Pincock requires of it – that is, it cannot rule out IBE in the 
extra-mathematical cases.59 However, there is a second, more relevant problem. If we think 
that there is a diverse range of kinds of explanation, then there is no guarantee that a formal 
requirement that a causal mechanical explanation (for example) must meet for IBE to be 
permissible will also be a requirement than an explanation of a different kind must meet. 
That is, even if Sensitivity is a formal requirement on the permissibility of IBE for the kind of 
explanation that the atom explanation belongs to, the mathematical realist may well press 
that there is no good reason to think that it is also a formal requirement on the permissibility 
of IBE in the extra-mathematical case.  
 
																																																						
59 Here is why. Pincock uses a variation on Cicadas to argue that extra-mathematical explanations will not meet 
Sensitivity. The variation is identical to Cicadas save for the fact that the number-theoretic theorem is replaced 
with the claim that “prime periods of less than 100 years minimize intersection (as compared to nonprime 
periods)” (Pincock 2012: 212) (emphasis in original). Pincock does not offer a principled way of working out, 
in any given case, what the relevant epistemic possibilities are. The invocation of the notion of relevance makes 
working out what the epistemic possibilities are more difficult still: it is natural to think that relevance is 
determined by contextual factors. If the epistemic possibilities are to be indexed to particular users of an 
explanation, then it seems that there could be some user for which ‘there are no natural numbers’ is an epistemic 
possibility. If so, then it seems like, for this user in this context at least, Cicadas does indeed tell against (at least 
one of) the relevant epistemic possibilities even if it does not tell against some alternatives concerning how 
many natural numbers there are. It would be a peculiar result that IBE is permissible for this agent, given their 
background beliefs, but not for another agent, even when faced with the exact same explanation. The second 
worry concerns whether or not Sensitivity is different from the requirement that the mathematical fact is 
indispensable, in addition to being explanatory. If it is the case that there are two equally good explanations (a 
claim Pincock endorses (ibid: 216)) with different number-theoretic theorems, then this seems like a 
demonstration that neither of these number-theoretic theorems are indispensable to the explanation. This 
worry stems from an ambiguity in Baker’s formulization of the EIA. One way of reading the premise 
concerning explanatory mathematics is as saying that there is some particular mathematical fact that features in 
the best explanation (or all of the best explanations) of some particular explanandum, whilst another reading is 
that there is some particular explanandum such that all of the best explanations of that explanandum feature 
some mathematical fact (where the mathematical fact need not be common across all of the explanations of 
the explanandum). It is not immediately clear which of these requirements the mathematical realist should be 
required to meet. Given the possibility of constructing any mathematical claim using set theory, meeting the 
stronger requirement will be difficult.  
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This suggests a second route: getting clearer on how extra-mathematical explanation 
functions and using this to investigate whether, for each example of extra-mathematical 
explanation appealed to by the mathematical realist, an inference to the existence of the 
relevant mathematical object is justified. Hopefully the contrast with Pincock’s methodology 
is clear. Whether or not an explanation satisfies Sensitivity, for Pincock, doesn’t turn on any 
further details of what kind the explanation is or on how the explanans plays a particular 
explanatory role: it is met (or not) depending on the relationship between the explanation 
and the agent’s epistemic possibilities. This route carried out in the next two chapters, in 
contrast, involves getting clearer on how the paradigm cases of extra-mathematical 
explanation function, by constructing an account of extra-mathematical explanation. 
 
2.7. Examples of extra-mathematical explanation 
 
In this section I set out four explanations that make use of mathematics: Cicadas, Levy walks, 
Bridges, and Pendulum. I make explicit the features that are salient for the discussion of 
accounts of extra-mathematical explanation in the next two chapters.  
 
The first explanation is that which has dominated discussion of extra-mathematical 




Cicadas spend much of their lives under the ground, and then emerge from the soil 
for a short period to mate and die. A striking fact about the life-cycle lengths of some 
particular North American cicada species is that they are prime: either 13 or 17 years, 
depending on the particular species. Biologists have offered an explanation of this 
striking fact, one that Baker formalises as follows: 
 
(1) Having a life-cycle period that minimizes intersection with other (nearby/lower) periods 
is evolutionarily advantageous. 
(2) Prime periods minimize intersection (compared to non-prime periods). 
(3) Hence, organisms with periodic life cycles are likely to evolve periods that are prime. 
(Baker 2005: 233) 
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Combined with information about ecological constraints, the explanation yields 
specific predictions about cicada life cycles (or, alternately, explanations of more 
specific explananda): 
 
(4) Cicadas in ecosystem-type E are limited by biological constraints to periods from 14 to 
18 years. 
(5) Hence, cicadas in ecosystem-type E are likely to evolve 17-year periods. (ibid) 
 
Biologists suggest that in the evolutionary history of the cicadas, the cicadas shared 
their environment with creature that both also had periodical life cycles and that it 
would have been evolutionarily advantageous for the cicada to avoid – such as 
predators. This is the justification for (4) – by minimizing the intersection of their 
periods with others, the cicadas minimize the extent to which they interact with their 
periodic predators.  
 
The first salient feature of Cicadas: it is ambiguous as to whether or not it is dialectically 
permissible to appeal to it when mounting the enhanced indispensability argument. The 
explanandum of the more general form of Cicadas appears to have mathematical content: on 
a face value reading, it appeals to a mathematical feature of the life-cycles of cicadas, their 
primeness (Bangu 2008). As such, it seems as though appealing to Cicadas is illegitimate in 
the same way as appealing to mathematical explanations of mathematical facts: in that it is 
question-begging (Leng 2005a: 174).  The second salient feature is that Cicadas is an 
optimality explanation. That is, it explains the presence of some trait or behaviour by 
appealing to the fact that it is optimal. In this case, having prime periods is the optimal 
strategy for avoiding periodical predators.60 There is reason to think that similar mathematical 
optimality explanations can be found throughout the scientific literature (Baron 2014).61 That 
mathematical optimality explanations are likely to be widespread strengthens the demand for 
a general account of the functioning of such explanations, rather than piecemeal analyses of 
particular cases. In a recent discussion, Lange notes a worry that the standard explananda of 
presentations of Cicadas are not those that have an extra-mathematical (or what he calls 
																																																						
60 When discussing optimality more generally, it’s important to note that there may well be discrepancies 
between the observed behaviour and the behaviour that the theory indicates is optimal and therefore predicts 
that the organisms will exhibit. This can be bracketed here, however. 
61 Chirimuuta suggests that efficient coding explanations in cognitive neuroscience are extra-mathematical 
explanations in the same way that optimality explanations from biology are (Chirimuuta forthcoming). I return 
to Chirimuuta’s discussion in chapter 4.	
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‘distinctively mathematical’) explanation. I will leave the explanations in the paradigmatic 
form in this chapter – but see fn.87 for a response to Lange on this point. 
 
Baron provides one other example of a mathematical optimality explanation, which I am 
calling Levy walks, involving the predation patterns of sharks (Baron 2014), set out below. 
The purpose is to support the claim that explanations like Cicadas will be widespread. 
 
 Levy walks 
 
Some animals, when they are foraging in environments with relatively few prey, move 
in a pattern described as a Lévy walk: “a random sequence of larger jumps, 
interspersed with several smaller jumps with frequent reorientation” (Baron 2014: 
476). Why do the animals move in this way? Mathematics is used to demonstrate that 
moving in accordance with a Lévy walk maximises the chances of coming across 
targets, given that targets are distributed randomly and relatively scarcely. This fact, 
combined with facts about it being adaptively beneficial for the animals to move in 
a way that maximises their chances of finding prey and information about accordant 
trade-offs, explains why it is that some animals move in accordance with a Lévy walk. 
(ibid) 
 
Here is the third case, concerning the bridges of Königsberg, introduced into the literature 




Everyone who attempted to walk across the seven bridges of Königsberg, passing 
over each bridge exactly once, failed to do so. Why? The islands and bridges 
constitute a connected graph, each island taken to be a vertex and each bridge taken 
to be an edge between two vertices. Let a Eulerian Path be a path through a 
connected graph that goes through each vertex precisely once. The Euler Path 
Theorem states that any connected graph with greater than two vertices (of odd 
degree) lacks a Eulerian Path. The fact that the bridges of Königsberg constitute a 
connected graph with four vertices with an odd degree, combined with the Euler 
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Path Theorem, explain why it is that it is impossible to walk across all the bridges 
exactly once. 
 
The first salient feature of Bridges is that it is not drawn from scientific practice, unlike Cicadas 
and Levy walks. An adequate account of extra-mathematical explanation ought to account for 
these non-scientific cases, too. The second salient feature of Bridges is that when it is 
discussed, it is often unclear quite what the explanandum is supposed to be. The first option 
is that what is being explained is that one particular attempt to complete a tour of the bridges 
failed. The second is that all such past attempts to complete a tour of the bridges failed or 
that all future attempts will fail. The third possible explanandum is the modal fact that it is 
(for some sense of possibility) impossible to complete a tour of the bridges – this is what 
Pincock takes the explanandum to be (Pincock 2007; Pincock 2012). Given that an 
explanation of the third explanandum will trivially also count as an explanation of the first 
two possible explananda, this seems good reason to take the modal fact as the thing to be 
explained. This makes Bridges importantly different from the optimality cases like Cicadas and 
Levy walks, a third salient feature. Perhaps it is necessary that given the adaptive conditions the 
cicada evolved to have prime-numbered life-cycles but it is presumably no more necessary 
than that – but what is to be explained in Bridges is the impossibility of touring the bridge 
system in a particular way. 
 
Here is a final explanation with mathematical content, adapted from Woodward (Woodward 




The period of a pendulum T has the value 2.46 (seconds). Why? The length of the 
pendulum L has value 1.5 and gravitational field strength g has value 9.81. The period 
of a pendulum T is related to the length of the pendulum L in the following way: 𝑇 = 2𝜋 𝐿/𝑔. This explains why, given that the length of the pendulum and the 
gravitational field strength have the values that they do, the period of the pendulum 
has the value 2.46 seconds. 
 
Is Pendulum an extra-mathematical explanation like Cicadas, Levy walks, and Bridges? Plausibly 
not. This suggests a bifurcation of the notion of a mathematical explanation. (Lange provides 
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a double pendulum example as a case of an explanation that involves mathematics that fails 
to be an extra-mathematical explanation (Lange 2016b: 25-26).  I’ll say more about this 
distinction in §2.8.2. below. 
 
2.8. Criteria for assessing accounts of extra-mathematical explanation 
 
In this section I set out some criteria that successful accounts of extra-mathematical 
explanation will have to meet. They will be used in the next chapter to assess recently 
proposed accounts and the account endorsed in chapter 4 will be argued for by 
demonstrating that they meet the criteria set out in this section. 
 
2.8.1. Accounting for case studies 
 
An obvious desideratum for an account of extra-mathematical explanation is that it sheds 
light on the case studies set out above. It is obviously constitutive of accounting for the case 
studies that, according to the successful account of extra-mathematical explanation, the case 
studies come out as being explanations: even minimal consistency with the judgements of 
experts as to what does and does not count as an explanation requires that an account of 
extra-mathematical explanation should not entail that Cicadas, for example, is no explanation 
at all of the primeness of the life-cycles. This is consistent, however, with diverging from any 
judgements made by non-philosophers about what role the mathematics is doing: biologists, 
for example, are to be trusted to identify genuine explanations of phenomena but not 
necessarily to make careful philosophical judgements about the contributions of this or that 
part of the explanations. A successful account of extra-mathematical explanation should also 
tell us how the mathematical component of the explanation functions in the explanation, too: 
whilst it is (near trivially) true to say that extra-mathematical explanations partially function 
by providing facts about the target system that are not contained in the explanandum, this 
weak claim tells us nothing about what the mathematics is doing in the explanation. 
 
2.8.2. Distinguishing extra-mathematical explanations and explanations that use 
mathematics 
 
As discussed above, the kinds of explanations required to buttress the enhanced 
indispensability argument are those in which mathematics explains a non-mathematical fact. 
A common sentiment is that in order to count as an extra-mathematical explanation, it is not 
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sufficient for an explanation to merely contain some mathematics or for the explanation to 
express its content using mathematics (if these two come apart). Lange, for example, 
comments that extra-mathematical explanations are such that they differ “profoundly from 
ordinary scientific explanations employing mathematics” (Lange 2013a: 486) and also 
approvingly quotes Steiner’s remark that “one senses a striking difference” between these 
two kinds of explanations that feature mathematics (Steiner 1978).  
 
If any scientific explanation that featured mathematics counted as extra-mathematical then 
very many scientific explanations would count as extra-mathematical as very many scientific 
explanations are expressed using mathematics. Considering Pendulum will be illustrative. I will 
assume that Pendulum does not count as an extra-mathematical explanation. The 
mathematical statement that features in the explanation should be understood as a 
mathematical expression of a physical fact: namely, a counterfactual-supporting physical 
regularity.62 It is this physical regularity that obtains between the pendulum period, the period 
length and the gravitational field strength that does the explanatory work, rather than a 
mathematical fact. Pendulum illustrates the fact that merely having mathematical content is 
not sufficient for being an extra-mathematical explanation. An explanation appealing to a 
mathematized law statement (for example) is not a mathematical explanation in the sense that 
Baker and Colyvan intend merely in virtue of it containing a mathematical statement (Baker 
2005; Lyon & Colyvan 2009).63  
 
A viable account of extra-mathematical explanation will shed light on this widely shared view 
that there is a difference between mathematical explanations like Cicadas and Levy walks and 
mathematized explanations like Pendulum. Given the schematic nature of accounts of extra-
mathematical explanation to date, however, there is no agreed upon (or even particularly 
well-worked out) means of distinguishing extra-mathematical explanations from scientific 
explanations that use mathematics. One criterion for an account of extra-mathematical 
																																																						
62 There are difficult questions about what the expressed fact comes to, given that it is plausibly a law. Assuming 
Humeanism about the laws of nature, the law in Pendulum is a worldly regularity expressed using mathematics. 
Although it is expressed using mathematics (making Pendulum a mathematical explanation in a weak sense), the 
law featuring in the explanation is made true by its instances – the regularities that make it true that pendulum 
lengths and gravitational field strengths stand in the relations expressed. Although some interlocutors found 
later in the thesis (such as Marc Lange) have decisively non-Humean accounts of the laws of nature, nothing 
said in this thesis turns on accepting Humeanism. 
63 Referring to equations given in accounts of coding schemes, Chirimuuta says that: “the question now is, why 
should we think of this as a mathematical fact? One reason to think that the facts summarised in the resource precision 
curves are straightforwardly empirical is that the points plotted in such graphs are the outputs of equations which 
have empirically measurable parameters, such as the length and width of transistors” (Chirimuuta forthcoming: 
13). 
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explanation, then, is plausibly that it must elucidate on this distinction between mathematical 
explanations and explanations that use mathematics. To make this a deriseratum is not, of 




Two arguments have been considered in this chapter for the view that assessing the truth of 
the Explanation Conditional need not go via the development of substantive accounts of 
extra-mathematical explanation. I have argued that both arguments, the argument from 
inferential conservativeness and the argument from abductive maximalism, fail. 
 
I argued that, despite it being taken for granted by many in the literature, the extent to which 
the mathematical realist’s opponent is a scientific realist is both ambiguous and orthogonal 
to the substantive debate at hand. What is at issue is whether or not, in order to maintain 
reasoned belief in unobserved physical posits of our best scientific theories, it is necessary to 
endorse the form of abductive reasoning that is appealed to in the enhanced indispensability 
argument. I introduced the notion of inferential conservativeness and argued against the 
realist claim. The argument from inferential conservativeness fails. I also argued that there is 
no default entitlement to abductive maximalism and that, in fact, there are reasons to think 
that it is false. I distinguished two ways in which the debate might proceed from this 
perspective and argued in favour of one of them. This sets up the discussion in the next two 















Extant accounts of extra-mathematical 
explanation 
 
In the previous chapter I made the case that, because the arguments from inferential 
conservativeness and abductive maximalism fail, the debate about mathematics’ explanatory 
role should be advanced by developing accounts of extra-mathematical explanation. This is 
in addition to the light that doing so can shed on interesting more general questions about 
the nature of explanation, as discussed in the introduction. In this chapter, then, I discuss 
accounts of extra-mathematical explanation that have been presented in the recent literature. 
Whilst some of the problems facing these accounts turn on their idiosyncrasies, a recurring 
theme is that (at least) many of the accounts fail because they cannot account in the right 
way for that the explananda of extra-mathematical explanations depend on the facts doing 
the explaining. This naturally suggests an account along the lines of the account argued for 
in the following chapter. 
 
I first discuss two accounts that are anti-exceptionalist in character. I first discuss Baker’s 
schematic extension of the deductive-nomological account of explanation and argue, 
amongst other faults, that it fails to distinguish between mathematical explanations of 
different kinds. I then briefly discuss and reject Lyon’s extension of Jackson and Pettit’s 
program account of explanation. I then discuss two accounts that appear to be exceptionalist 
in character: Lange’s constraint account and Pincock’s abstract dependence account. I argue 
that whilst these accounts successfully capture some distinctive features of the relevant set 
of explanations, they suffer from problems that suggest we ought to look elsewhere.  
 
3.1. Exceptionalism and anti-exceptionalism 
 
It will be useful to briefly recall the distinction between exceptionalism and anti-
exceptionalism. An account of some kind of explanation is exceptionalist if it treats that kind 
of explanation as non-accomodatable by existing accounts of explanation. It is tempting, at 
first, to think that being exceptionalist about a kind of explanation is tantamount to holding 
that kind of explanation to be sui generis. But this is too quick. One might be an exceptionalist 
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about extra-mathematical explanation whilst not holding it to be sui generis. If one held that 
neither extra-mathematical explanation nor metaphysical explanation (qua grounding) could 
be accommodated by standard causal accounts of explanation but nevertheless held that a 
single account could be given of these two special kinds of explanation, this would be anti-
exceptionalist but would not involve taking either of the two special kinds of explanation to 
be sui generis. A kind of explanation’s status as sui generis depends on its relation to the 
complete set of other kinds of explanation, whilst a kind of explanation’s status as anti-
exceptionalist (in the current context) depends on its relation to standard accounts of 
explanation. 
 
3.2. The entailment account  
 
A natural thought is that mathematics deals in certainties: if we use mathematics to explain 
some phenomenon, then the certainty present in the mathematics carries over to the 
explanandum. In their own ways, the entailment account and the constraint account attempt 
to make this intuition precise. In this section I set out the entailment account, discuss Baker’s 
relationship with anti-exceptionalism, and discuss some of the advantages of the entailment 
account before arguing that it nevertheless fails. 
 
3.2.1 Baker’s diffuse anti-exceptionalism 
 
Despite the fact that much of the debate following Baker’s original presentation of the 
enhanced indispensability argument proceeded without a particular account of explanation 
in mind, the paper does in fact briefly work through some leading accounts of explanation 
and suggest that the case study he discusses in that paper (Cicadas) fits into these accounts. It 
is obviously false, then, to claim that no work has been done until reasonably recently on 
trying to accommodate extra-mathematical explanation into existing accounts of explanation. 
Indeed, this section of the Baker paper (Baker 2005: 233-236) can be treated as an argument 
for a kind of diffuse anti-exceptionalism: not only can extra-mathematical explanation be 
accommodated by one existing account of explanation, it can be accommodated by many! 
 
There are a few tensions, however, between Baker’s attempt in Baker 2005 and the task of 
this chapter and the next. The first is that Baker’s purpose in briefly demonstrating the prima 
facie plausibility of Cicadas being accommodated by these accounts of explanation is not the 
production of a descriptively robust account of extra-mathematical explanation. Rather, his 
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aim in that passage is to bolster the judgement that Cicadas is genuinely an explanation: that 
the number-theoretic theorem does explanatory work and that Cicadas counts as evidence 
that mathematical objects can play the same kind of role in our scientific theories as 
unobservable physical objects. In later discussions, Baker makes the case for this by appealing 
to the judgements to practising scientists (Baker 2009: 616). That Baker has this aim in mind 
is reflected in the fact that he demonstrates that Cicadas comes out as an explanation on many 
different current accounts of explanation, rather than just one. This is a sensible hedge-
betting strategy if one is attempting to demonstrate that Cicadas is an explanation, rather than 
a non-explanation: if Cicadas is an explanation according to many accounts of explanation 
then, no matter which of these ends up being vindicated by separate debate in the general 
philosophy of science, the result that Cicadas is an explanation is secured. However, if the 
aim is to pinpoint how extra-mathematical explanation actually functions, to pinpoint in virtue 
of what the mathematical fact plays a role in the explanation, demonstrating that Cicadas is 
consistent with many accounts of explanation does not get us very far.  
 
Finally, that Baker’s aim in this passage is not to provide a descriptively adequate account of 
how extra-mathematical explanation is reflected in the fact that he provides reasonably 
shallow glosses of the kinds of explanation he discusses. This is reflected most clearly in his 
rejection of accommodating extra-mathematical explanation by appealing to causal accounts 
of explanation. Baker notes that “according to the causal account, explaining a phenomenon 
involves giving a description of its various causes” and claims that this is a defeater for any 
attempts to accommodate extra-mathematical explanation into a causal account of 
explanation because “mathematical objects (if they exist) are acausal” (Baker 2005: 234). At 
a suitably high-level of abstraction it is, of course, true that current causal accounts of 
explanation claim that explanation involves giving a “description of [the explanandum’s] 
causes” but Baker does not attempt to discuss the details of how any contemporary causal 
accounts of explanation spell this notion out. I discuss this point in much more detail in the 
next chapter, so will say no more here: this is raised here to motivate developing the project 
of the Baker passage in more depth, the task of this chapter. 
 
In addition to his brief discussion and subsequent rejection of causal account, Baker sets out 
how Cicadas can be accommodated by the pragmatic account of explanation and the D-N 
model of explanation. Pragmatic explanation seems ill-suited to licensing inference to the 
existence of an object on the basis of it being purportedly referred to by the premise of an 
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explanation. So, in this section, I take Baker’s proposed extension of the D-N account of 
explanation (as offered to bolster the judgement that Cicadas is genuinely an explanation) and 
see how it fares as a descriptively adequate account of extra-mathematical explanation. 
 
3.2.2. The D-N account of explanation 
 
According to the D-N account of explanation, explanations take the form of deductive 
arguments. These arguments take as their conclusion the explanandum and as their premises 
the explanans. The following conditions are placed on an argument counting as an 
explanation of its conclusion. First, the explanandum must be a logical consequence of the 
explanans. Second, the explanans must contain at least one law and the law(s) must be 
essential to the explanation (where for a law to be essential to the explanation is for the other 
premises to not deductively entail the conclusion). Finally, the explanans must have empirical 
content and the explanans/premises must be true. 
 
As is well known, the D-N account of explanation suffers from problems: I will only very 
briefly rehearse them here. The first problem is that of explanatory asymmetry. There are 
pairs of deductively valid arguments that appeal to the same law(s), satisfy the requirements 
and where an explanandum of one argument is an explanan of the other. However, it is true 
of these argument pairs that only one of the arguments is intuitively an explanation.64 The 
second problem is that of explanatory irrelevance. In these cases, an argument can be given 
that satisfies the requirements yet with premises that seem in some sense irrelevant to the 
conclusion/explanandum.65 In short, then, the D-N account is taken to be unsuccessful in 
virtue of there being deductive arguments that satisfy the conditions even though the 
explanans fail to jointly explain the explanandum.   
 
It is tempting, then, to reject a potential entailment account of extra-mathematical 
explanation at this point. A competing consideration, though, is that there are some prima 
																																																						
64 The canonical example: the length of a flagpole’s shadow can be derived from information about the height 
of the flagpole, the angle the flagpole makes with the sun and laws governing the propagation of light; the 
height of the flagpole can be derived from information about the length of the shadow, the angle the flagpole 
makes with the sun and laws governing the propagation of light. Yet, it is possible to explain the shadow length 
by citing the information about the height, angle and laws but intuitively impossible to explain the height by 
citing information about the shadow length, angle and laws. 
65 A deductive argument can be provided that has as its explanandum that some hexed salt dissolved and that 
has as its premises: the salt was placed in water, all hexed salt dissolves and that the salt was hexed. Yet, it is 
clear that the salt being hexed does not explain its dissolution (Salmon 1984: 94).  
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facie reasons for thinking that extra-mathematical explanation is amenable to a treatment 
along deductive-nomological lines. The standard portrayal of the Cicadas explanation, 
appealed to by both supporters (Baker 2005) and critics (Saatsi 2011) of its use in the 
enhanced indispensability argument, is indeed in terms of premises and conclusions. Second, 
as seems to be the case in at least some of the case-studies considered, extra-mathematical 
explanations plausibly demonstrate that given the mathematical fact, the explanandum must 
obtain. An account of explanation with deductive entailment seems a way of accommodating 
this distinctive feature of extra-mathematical explanation. Furthermore, an entailment 
account being inappropriate for understanding some kinds of explanation doesn’t 
automatically mean that it cannot be used to understand some other kind of explanation. 
Finally, there are interesting problems with the entailment account as an account of extra-
mathematical explanation which can help guide us to a successful account. 
 
3.2.3 The entailment account of extra-mathematical explanation 
 
In this section I set out the entailment account of extra-mathematical explanation. Baker 
presents Cicadas in the form of a deductive argument with the explanandum as its conclusion 
and the number-theoretic theorem featuring amongst the explanans. Even though this is not 
the form in which the explanation is given in the biological literature (Yoshimura 1997; 
Goles, Oliver & Markus 2001), this needn’t be a serious problem.66 As noted above, Baker 
presents Cicadas in a schema that resembles the kind of argument that, according to the D-
N account, constitutes an explanation. It’s ambiguous, though, that Cicadas cites any laws. 
Here are the most plausible candidates:  
 
Having a life-cycle period which minimises intersection with other (nearby/lower) 
periods is evolutionarily advantageous.  
 
Prime periods minimise intersection. 
 
Baker notes the possible lack of laws in Cicadas and responds in the following way: 
 
One point in the platonist’s favour is that the purely mathematical premise of the cicada 
inference is in the form of a general law, in this case a theorem of number theory. A 
																																																						
66 Assuming some reasonable account can be given of the relationship between the deductive argument and 
what is found in the biology literature. 
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broadening of the category of laws of nature to include mathematical theorems and 
principles, which share commonly cited features such as universality and necessity, would 
count the mathematical theorem (2) as explanatory on the same grounds as the biological 
law (1). (Baker 2005: 235) 
 
This move reflects the fact that the law-like statements featuring in D-N explanations do not 
play their role in the explanation in virtue of the lawfulness, but in virtue of their generality. 
The suggestion offered by Baker, then, is to weaken the second requirement of the D-N 
account, I assume such that it now says one of the following: 
 
2*. The explanans must contain at least one law or mathematical theorem and the 
law(s) and/or mathematical theorem must be essential to the explanation (a law is 
essential to the explanation if the other premises alone do not deductively entail the 
conclusion). 
 
2**. The explanans must contain at least one premise that holds universally and/or 
with necessity and this premise must be essential to the explanation (a premise is 
essential to the explanation if the other premises alone do not deductively entail the 
conclusion). 
 
3.2.4. Problems with the entailment account 
 
3.2.4.1. Empirical content and independent support  
 
That is the solution to the problem raised (and solved) by Baker. Here, however, is a second 
problem. The number-theoretic theorem (and the Euler Path Theorem and the claim about 
twenty-three’s divisibility) lack empirical content. On the surface, then, the requirement that 
each explanan must have empirical content is a decisive objection to the entailment account: 
mathematical facts are not the right kind of thing to have empirical contents.67 However, one 
of the motivations behind this requirement is that each explanan must have received 
independent support. Given this motivation, the proponent of the entailment account could 
																																																						
67 As has been pointed out this issue is slightly complicated in some of the cases: the number-theoretic theorem 
in Cicadas, for example, is already couched in terms of ‘periods’, an empirical concept (Baker 2017: 194). Lange 
offers related explanations for the standard optimality explanations that are he claims are the genuine extra-
mathematical explanations (Lange 2013a: 499). I return to Lange’s comments about what the distinctively 
mathematical explanation is in the cicada case in fn.87. 
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suggest the following fix. The proponent of the entailment account of extra-mathematical 
explanation could suggest that the requirement that the premises can be given some 
independent support should be widened to include support from mathematical practice. That 
is: even if the number-theoretic theorem cannot receive empirical support (at least, not in 
the usual way), in virtue of lacking empirical content, a modified version of the entailment 
account could permit that independent verification of the premises of an explanation can 
come from mathematical practice, in addition to observation. On this line, cases of extra-
mathematical explanation are not like faulty non-explanations that contain premises that 
cannot receive independent support in virtue of lacking empirical content: rather, we have 
good reason to believe that prime periods minimise rather than maximise intersection. 
Indeed, we have a proof that prime periods minimise intersection, rather than having some 
other effect on the chance of intersection. 
 
There is, however, a problem with this extension of the entailment account. At least two 
kinds of commentators partaking in this debate will demur from the claim that the number-
theoretic theorem gets independent support from mathematical practice. First are realists 
who claim that the only good reasons we can have for believing a mathematical claim stem 
from mathematical practice (Colyvan 1998: 39). If we accept that the number-theoretic 
theorem gets independent support from mathematical practice, then the indispensability 
argument begins to seem surplus to requirements. This leads to a more pressing concern. 
Many nominalists will simply reject the claim that the number-theoretic theorem receives 
independent support from mathematical practice (at least, if the support is understood as 
being reason for thinking that the theorem is true).68 This leads to subtle concerns regarding 
question-begging.  
 
Of course, one desired consequence of developing an account of extra-mathematical 
explanation is that it might shed light on the mathematical ontology question in a way that is 
principled. Is it a problem, then, that a modified entailment account must assume that the 
mathematical fact appealed to by an extra-mathematical explanation is true? I think so. If 
either the realist or nominalist is to use the correct account of extra-mathematical explanation 
to argue in favour of their view, their argument must be of the form: there are reasons for 
preferring x that hold for all reasonable participants of the debate, regardless of one’s 
																																																						
68 I say many nominalists will balk at this claim (rather than all) because of the (at least, logical!) possibility of 
being a nominalist in the sense of holding that there are no mathematical objects but a truth-value realist – 
holding that the sentences of mathematics are (sometimes) true.  
	 78 
ontological aim, and it is a consequence of x that y (where x is the correct account of extra-
mathematical explanation and y is some view in the metaphysics of mathematics).    
 
3.2.4.2. Irrelevance and mathematical explanations of different kinds 
 
The extended entailment account, then, is plausibly question-begging. Here is a second pair 
of problems for the entailment account. On the kind of account being considered here, a 
mathematical sentence is explanatory if it features in a deductive argument with the 
explanandum as its conclusion. However, not all mathematical sentences will be relevant to 
the conclusion but all mathematical sentences could be a premise of a deductive argument 
that has as its conclusion the explanandum, given the necessity of mathematical facts. A 
mathematical fact that is intuitively irrelevant to the explanation could be added to an extra-
mathematical explanation and count as explanatory. The problem of explanatory 
irrelevancies is, of course, one of the standard objections to the D-N account of explanation 
– so far, then, there seems nothing special about this problem.69 
 
However, there is a deeper, related problem. Recall Pendulum, an example of an explanation 
that had mathematical content without counting as an extra-mathematical explanation. What 
is wrong with Pendulum is not that the pendulum law is irrelevant to the explanation.70 Indeed, 
any account of relevance that had this consequence would be faulty. The mathematically 
stated pendulum law surely counts as relevant to the explanation: it is therefore a relevant 
piece of mathematics. However, Pendulum is not an extra-mathematical explanation. As it 
stands, the entailment account fails to distinguish between mathematical and mathematicised 
explanations. In both kinds of explanation, on the entailment account, the mathematical 
sentence is performing the same role: logically entailing the explanandum. As it stands, I do 




69 It is tempting to appeal to this modal character of both entailment and the mathematical fact to run a version 
of the asymmetry objection. Assuming that mathematical facts are necessary if true, then by swapping the 
number-theoretic theorem in Cicadas with the explanandum generates an explanation of the number-theoretic 
theorem, according to the entailment account. However, the resulting (purported) explanation of the number-
theoretic theorem is not an extra-mathematical explanation, given that the explanandum is a mathematical fact. 
70 This objection would also apply to a version of the entailment account that is supplemented with a suitably 
updated account of relevance (cf. Baron 2016b: 20-23). 
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3.3. The program account 
 
Extending the D-N account, then, does not seem a fruitful way of understanding extra-
mathematical explanation. In this section I briefly discuss another recent anti-exceptionalist 
account, Lyon’s program account of extra-mathematical explanation. 
 
Lyon (Lyon 2012) develops a suggestion of Colyvan’s that extra-mathematical explanation 
could be accommodated by Jackson and Pettit’s (Jackson & Pettit 1990b) program account 
of explanation. Jackson and Pettit contrast two different explanations of the same 
explanandum, one of which is taken to be a process explanation and the other a program 
explanation. Consider Putnam’s (Putnam 1975: 295) two explanations of the fact that a 
square peg fails to fit through a round hole when the hole has a diameter equal to the side 
length of the peg, one that cites a particular microphysical story about parts of the peg 
touching parts of the board and one that cites the squareness property of the peg and the 
roundness property of the hole. The former is a process explanation and the later a program 
explanation. Lyon characterises a program explanation as one that 
 
cites a property or entity that, although not causally efficacious, ensures the instantiation of 
a causally efficacious property or entity that is an actual cause of the explanandum (Lyon 
2011: 8) 
 
The basic idea is that a program explanation does work by providing information about the 
facts that ensure that (or program for, hence the name) there is a causal process that brings 
about the explanandum: the programming properties ensure the presence of the causally 
efficacious properties that would be cited in a process explanation of the same explanandum 
event. Jackson & Pettit say that the programming properties are causally relevant but not 
causally efficacious: as noted by Lange, then, on this account extra-mathematical explanation 
comes out as causal, in this narrow specialised sense (Lange 2013a: 506).  
 
Lyon, discussing some cases of extra-mathematical explanation, says that they are program 
explanations:  
 
[The explanations] cite properties and/or entities which are nor causally efficacious but 
nevertheless program the instantiation of causally efficacious properties and/or entities that 
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causally produce the explanandum. And, importantly, they cite mathematical properties 
and/or entities that are doing (at least part of) this programming work. (Lyon 2012: 9) 
 
Lyon briefly works through the examples, suggesting of each that the mathematics is doing 
programming work. Of Cicadas, for example, he says that “a detailed process explanation 
could be given for why the Magicicada have life-cycles of 13 and 17 years” (ibid) but that this 
would be unsatisfactory compared to the explanation actually given by the biologists.  
 
3.3.1. Problems with the account 
 
Saatsi (2012) raises the following objection to Lyon’s account.71 Jackson and Pettit’s 
relationship between a program explanation the lower-level explanation that it programs is a 
relationship between some higher-level programming properties and a particular causal 
process that they (in some sense) necessitate. As such, the account is suited only to explaining 
events rather than regularities: it’s unclear how we should make sense of the idea of a causal 
process that leads to (and therefore explains) a regularity. Whilst there will be a particular 
causal process that brought about this or that particular individual cicada having the life-cycle 
length that it did, what is to be explained is the regularity. According to Saatsi, the program 
explanation is not suited to such explananda. Speaking of the Bridges regularity, Saatsi says 
that “it is difficult to make sense of the notion that there exists any corresponding process 
explanation of this very explanandum” (Saatsi 2011: 581) – the process explanation needs to 
be a particular causal process that brings about the fact that no-one has ever completed a tour 
of the bridges, which is a regularity.  
 
There is a response that Lyon could give to this – but it is only partial. As Saatsi notes, one 
way to present the explananda of optimality explanations is in the form of regularities: the 
regularity that cicada life-cycles are always prime, the regularity that sharks and other marine 
animals move in particular patterns and so on. But it seems equally natural, in these cases, to 
think that each fact constituting the regularity is grounded by another fact: the fact that 
																																																						
71 In the same discussion note, Saatsi discusses two additional objections that I do not discuss here. The first is 
a point of dialectical permissibility (in short: the worry is that Lyons assumes, rather than argues, that by playing 
a programming role the mathematics is doing explanatory work rather than representing an explanatory non-
mathematical property) and the second expresses scepticism about the possibility of giving a full account of 
how a mathematical property could do programming work of the kind appealed to in Jackson and Pettit’s 
account. The first objection does not concern the viability of Lyon’s account as a descriptively adequate account 
of extra-mathematical explanation and I share Saatsi’s scepticism that forms the basis of the second objection 
(See Saatsi 2012: 581-582 for details). Lyon simply does not say enough in this regard. 
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cicadas evolved to have prime-numbered life-cycles and the fact that sharks evolved to have the 
particular trait (and so on). These events, unlike the regularities that they bring about, do have 
an underlying causal explanation, and this is already implicit in the explanations. Lyon could 
claim in response to Saatsi that both the optimality explanations and the peg and board 
explanation do their explanatory work by not including detailed causal information but only 
by including information about the facts that necessitate that one of the many possible causal 
processes took place, each of which have as their outcome the event of the trait being 
selected for. 
 
Although this response seems promising, it fails to generalise properly. Consider the three 
possible explananda in Bridges: that a particular attempted tour of the bridges failed, that all 
such attempts have failed and that all such attempts necessarily fail. One of the explananda in 
Bridges is the modal fact that crossing the bridge in the specified way is impossible (for some 
sense of necessity). The problem (in at least some of the cases), then, is not that the 
explanandum of an extra-mathematical explanation is a regularity but that it is the wrong 
kind of fact to be explained by the kind of causal process that programming properties 
program for. What is the event in Bridges that is analogous to the evolution of the trait in 
optimality explanations, the event that grounds the regularity (the constant failings of 
attempts to tour the bridges)? Perhaps Lyon could claim that the one causal process that led 
to the regularity is (something like) the building of the bridge system such that it has the graph 
that it has and that this grounds the regularity. But this has things backwards: whatever the 
programming property is in the Bridges case, it doesn’t seem like it could have programmed 
for the building of the bridge. If the causal process that led to the regularity is the building of the 
bridge system, this doesn’t seem to be the right kind of causal process to have been 
programmed for by the higher-level graph-theoretic properties.72 Combined with the 
additional worries raised (see fn.71), Lyon’s account seems to be problematic. 
 
An instructive aspect of Lyon’s account, as with Baker’s, is that it attempts to use an existing 
account of explanation to shed light on the extra-mathematical cases: this is clearly along the 
right lines. However, the program account in particular does not seem a suitable candidate. 
Perhaps inspired by the failure of this anti-exceptionalist account, Lange and Pincock offer 
(what seem to be) exceptionalist accounts. Those are inspected in the next two sections.  
																																																						
72 Lyon could, of course, deny that Bridges is an extra-mathematical explanation, or narrow his account to the 
optimality examples: but the former seems question-begging and the latter sacrifies generality. 
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3.4. The constraint account 
 
In a recent paper, Lange discusses an account of extra-mathematical explanation that takes 
as central the idea that such explanations (in some sense) have greater modal force than other 
scientific explanations: in a sense hopefully to be made precise, extra-mathematical 
explanations constrain the range of possibilities. This sharply contrasts with explanations 
that explain by describing the world’s causal powers. It is tempting, then, to straightforwardly 
cast the constraint account as exceptionalist: as a kind of explanation that cannot be 
accommodated by existing accounts of explanation. This understanding of the constraint 
account is consistent with what Lange says in his original presentation of the account (Lange 
2013a). However, the easy categorisation of Lange’s account as exceptionalist is complicated 
by the fact that in an overview on his recent work on non-causal explanation, Lange says that 
distinctively mathematical explanations belong to a wider group of explanations: 
explanations by constraint (Lange 2016b: xvi). The notion of constraint appears once in the 
earlier version of the paper in which he sets out the constraint account but he does not signal 
that he holds extra-mathematical explanations belong to a wider class of explanations that all 
explain in this way. Lange says that:  
 
[S]ome non-causal scientific explanations work by identifying certain constraints to which 
the world must conform. These constraints (such as mathematical facts and symmetry 
principles) apply to causal processes, but not in virtue of their being causal processes (ibid) 
 
Perhaps, however, the anti-exceptionalist understanding of the constraint account of extra-
mathematical explanation survives. Recall that one helpful way of unpacking the notion of 
anti-exceptionalism cleaved it apart from holding an explanation being sui generis. Being an 
exceptionalist about a kind of explanation plausibly means that it cannot be accommodated 
by existing accounts of explanation – and this is clearly Lange’s view, given that he mentions 
Woodward and Strevens’ accounts in passing and claims that extra-mathematical explanation 
cannot be accommodated by them (ibid: 487). What Lange’s latest comments reveal is that 
he holds that extra-mathematical explanation belongs to a more general kind of explanation, 
the explanations by constraint. Even if there is some general account called ‘the constraint 
account’ that can accommodate all such explanations (with the extra-mathematical 
explanations being only one kind), Lange is still an anti-exceptionalist in virtue of the fact 
that he thinks some new account of explanation must be given in order to accommodate the 
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extra-mathematical cases. As will become apparent in chapter 4, however one carves up the 
exceptionalist/anti-exceptionalist distinction, the fundamental disagreement between my 
view and Lange’s remains. Before this can become apparent, it is necessary to set out Lange’s 
view and raise a problem with it.  
 
This idea of extra-mathematical explanations demonstrating that the explanandum is 
necessary (for a strong sense of ‘necessary’) is crucial to the constraint account. Lange gives 
the following summation of his account: 
 
Such an [extra-mathematical] explanation works […] by (roughly) showing how the fact to 
be explained was inevitable to a stronger degree than could result from the causal powers 
bestowed by the possession of various properties. If a fact has a distinctively mathematical 
explanation, then the modal strength of the connection between causes and effects is 
insufficient to account for that fact’s inevitability. 
 
These explanations work not by describing the world’s network of causal relations in 
particular, but rather by describing the framework inhabited by any possible causal relation. 
(ibid: 509) 
 
Lange provides the example of Newton’s second law as an example of what he means by 
‘framework’: the law does not give information about a particular cause, instead being “the 
framework within which any force must act” (ibid: 503). Something cannot be a force without 
satisfying Newton’s second law, the thought goes. Extra-mathematical explanations give 
information about the constraints on possible behaviour. Lange is at pains to point out that 
the notion of possibility here is stronger than nomological necessity: “these necessities are 
stronger than causal necessity, setting distinctively mathematical explanations apart from 
ordinary scientific explanations. Distinctively mathematical explanations in science work by 
appealing to facts […] that are modally stronger than ordinary causal laws” (ibid: 491). The 
idea, it seems, is that extra-mathematical (or ‘distinctively’ mathematical) explanations do not 
turn on any causal laws that are true at the actual world or at any world. In Bridges, for 
example, there is no causal process (consistent either with the actual causal laws or any 
possible causal laws) that would render the Königsberg bridge system tourable: the 
explanation does not appeal to any physical laws or facts. These physical facts are contained, 
for Lange, in the presupposition: referring to Bridges he says that there are “various contingent 
facts presupposed by the why question that the explanandum answers, such that the 
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arrangement of the bridges and islands is fixed” (ibid: 506) (emphasis added). The degrees of 
necessity present in distinctively mathematical explanations and regular causal explanations 
differ, according to the constraint account, and this fact distinguishes them.  
 
It is clear that Lange means that both the explanandum of an extra-mathematical explanation 
and the mathematical fact that features in the explanation hold with a kind of necessity not 
found in the explanandum or any of the explanans in standard explanations: 
 
These explanations explain […] by revealing that the explanandum is necessary – in particular 
more necessary than ordinary laws of nature are. (ibid: 491)  
 
Distinctively mathematical scientific explanations work by appealing to facts (including but 
not always limited to mathematical facts) that are modally stronger than ordinary laws of 
nature, together with contingent conditions that are contextually understood to be 
constitutive of the arrangement or task at issue in the why question. (ibid) 
 
I take it, then, that there is a sense in which the explanandum inherits the necessity of the 
explanan that has the special modal status. There is a sense in which it seems infelicitous to 
say that the explanation works by “revealing that” the explanandum is necessary: in Bridges, 
for example, before the explanation is given to us it is apparent that it is impossible (for some 
sense of ‘possible’) to cross every bridge, crossing every bridge only once (to complete a tour 
of the bridge system). Indeed, it seems like what is to be explained is that it is impossible to 
cross the bridges in this way: this is why an explanation appealing to the particularities of the 
bridge system won’t do, even though such an explanation might demonstrate that it is 
impossible to complete a tour.  
 
3.4.1. Advantages of the constraint account 
 
Despite the fact that it’s somewhat hard to pin down the explicit commitments of the 
constraint account, there are many things that it seems to do well. First, and most obviously, 
it accounts for the sense in which many extra-mathematical explanations demonstrate that 
their explananda hold with (some kind) of necessity and does so in a way that makes more 
precise how this fact relates to the necessity of the mathematical fact that features in the 
explanation. Another strength is that it provides criteria for distinguishing between 
mathematized explanations, like Pendulum, and extra-mathematical explanations, like Bridges, 
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and does so in a way that is not ad-hoc and follows naturally from the details of the account. 
Recall that this requirement was to explain in a principled way whether or not the pendulum 
law that features in Pendulm and the graph-theoretic fact that features in Bridges (for example) 
do explanatory work in different ways: this seems to be required to respect the judgement 
that not all explanations that feature mathematics are extra-mathematical explanations. The 
constraint account can explain this disparity by pointing out that the graph-theoretic fact 
(and the number-theoretic theorem in Cicadas, and so on) holds with a kind of necessity 
stronger than physical necessity whilst the pendulum law that features in Pendulum does not. 
Plausibly, the relationship between length and gravitation field strength (and so on) could 
have been different, if relevant other features of the world had been different in the 
appropriate ways: that is, the mathematics appealed to in the pendulum law could (if things 
had been different) have expressed a false generalization that would have failed to do 
explanatory work.73 This contrasts with the graph-theoretic fact, which could not have been 
otherwise: there is no world at which a bridge system with a Eulerian graph is crossable in 
the specified way. Lange’s account, then, gives the resources to distinguish explanations that 
use mathematics from extra-mathematical explanation: whether the mathematics is used to 
express a contingent fact (and so does not demonstrate that the explanandum holds with a 
form of necessity higher than physical necessity) or whether the mathematics is, itself, a fact 
that holds with necessity. Indeed, Lange says something suggesting this line of thinking when 
he discusses the following explanation: 
 
Why are all planetary orbits elliptical (approximately)? Because each planetary orbit is 
(approximately) the locus of points for which the sum of the distances from two fixed points 
is a constant, and that locus is (as a matter of mathematical fact) an ellipse. (ibid: 508) 
 
Lange rejects this as an example of a distinctively mathematical explanation (or extra-
mathematical explanation), in virtue of the fact that “the first fact to which it appeals is 
neither modally more necessary than ordinary causal laws nor understood in the why 
question’s context to be constitutive of being a planetary orbit (the physical arrangement in 
question)” (ibid).  
 
																																																						
73 Whilst the claim that the laws of nature (at least, non-fundamental laws like the pendulum law) are contingent 
and so could have been otherwise seems to be widely held, it is by no means uncontested. See, for example, 
Bird’s arguments that (at least some) laws of nature are necessary (Bird 2004). 
	 86 
3.4.2. The constraint account and contextual presuppositions 
 
There are, however, problems with Lange’s account that prompt us to look elsewhere. In 
this section I set these problems out and consider possible responses. 
 
A distinctive aspect of Lange’s account the role of the explanatory presupposition and that 
he is relatively open as to what facts get to go into this presupposition. Reutlinger notes that 
this contextual aspect of the constraint account might render the distinction between 
mathematical and non-mathematical explanations non-sharp (Reutlinger 2017a: 8).74 This 
point is well taken – although I am not sure this is as serious a problem as Reutlinger (and 
Pincock) take it to be. Even if this renders extra-mathematical explanations abundant, it will 
not entail that very many explanations offered in scientific practice count as extra-mathematical. 
As will become clear, that the constraint account renders this boundary non-sharp or renders 
extra-mathematical explanation abundant is not the objection being pressed here. Rather, 
here, the worry is that the contextual aspect of the account can render as explanatory cases 
that we judge to be non-explanatory. This, I take it, is a more pressing worry than the 
potential rendering of the mathematical/non-mathematical boundary as non-sharp. 
 
Suppose we, as we might do, wish to explain why it is that the ecological constraints in a 
particular cicada ecosystem are such that they limit possible life-cycles to lengths within a 
certain range. Suppose that, as is the case, we know facts about what life-cycles cicadas have 
and that prime periods minimise intersection. It seems that these facts, including the number-
theoretic theorem, place constraints on our new explanandum, the life-cycle range. If the 
non-mathematical facts are taken to be presupposed in the given context, the number-
theoretic theorem seems to explain the ecological constraints. But, this seems incorrect. As 
noted above (and as discussed in fn.87 below) Lange disputes that Cicadas, as it is normally 
formulated, is an extra-mathematical explanation. Here, then, is a way to press the problem 
with an uncontroversial example. Suppose we know, as we do, that it is impossible to 
complete a tour of the bridge system – this is the thing that are trying to explain, so it certainly 
counts as amongst our evidence and propositions known. Suppose we also know, as we do, 
that it is impossible to complete a tour of a bridge system if the system constitutes a graph 
with an odd number of vertices. This, too, is something that we know: this is just the graph-
																																																						
74 See, also, Pincock’s remark that “the danger is that every phenomenon will have a distinctively mathematical 
explanation” (Pincock 2015: 875). 
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theoretic fact that plays a role in Bridges. These two facts, however, seem to place constraints 
on what the number of vertices are had by the graph constituted by the bridge system in just 
the same way as in the original explanation, and the explanan with the special modal status 
(the graph-theoretic fact) plays the same kind of role. But, of course, we intuitively cannot 
explain why it is that the graph constituted by the bridge has the number of vertices that it 
does in this way. A genuine explanation of this fact would have to cite facts about the bridge’s 
construction, for example. Nevertheless, if the non-graph-theoretic facts are placed in the 
presupposition, it seems as if the graph-theoretic fact explains the explanandum, according 
to the constraint account. 
 
It is tempting to present this worry about the presupposition in a way that mirrors the 
asymmetry objection to the D-N account of scientific explanation that was discussed in §3.2, 
but I think this is a mistake. In a recent paper, Craver and Povich do this (Craver & Povich 
2017), reorganising the explanans and explanandum of some extra-mathematical cases as is 
standard in formulating the asymmetry objection to the D-N account of explanation. 
However, to do this makes some strong assumptions about what the canonical form of an 
explanation is on the constraint account, an issue that Lange is silent on. Furthermore, it 
flattens the different roles played by each of the facts involved in the explanation. On the 
objection presented above, some facts are placed in the presupposition, and this makes it the 
case that the mathematical fact is the sole fact doing explanatory work (in line with Lange’s 
understanding of (what he calls) distinctively mathematical explanations). The worry is, as 
pressed above, that the mathematical fact doesn’t explain the explanandum, even with the 
relevant facts placed in the presupposition. Taking each fact as if it is a premise in an 
explanatory argument (with the argument having both empirical and mathematical premises) 
as Craver and Povich do, does not seem to respect this aspect of the constraint account. The 
fact that some of (what we would naturally call) the explanans are presuppositions (contextually 
determined) whilst one of the explanans is the fact doing the explaining suggests that one should 
not take explanations by constraint to take the form of arguments with the explanandum as 
their conclusions. The role of some facts being placed in the presupposition is an important 
component of Lange’s account: otherwise it seems to collapse into the entailment account, 
discussed above. The fact that certain facts are placed in the presuppositions is what makes 
the constraining fact explanatory. 
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However, what this understanding of the worry does get right is that one similarity does carry 
over from asymmetry worries about the D-N account. In the flagpole case, a very natural 
response is that we cannot explain the height of the flagpole by citing facts about the length 
of the shadow because the length of the shadow does not depend on the height of the 
flagpole in the right kind of way. This ‘right kind’ of dependence is normally understood 
causally: the height of the flagpole plays a role in causing the shadow to have the length that 
it does, but the length of the shadow plays no role in causing the flagpole to have the height 
that it does. There is a similarly natural response, here. However, it’s less than clear how 
Lange’s notion of constraint could accommodate this way of thinking: once the relevant facts 
are placed in the explanatory presupposition, the single (intuitively non-explanatory) fact 
does seem to generate constraints, such that the explanandum is necessitated.  
 
Here is one possible response that could be made on Lange’s behalf. Lange might argue that 
his account in fact can accommodate the fact that the alternate Bridges explanation is no 
explanation at all and can do so without resorting to dependence talk. The constraint account 
assigns a crucial role to the fact that the explanandum holds with a greater degree of necessity 
than physical necessity. I suggested above that the account could be understood as claiming 
that an explanation demonstrates why the explanandum holds with greater-than-physical 
necessity rather than demonstrating that it does. Lange could, therefore, respond by claiming 
that the proposed explanandum in the problematic case (that the bridge system has an odd 
number of bridges) doesn’t hold as a matter of necessity and, therefore, this explanation does 
not count as an explanation-by-constraint. 
 
I don’t think this response is successful. It seems that the fact that the bridge system having 
the number of bridges that it does holds with the same kind of necessity as the fact that the 
bridge system is non-tourable. What is necessary, I take it, is not that the bridge system in 
Konigsberg is non-tourable: if the bridge system in Konigsberg had a different number of bridges, 
then it would have been tourable. What is necessary, instead, is that given that it has an odd 
number of bridges, the bridge system in Konigsberg is non-tourable. Without this conditional 
aspect, there is no necessary fact at all. It is true, I take it, that the bridges of Konigsberg 
could have been tourable but it is not possible that this bridge system is tourable. There is a 
directly analogous pair of necessary and merely contingent explananda in the problematic 
case. It is possible, as the proposed rejoinder from Lange goes, that the bridge system could 
have had a different number of bridges. But it is impossible that, given the graph-theoretic fact 
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and the fact that the bridge system is non-tourable, the bridge system could have had an even number 
of bridges. The graph-theoretic fact, on this reading, equally plays a role in constraining the 
number of bridges that make up the bridge system: that is, it constrains it to being an odd 
number. Contra the constraint account, however, the fact that the graph-theoretic fact and 
the fact about non-tourability constrain the number of bridges in this way, and in turn 
demonstrate that it is necessary that the bridge system has an odd number of bridges, does 
not explain why the bridge system has the number of bridges that it does. Again, the reason 
for this seems simply to be that there is not the right kind of dependence between the 
tourability, the graph-theoretic fact and the number of bridges.  
 
At first, Lange’s account seemed to be on the right track: it successfully met some of the 
criteria discussed in chapter 2. However, the notion of explanation by constraint seems too 
liberal: it is too easy to explain in the way set out by Lange’s account, and as a result non-
genuine explanations ended up counting as explanations by constraint. I suggested a way of 
correctly rendering the non-explanations as faulty, but also suggested that Lange’s account 
cannot straightforwardly accommodate this. 
 
3.5. The abstract dependence account 
 
In this section I set out Pincock’s account of extra-mathematical explanation, which I will 
refer to as the abstract dependence account. 
 
In a recent paper, Pincock sets out what appears to be an exceptionalist account of extra-
mathematical explanation: like Lange, he explicitly suggests that the kind of explanations he 
is concerned with cannot be accommodated by standard accounts of explanation (Pincock 
2015: 867). There are preliminary uncertainties when it comes to Pincock’s account. First: 
the most recent discussion of such explanations (Pincock 2015), Pincock refers to the class 
of explanations under discussion as ‘abstract explanations’ rather than extra-mathematical 
explanations. However, Pincock uses the term ‘mathematical explanation’ on occasion 
(Pincock 2015: 871) and also contrasts his account with Lyon’s account (ibid: 871) and 
Lange’s account (ibid: 874). Second: in addition to his most recent discussion, Pincock also 
discusses extra-mathematical explanation in three other places (Pincock 2004b; Pincock 
2007; Pincock 2012). In the most recent paper, Pincock does not explicitly say how the most 
recent statement of his view relates to his earlier views. Perhaps, like Lange’s notion of a 
	 90 
constraint explanation, Pincock holds extra-mathematical explanations to be a subset of the 
abstract explanations. On this understanding, although extra-mathematical explanations 
cannot be accommodated by standard accounts of explanation, they are nonetheless not sui 
generis. This ambiguity, although interesting, does not bear on the reasons for which Pincock’s 
account is unsatisfactory. In this section I try to set out the core commitments of Pincock’s 
view, drawing on his comments across his various discussions. Even if there isn’t a precise 
formulation of the view that is consistent with everything Pincock says, in this section I am 
interested in assessing whether there is a plausible view that draws on the core insight of all 
of Pincock’s discussions, drawing together two strands: the notions of abstract dependence 
and the irrelevance of microphysical details. 
 
In his most recent account of his view on this issue, Pincock says the following of his view: 
 
We think we have an explanation when we have found a (i) classification of systems using 
(ii) a more abstract entity that is (iii) appropriately linked to the phenomenon being explained. 
Whenever an explanation has these three features I will say that we have an abstract 
explanation. (Pincock 2015: 867) 
 
What does Pincock mean by ‘abstract entity’? The use of the term “more abstract entity” 
(emphasis added) suggests that Pincock does not mean an abstract object in the standard 
sense (seeing as the standard sense of abstractness does not admit degrees, at least when 
being used to characterise the abstractness of an object), yet the rest of what he says does seem 
to cohere with the standard sense. Pincock does say this, which is instructive: 
 
Note that a distinguishing feature of abstract explanation and abstract dependence is that we 
appeal to a more abstract entity that has a more concrete entity as an instance. (ibid: 879) 
 
A second natural question about the account is: what, exactly, is abstract dependence? 
Pincock does not provide a clear definition of this notion. For the target system to abstractly 
depend on the entity invoked is for the abstract entity to be “appropriately linked” to the 
explanandum. Pincock also takes the concrete physical system under consideration to be an 
“instance” of the abstract entity: “we can say that a soap-film surface obeying Plateau’s laws 
depends on its being an instance of an almost minimal set” (ibid: 869). On this understanding, 
abstract extra-mathematical explanations are distinguished by the fact that the explanans 
serve as an explanation for any explanandum physical system that realizes (or is an instance 
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of) the kind of abstract system described in the explanans. This is the sort of picture that 
Pincock seems to have in earlier discussions of the Bridges case.  
 
The abstract explanation seems superior because it gets at the root cause of why walking a 
certain path is impossible by focusing on the abstract structure of system. Even if the bridges 
were turned into gold, it would still have the structure of the same graph, and so the same 
abstract explanation would apply. By abstracting away from the microphysics, scientists can 
often give better explanations of the features of physical systems. (Pincock 2007: 260) 
 
Bringing these earlier comments in line with Pincock’s recent precis of his account quoted 
on the previous page: Bridges does its explanatory work by classifying potential bridge systems 
by using a more abstract entity than the system under consideration (the more abstract entity 
in this case, I take it, being the graph) that is appropriately linked to the phenomenon (in that 
the physical bridge system is an instantiation of the abstract graph). However, I take it that 
if all Pincock meant by ‘abstract dependence’ and ‘linked in the right way’ was instantiation 
or realisation, he would have said so. Whatever one thinks about the multiple ways in which 
these terms are used in philosophy, there is a better collective grip on them than there is to 
be had on being ‘appropriately linked’ – in addition, in concluding his discussion Pincock is 
unsure and noncommittal regarding the nature of abstract dependence.75 Perhaps the most 
reasonable understanding of Pincock’s account is that there are many ways in which the 
abstract entity can be appropriately linked (and therefore multiple ways in which a target 
system can abstractly depend on the entity) to the phenomenon being explained: that being 
‘appropriately linked’ is something like a functional role and realizing and instantiating are 
relations that can play this role in bringing about an abstract explanation in particular cases. 
This interpretation respects both Pincock’s use of the term ‘instances’ but also the fact that 
he remains non-commital regarding the nature of abstract dependence. 
 
In addition to the key role played by abstract dependence, there is a second aspect of 
Pincock’s account of extra-mathematical explanation that is worth stressing. Earlier 
expositions stress the fact that explanations like Bridges purportedly do not contain 
information about microphysical details of the target and that this is (partially?) constitutive 
of the information being explanatory: “the explanatory power is tied to the simple way in 
																																																						
75 See, for example, his remark that “at least two things are needed to flesh out this suggestion. First, there 
should be a theory of what abstract dependence comes to and how these relations are distributed in the world” 
(Pincock 2015: 877). 
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which the model abstracts away from the irrelevant details of the target system” (Pincock 
2011: 213). For example:  
 
[A]n explanation for this [that it is impossible to cross each bridge exactly once] is that at 
least one vertex has an odd valence. Whenever such a physical system has at least one bank 
or island with an odd number of bridges from it, there will be no path that crosses every 
bridge exactly once and that returns to the starting point. If the situation were slightly 
different [so that] the valence of the vertices were to be all even, then there would be a path 
of the desired kind. (Pincock 2007: 260) 
 
According to Pincock’s account, then, explanations like Bridges explain by demonstrating that 
so long as the system in question has the relevant higher-level properties (so long as it “still 
[has] the structure of the same graph”), the explanandum will obtain. For this reason, Pincock 
refers to the explanations as abstract explanations. In Pincock 2012, he suggests that he takes 
the same to be true of the Cicadas explanation: he mentions that the “specific genetic coding 
responsible for the actions of the cicada or the bees [referring to the extra-mathematical 
explanation of the fact that honeybees’ honeycombs are hexagonal] are not relevant to the 
sort of explanation we have offered” (Pincock 2012: 210).76  
 
So, coming to something like a reconstructed statement of the abstract dependence account, 
(abstract) extra-mathematical explanations function by using information about abstract 
dependence to demonstrate that the explanandum obtaining is explained by the fact that the 
target is appropriately linked (where being appropriately linked can be achieved by different 
relations) to an abstract entity and is therefore not explained by any of the microphysical 
details of the system in which the explanandum located. The abstract dependence account, 
on my reconstruction that draws on Pincock’s distributed remarks, has a positive component 
(the explanation works by giving information about abstract dependence) and a negative 
component (the explanation does not work by appealing to microphysical details of the 
system). An example: the explanandum in Bridges, on the abstract dependence account, is 
fully explained by the fact that the physical bridge system is appropriately linked (in this case, 
is an instance of, or instantiates) to the graph (the abstract entity) and is therefore not 
																																																						
76 It is true that the notion of leaving out microphysical detail drops out of the discussion in Pincock 2015: 
nevertheless, Pincock clearly considers Bridges to be an example of the kind of explanation he is discussing in 
Pincock 2015 and does not walk back his earlier remarks regarding the case. I take it Pincock 2015 to be 
appealing to a different case study to draw out another aspect of abstract (or extra-mathematical) explanation – 
the role played by abstract dependence. 
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explained by any of the facts about the bridge system that are not entailed by it being 
appropriately linked: for example, it being made of stone rather than gold.  
 
It is worth briefly comparing my reconstruction of Pincock’s account with one of the few 
others in the literature. In a forthcoming paper, Jansson and Saatsi understand Pincock’s 
account as locating explanatory information as information about independence (Jansson & 
Saatsi forthcoming: 2), contrasting it with approaches to explanation that emphasise 
dependence.77 I don’t think this can quite be right. As I attempted to unpick above, Pincock 
stresses at various points in his discussion that the explanandum depending on the entity 
invoked is crucial: it is the presence of abstract dependence of the target system on an 
abstract entity that seems to distinguish such explanations, for Pincock. This constituted the 
positive component of the account. 
 
There is always the risk, of course, that this is a terminological disagreement (especially given 
the close conceptual link between dependence and independence (which Jansson & Saatsi 
also stress)). Perhaps one provides information about independence by providing 
information about abstract dependence. However, it is more faithful to what Pincock says 
to take his insight to be that this special class of explanations is distinguished from ordinary 
causal explanations not because they appeal to information about independence rather than 
dependence but because the kind of dependence doing explanatory work is a different kind of 
dependence. Whilst in causal cases, physical dependence (construed causally) is doing the 
explaining, in these cases a special kind of abstract dependence can do explanatory work: what 
explains is not dependence of the explanandum on other parts of the world, but of the target 
system abstractly depending on an abstract entity. As suggested above, abstract dependence 
might be cashed out using different metaphysical notions: the idea being that the target might 
abstractly depend on the abstract entity because it is an instance of it, rather than abstract 
dependence being identified with instantiation. This makes better sense of Pinock’s tentative 
discussion of a sort of general theory of explanation that appeals to different kinds of 
dependence relations. One might wonder about the anti-exceptionalist credentials the 
abstract dependence account, given that (like other existing theories) it gives a crucial role to 
dependence. Pincock, too, considers this question: it makes more sense, however, to bracket 
this interesting interpretive question until chapter 4. 
 
																																																						
77 I discuss the positive proposal in Jansson & Saatsi forthcoming in the next chapter. 
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3.5.1. The cicada variation objection 
 
Somewhat awkwardly, the most persuasive reasons for not endorsing the abstract 
dependence account concern Pincock’s faulty reasons for not subsuming the account under 
Woodward’s account of explanation, which also appeals to dependence. This will have to 
wait until after §4.2, where this account is set out. There is, also, of course a very easy 
response to give to Pincock: that of maintaining that it’s just not clear what abstract 
dependence amounts to and that, until this point is clarified, it’s difficult to assess both the 
plausibility of Pincock’s account and whether or not it captures what’s going on in the case 
studies. Pincock mentions ontological dependence as an example of a kind of non-physical 
dependence (Pincock 2015: 878) but does not identify abstract dependence with ontological 
dependence or any other kind of metaphysical relation. I don’t know what abstract 
dependence is, and therefore do not know how plausible Pincock’s account is. 
 
As tempting as it is to give this response, an orthogonal objection to the abstract dependence 
account can be had using only using resources that Pincock provides in an earlier discussion, 
and so therefore not involving resort to footstamping about not understanding what Pincock 
means by ‘abstract dependence’. I will set out this objection here. It is important to stress, 
from the get-go, that in a forthcoming commentary Jansson & Saatsi have separately offered 
an objection (aimed at accounts that (they claim) appeal to independence rather than 
dependence (see above)) along these same lines, appealing to versions of Bridges with 
different explanatory strengths. I take mine to be distinguished in that it has greater dialectical 
force when aimed at the abstract dependence account, given that it appeals to earlier work 
by the proponent of that account.  
 
Recall from the previous chapter that Pincock introduces a variation of Cicadas (Pincock 
2012: 211), for the purposes of arguing that Cicadas fails to meet his Sensitivity condition on 
IBE.78 The weaker variation of the explanation appeals to a different number-theoretic claim. 
Instead of the explanatory number-theoretic claim being that prime periods minimise 
intersection, the variation of the argument appeals to the true generalisation that prime 
periods up to 100 years minimise intersection. There is existing disagreement in the literature 
as to which explanation is superior: the one Baker abstracts from the scientific literature, 
appealing to the general theorem, or the one that Pincock discusses, appealing to the 
																																																						
78 See §2.6 for a discussion of this requirement. 
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restricted theorem. In response to the argument (for the purposes of which Pincock 
originally deploys this weaker variant), Baker provides some reasons for thinking that the 
stronger version of the explanation is superior. He says: 
 
Among other things, [the weaker theorem] is less general, it has less predictive power, it 
supports fewer counterfactuals, the precise restriction on the domain has no independent 
motivation, and it is less syntactically simple. (Baker 2015: 698) 
 
As with Baker’s diffuse anti-exceptionalism, his aims here are orthogonal to the aims of this 
chapter: Baker briefly lists these purported weaknesses of Pincock’s alternate argument in 
order to side-step Pincock’s objection. It is worthwhile unpacking this claim, though. There 
is reason to think that the first two strengths of Pincock’s alternate explanation (and, 
correspondingly, the two strengths of the original Cicadas), that it is less general, less 
predictively powerful and supports fewer counterfactuals, are importantly connected. 
Indeed, the argument having less predictive power just is the argument supporting fewer 
counterfactuals: predictions about what life-cycle length the cicada would have if the 
ecological constraints were such that their life-cycles must fall in the range 101-113 (for 
example) can be made by the original version of Cicadas precisely because it provides an 
answer to this counterfactual inquiry. Furthermore, the fact that the original version of 
Cicadas is predictively more powerful, in virtue of supporting more counterfactuals, is 
grounded by the fact that the number-theoretic theorem is more general: because it makes a 
claim about prime periods in general, and not just a narrower subset, it can support more 
counterfactuals.79  
 
It is important to note, however, that Pincock also holds that the explanations differ, but 
says we ought to prefer the weaker version of the argument, saying that: 
 
[R]easonable rules for the use of IBE suggest that, other things being equal, the explanation 
that employs the weaker claim is superior to the explanation employing the stronger claim. 
(Pincock 2012: 212) 
 
																																																						
79 It is less clear that the last two purported benefits of the original Cicadas explanation are genuine benefits. 
The fact that the weaker version of the explanation lacks independent motivation does not make the 
explanation worse, unless the lack of motivation has any ramifications for the power of the explanation. Similarly, 
the fact that the explanation is less syntactically simple seems to make the same equivocation between various 
kinds of simplicity that Melia observed (Melia 2000: 473). 
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However, this is to confuse two different meanings of ‘superior’. One concerns the 
explanation’s strength and the other is concerned with epistemic humility: the idea being that 
when offering explanations, we ought to select the explanation that manages to successfully 
explain the phenomenon with the fewest commitments (for a useful discussion of when 
explanatory virtues might count as pragmatic, see Ylikoski & Kuorikoski 2010). An 
explanation might be a more powerful explanation with it still being the case that it is a 
mistake to accept it, if doing so is very epistemically risky. Baker’s claim, I take it, is both that 
the original version of Cicadas is more powerful in the first sense and, also, that it is not 
epistemically risky to accept it. 
 
I won’t discuss this question any further here: although I think there is reason to endorse 
Baker’s line regarding the two versions of Cicadas, what is most important for the purposes 
of critiquing the abstract dependence account is that the two versions are judged to differ in 
their explanatory character. Pincock’s account is unable to vindicate this judgement: the 
central problem is just that from the little that Pincock says about abstract dependence, it 
seems as though it does not come in degrees, but explanatory strength seems to: recall that, 
at least in some cases, abstract dependence was had because the target is an instance of the 
abstract entity. Even admitting that the kind of abstract dependence that Pincock is 
interested in does come in degrees does not seem to help. We seemingly judge that the two 
cicada explanations differ in explanatory strength, yet they do not differ when it comes to 
the extent to which they are connected in the right way to an abstract entity (I take it, in this 
case, the natural number structure) and the extent to which the microphysical details play a 
role. Pincock could, of course, merely bite this bullet and maintain that the two explanations 
are identical in their degree of explanatory power and that appearances otherwise ought to 
be explained by gesturing towards pragmatic concerns associated with the act of explaining 
(see, again, Ylikoski & Kuorikoski 2010) – but this is in tension both what he has said earlier 
and, I suggest, the most natural understanding of the two explanations. 
 
3.5.2. The abundance of abstract explanations  
 
Recall the reconstruction of the abstract dependence account that I gave above: (abstract) 
extra-mathematical explanations function by using information about abstract dependence 
to demonstrate that the explanandum obtaining is explained by the fact that the target is 
appropriately linked (where being appropriately linked can be achieved by different relations) 
to an abstract entity and is therefore not explained by any of the microphysical details of the 
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system in which the explanandum located. The worries raised above concern the first 
component, the notion of abstract dependence. During his discussion of causal and extra-
mathematical explanation, Lange makes a remark that suggests an additional worry about 
Pincock’s account, about the second, negative component: the claim that because the 
explanandum is explained by a fact about abstract dependence, it is not explained by 
microphysical details. (Repackaging Lange’s remark as an objection to the negative 
component of the abstract dependence account does not turn on accepting any of the details 
of Lange’s positive proposal). 
 
Lange makes the (near-platitudinous) claim that “plenty of explanations abstract from petty 
causal influences, emphasizing mathematical structure instead, but are nevertheless causal 
rather than distinctively mathematical explanations” (Lange 2016b: 34) and referring to 
Batterman’s claim that the relevant explanations involve “throwing away of various causal 
and physical details” (Batterman 2010: 3), says that “many causal explanations do that too – 
including explanations that appeal to one trait’s having greater fitness than another 
(abstracting away from the detailed histories of individual mating, reproduction and 
predation events) [and] explanations that appeal to a peg’s roundness and a hole’s squareness 
(abstracting away from the particular intermolecular forces at work)” (Lange 2013a: 506). 
 
Although Pincock discusses Lange’s earlier presentation of the constraint account (Lange 
2013a), he does not indicate whether or not he thinks the above observation(s) are 
problematic for the abstract dependence account. Yet, it seems clear that they are: if the sorts 
of explanations that Lange discusses count as abstract explanations, then it seems both that 
such explanations are abundant (suggesting that the account does not successfully capture 
the narrow class of extra-mathematical explanations) but, crucially, that they are not different 
in kind from regular explanations. This can be brought out by briefly discussing an example 




What is being explained is “the magnitude of the electric field created by a long, straight wire 
with a positive charge uniformly distributed along its length” (Woodward & Hitchcock 2003: 
4). Coulomb’s law “can be used to tell us how the electric field would differ if the charge 
density of the wire were increased, or if the wire twisted into a circle or a solenoid. In this 
way, [the law] shows us that certain factors, such as charge density and geometrical 
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configuration of the conductor, make a systematic difference to intensity and direction of 
the field.” (ibid) 
 
When coupled with Woodward and Hitchcock’s interventionist account of causation (see 
Woodward 2003; Woodward & Hitchcock 2003 for details), Wire comes out as being causal 
(cf. Saatsi & Pexton 2013). (Even though Lange, above, makes the point that an explanation 
being abstract in the sense that Pincock discusses doesn’t seem inconsistent with the 
explanation being causal, this is not to say that he endorses the interventionist account of 
causation). Nevertheless, it leaves out any of the microphysical information about the wire 
and as such can be used as an explanation for any physical system has the properties 
described in the explanans. It is unclear how this case differs from Bridges, at least in as much 
as it abstracts away from microphysical information about the system under consideration. 
Why does Wire not constitute an abstract explanation, with the explanatory target counting 
as an instance of an abstract entity that has amongst its instances all of the wires with the 
properties described? It is not clear that the abstract dependence account has the resources 
to explain why Wire does not count as such an explanation. At a first pass, one might press 
that this isn’t a problem for Pincock’s view qua account of extra-mathematical explanation: 
perhaps abstract explanations just are abundant. It seems, however, that a consequence is that 
Pincock’s account cannot distinguish the special class of explanations that of interest from 
regular explanations that use mathematics. It is this, especially, that suggests looking 
elsewhere.80 With both Lange and Pincock’s accounts, the fact that explanations by constraint 
or abstract explanations are abundant doesn’t seem by itself to be an objection: but in both 
cases, in different ways, this had consequences that rendered the accounts problematic (in 
the constraint case, that non-explanations are rendered explanatory and in the abstract 
dependence case, that extra-mathematical explanations are not properly distinguished from 
other explanations). 
 
The situation, then, is as follows. Much of what Pincock says about the individual cases 
seems right-headed: what seems to be mistaken is his claim that these insights cannot be 
captured by causal accounts of explanation. At heart, this is also what is wrong with Lange’s 
account: he is not wrong that extra-mathematical explanations sometimes admit to a degree 
																																																						
80 Consider that Pendulum, too, seems to meet the requirements of Pincock’s notion of abstract dependence. 
Yet this was introduced as the kind of case where it seems clear that the explanation is a regular explanation 
that uses mathematics, and not an extra-mathematical explanation.  
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of necessity stronger than many other explanations, but is too quick in thinking that this 




In this chapter I considered four recent accounts of extra-mathematical explanation: some 
of these are anti-exceptionalist whilst some are exceptionalist, and some are offered explicitly 
in order to boost the prospects of the enhanced indispensability argument whilst others are 
offered merely to shed light on this interesting kind of explanation.  
 
Some of the problems with the accounts turned on their particular details. There are a couple 
of recurring themes, however. The first is that the line between extra-mathematical 
explanation and causal explanation seems less straightforward than appearances suggest. The 
second is that the role of dependence popped its head up at various points: problems with 
Baker’s entailment account and Lange’s constraint account can plausibly be resolved by 
appealing to notions of dependence whilst some of the uncertainties surrounding Pincock’s 
account arose from the notion of abstract dependence. Turning to the current literature on 
scientific explanation, there is a long tradition of explicating explanation by appealing both 
to notions of causation and to notions of dependence (of a certain kind). The lesson of this 
chapter, then, is that it is worthwhile to see if these resources can shed light on extra-
















The modal account of extra-mathematical 
explanation 
 
In the previous chapter I considered some recent accounts of extra-mathematical 
explanation and argued that there are reasons to look elsewhere. In this chapter, I motivate 
and endorse an alternate account of extra-mathematical explanation. According to the modal 
account of extra-mathematical explanation, such explanations function by demonstrating the 
ways in which the explanandum depends on the explanans facts and, in doing so, allow a 
user of the explanation to answer what-if-things-had-been-different questions about the 
explanandum. Extra-mathematical explanations have more in common with causal 
explanations (at least, as understood by those working in the interventionist tradition) than 
usually thought. Accordingly, a form of anti-exceptionalism about extra-mathematical 
explanation is vindicated. 
 
In the first section I return to a thought briefly noted in discussing Baker’s entailment 
account: namely, that the reasons he gives for eschewing attempting to extend a causal 
account to the extra-mathematical case are unconvincing. I work through some ways of 
trying to make the judgement that causal accounts are unsuited for our task more precise and 
suggest that, after they are fleshed out, the worries reveal themselves to be unpersuasive. In 
the second section I offer some prima facie reasons in favour of appealing to Woodward’s 
interventionist account of causal explanation, over other theories of causal explanation. I 
then make salient the relevant features of Woodward’s account. In the third section I make 
the case that a Woodward-style account can shed light on extra-mathematical explanation in 
what I take to be the most appropriate way: by working through some of the case studies set 
out at the end of chapter 2. The basic idea behind this extension of the account is that the 
mathematical fact is analogous to the invariant generalization that features in Woodward-
style treatments of paradigm causal cases. Until reasonably recently, the only discussion in 
the literature regarding the plausibility of a Woodward-style account of extra-mathematical 
explanation was negative (see, for example, the discussion in §4.5). However, there are also 
some recent and forthcoming positive proposals along these lines, which I have incorporated 
into the discussion in this chapter. In order to contribute to this promising emerging line of 
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thought, in the fourth section I draw on forthcoming work to adjudicate whether or not 
extending a counterfactual account of explanation to the extra-mathematical case involves 
appealing to counterpossibles resulting from perturbations of mathematical facts. I locate 
the source of this implicit disagreement and argue (in line with Jansson and Saatsi and contra 
Baron, Colyvan and Ripley, and Chirimuuta) that extending the account does not involve 
counterpossibles. In doing so, I alleviate a potential burden on the modal account, that of 
giving an account of the semantics of counterpossibles. In the fifth section I briefly discuss 
and reject the aforementioned objection(s) to approaches like that of this chapter, owing to 
Pincock. In the sixth section I raise a pressing outstanding question for the modal account 
of extra-mathematical explanation, as it stands. I motivate the claim that an explanation must 
be given of why a mathematical fact allows access to modal information about the 
explanandum in the same way that an invariant generalization does in cases of regular causal 
explanation: an answer to what I call the in virtue of question. I tentatively suggest that the 
structural nature of extra-mathematical explanations can shed light on this feature and 
provide an answer to the in virtue of question. In section seven I provide an overview of the 
benefits of the modal account and compare it to its rivals, discussed in chapter 3. In section 
eight I discuss whether or not the success of the modal account reveals that extra-
mathematical explanations are causal explanations, after all. In section nine I draw some 
conclusions from this chapter. 
 
4.1. Fretting in the literature 
 
Both in the literature and in conversation, philosophers take it for granted that there is 
something about extra-mathematical explanations that make the project of this chapter a non-
starter. Although we seemingly know very little about extra-mathematical explanation, one 
thing that we apparently do know is that causal theories of explanation won’t be a helpful 
tool in shedding light on this special class of explanations. In this section I set out four 
different ways of motivating and articulating this worry and argue that none amount to 
reasons for dismissing attempts to extend causal accounts of explanation to the extra-
mathematical case. These worries are distinct from objections to the particular account of 
extra-mathematical explanation offered here. The worries responded to in this section are 
more fundamental, in that they suggest that there is something wrongheaded about any 
attempt to accommodate the extra-mathematical cases using a causal account of explanation. 
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The first version of the worry states that extra-mathematical explanations do not provide 
causal-mechanical information and therefore are not ripe for accommodation by a causal 
account of explanation. Batterman seems to think that such explanations cannot be 
understood as broadly causal in virtue of the fact that causal explanations contain 
information about the “causal-mechanical […] workings of the mechanisms” that bring 
about the explanandum (Batterman 2000: 28) (see §3.5.2). Rice says something like this in 
describing optimality models:  
 
[T]hese idealizations entail that optimality models usually provide little, if any, accurate 
information about the actual causes, or causal mechanisms, within the model’s target system 
(s). In the end, the highly idealized optimality model represents mathematical relationships 
between constraints, tradeoffs, and the system’s equilibrium point that do not mirror any 
causal relationships (or processes) in the target system. (Rice 2015: 600) 
 
Is something like this true of the extra-mathematical explanations considered here? An 
inspection of some extra-mathematical explanations reveals that it is plainly false that extra-
mathematical explanations do not provide information about causal processes.81 Referring 
to some of the case studies brings this out. A crucial component of any optimality 
explanation is the presence of evolutionary pressures. Having prime periods is only 
adaptively beneficial because at some point in the evolutionary history of the cicada there 
were periodical predators. Accordingly, very many extra-mathematical explanations provide 
some information about the explanandum’s causes, and this point has already been noted 
(see, for example, Lange 2016b: 22 – 23). 
 
Here’s a second way of trying to make this worry precise. Recall that Baker says that 
“according to the causal account, explaining a phenomenon involves giving a description of 
its various causes. Clearly this account is incompatible with the existence of any genuine 
mathematical explanations, since mathematical objects (if they exist) are acausal” (Baker 
2005: 454). Baker’s suggestion here that extending causal accounts will fail because an extra-
																																																						
81 There is reason to think that this is not in tension with much of what Rice says in his discussion. It is 
important to distinguish between an explanation of the fact that it is optimal for the cicadas to have prime-
numbered life-cycles, given certain other conditions hold (for example) and an explanation of the fact that 
cicadas evolved to have prime-numbered life-cycle. That it is optimal to do so obviously features in this latter 
explanation but without endorsing a view about the transitivity of explanation (see Hicks & van Elswyk 2015; 
Lange 2013b; Lower 2012) it is not straightforward to demonstrate that an explanation of the fact that prime-
numbered life-cycles are optimal is also an explanation of the fact that cicadas evolved to have such life-cycle, 
an explanation which appeals to the fact that such life-cycles are optimal. 
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mathematical explanation is one in which the existence of a mathematical object is doing the 
explaining, and mathematical objects are acausal.82 This is consistent with mathematical 
explanations including some causal information. It, however, seems to disregard the 
possibility that a piece of mathematics can do explanatory work without it being the case that 
the existence of a mathematical object does explanatory work. Talking about a case study, 
Pincock says that “an easy way to see that causal dependence is not involved would be by 
emphasizing the highly mathematical character of [his case study]. As nobody thinks that 
causal relations obtain in pure mathematics, we have a non-causal explanation” (Pincock 
2015: 867). I agree with Pincock that there are no causal relations in pure mathematics and 
that if mathematical objects exist, then they do not cause the explananda of extra-
mathematical explanations. But, as Pincock seems to acknowledge at other points in his 
discussion (see §3.5 and §4.5), contemporary causal accounts of explanation do more than 
merely state that the objects appealed to in the explanans stand in causal relations to the 
objects featuring in explanandum. This will be brought into sharper relief when setting out 
the modal account of explanation in detail below. This purported reason for not attempting 
to extend causal accounts is perhaps a result of the fact that debate about extra-mathematical 
explanation stems from the enhanced indispensability argument, which focuses on 
mathematical objects and their possible existence. 
 
A similar worry might be motivated by the thought that a unified account should be given 
of intra-mathematical explanation and extra-mathematical explanation. Intra-mathematical 
explanations are mathematical explanations of mathematical facts: a natural thought is that 
although every distinct proof of a theorem demonstrates that the theorem is derivable, not 
all theorems explain why the theorem obtains (Mancosu 2008; Lange 2014).83 Combined with 
an assumption that a causal account of explanation definitely won’t be of use in the intra-
mathematical case (Colyvan forthcoming: 3), the claim that a unified account should be given 
of all kinds of mathematical explanation leads naturally to the conclusion that causal accounts 
should not be appealed to in understanding the cases currently under inspection. I won’t say 
much here about whether or not extending causal accounts of explanation to intra-
																																																						
82 It is commonplace to assume that mathematical objects, if they exist, are acausal. I will assume this here, 
although for an interpretation of mathematics that appeals only to the part/whole relation, concrete objects 
and some assumptions about the mereological structure of the world, see Lewis 1991 and Lewis 1993.  
83 This is not to say that all explanation within mathematics obtains between a theorem and a particular proof 
of that theorem: many of the interesting examples provided by Maddy of introducing a new axiom on the basis 
that it unifies various previously disparate mathematical phenomena (Maddy 1997: 208-219) seems, on the face 
of it, an act of explanaining by unifying, but what is doing the explanatory work here is an axiom. 
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mathematical explanation is a viable project: rather, the demand that one accommodate 
extra-mathematical explanation and intra-mathematical explanation using the same account 
is under-motivated. If it is taken for granted that intra-mathematical explanation is not going 
to be accommodated by an account of causal explanation, then one is either going to have 
to accommodate extra-mathematical explanation into one’s account of scientific explanation 
or into one’s account of mathematical explanation. I don’t think any distinctive features of 
the case studies pull decisively in either direction: the fact that a mathematical fact is playing 
a role in the explanation might be taken to pull in the latter direction, but the fact that the fact 
being explained is a non-mathematical fact pulls in the former direction. We should proceed 
by developing accounts and seeing how they compare. The desire for a unified account might 
also stem from the thought that in cases where a theorem is appealed to in a scientific 
explanation, it is the explanation of the proof that counts, too, as the explanation in the 
scientific context. Although Colyvan has once argued that this is the case (Colyvan 2001), he 
has since suggested that there is “reason to be suspicious of this claim” (Baker & Colyvan 
2009: 326), following Baker’s suggestion that there are theorems that play an explanatory role 
in scientific contexts for which there is not (at present, at least) an explanatory proof (Baker 
2012). It seems that defending a view along the lines of Colyvan’s earlier view requires 
defending some strong theses about the transitivity of explanation that, in this context at 
least, have not been defended (for details on this debate see Hicks & van Elswyk 2015; Lange 
2013b; Lower 2012). 
 
Here’s a final, and most charitable, version of the objection. This final version of the 
objection says that what is doing the explaining in the explanations is not information about 
causes. On this line, even if an extra-mathematical explanation provides some causal 
information (like the existence of predators in the cicada case), and even if it is not the 
existence of a mathematical object that is doing the explaining, whatever the source is of 
explanatory power, it is not information about causes. The cicada explanation could have 
added to it more fine-grained information about the causal process involving the adaptive 
pressures, but this would not make it a better explanation. In some sense, the particular 
causal-mechanical process is irrelevant to the evolution of the particular behaviours or 
attributes that are being explained in optimality explanations. The fact that the amount of 
causal-mechanical information provided has no ramifications for the explanatory power of 
the explanation reveals, on this line of thinking, that it is not the provision of causal-
mechanical information that is doing explanatory work (even if some causal-mechanical 
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information is present in the explanation and even if it is not the existence of a mathematical 
object that is doing the explaining). This is what Lange has in mind when he says that “this 
[extra-mathematical] explanation is non-causal because it does not work by describing the 
outcome’s causes or, more broadly, the world’s network of causal relations” (Lange 2013a: 
493) (emphasis added), drawing on Lipton’s remark that “causal explanations are explanatory 
because they are causal” (Lipton 2004b: 32) (emphasis in the original).84 
 
This last version of the objection is, clearly, the most charitable way of understanding the 
worry.85 It allows for the fact that extra-mathematical explanations contain causal 
information whilst still maintaining that any accounts of explanation that involve causal 
explanation being explanatory are non-starters for the extra-mathematical case. Yet, there is still 
something not quite right here. There is something wrongheaded about the claim that, even 
if extra-mathematical explanations cite information about causes, this information is not the 
source of explanatory power. The purported facts about the evolutionary history of the 
cicadas, and the evolutionary history of the marine mammals, clearly play some explanatory 
role in the relevant explanations. A simple replacement test seems to bring this out.86 Absent 
the fact about the evolutionary history of the cicadas, the explanation seems to be no 
explanation at all: if there were no periodical predators, then it would remain a mystery as to 
why the cicadas evolved to have prime life-cycles, even accepting the truth of the number-
theoretic theorem. Having a prime life-cycle would confer no evolutionary benefit on the 
cicadas in this case.87  
																																																						
84 Relatedly, one might worry that if causal information and causal explanation are tightly related to 
counterfactuals then the necessity of mathematical facts makes causal resources useless for understanding extra-
mathematical explanation. I will return to this worry after setting out an account of extra-mathematical 
explanation that draws on the resources of a leading account of causal explanation. 
85 The purpose of discussing and rejecting the less charitable readings of the worries is that, as evidenced above, 
these readings are suggested in the literature and are also encountered ‘in the field’. 
86 Appealing to a replacement test to work out whether or not a fact is genuinely part of an explanation is also 
done by Pincock. Pincock’s test is more stringent than the heuristic appealed to above: see Pincock 2012: 204-
205 for details. Of course, such a test can (at most) tell us that the fact is part of the explanation and cannot tell 
us in virtue of what the fact is explanatory. 
87 This worry is complicated by the fact that at least one interlocutor in the debate denies that the standard 
optimality explanations are cases of extra-mathematical explanation. Lange claims that, along with the other 
optimality examples, Cicadas is “just an ordinary causal explanation” (Lange 2013a: 499). Talking about another 
optimality explanation (the honeybee case introduced by Lyon (Lyon 2012)), Lange says that “this explanation 
works by describing the relevant features of the selection pressures that have historically been felt by honeybees, 
so it is an ordinary, causal explanation, not distinctively mathematical” (Lange 2013a: 499-500). He claims that 
the fact that has a genuinely mathematical explanation is that “in connection with predators having periodic 
life-cycles, cicadas with prime periods tend to suffer less from predation than cicadas with composite periods 
do” (ibid). (This corresponds to an explanation of the fact that it is optimal for the species to have this or that trait 
– see fn. 81). It is less than clear what Lange’s reasons are for thinking that the original Cicadas explanation does 
not count as a genuinely extra-mathematical explanation – on this line, it is a regular causal explanation that, 
nevertheless, necessarily appeals to a number-theoretic fact! (Lange says that it “uses a bit of mathematics in 
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This fact generates an additional condition on a successful account of extra-mathematical 
explanation. An account must accommodate the fact that both the causal information in the 
explanation and the mathematical information in the explanation play a role. A successful 
account of extra-mathematical explanation cannot render all non-mathematical facts cited in 
the explanation as non-explanatory. Even the simplest examples of extra-mathematical 
explanation involve some non-mathematical facts doing some explaining: the facts about the 
bridge configuration in Bridges is a physical fact about the number of bridges leading to and 
from each island, the facts about the number of children had by the parent in Lange’s 
strawberries case (and that cutting strawberries is forbidden by stipulation) and so on. 88   
 
Given that it is a requirement that an account of extra-mathematical explanation tells us how 
both the mathematical and non-mathematical facts do explanatory work (in turn making sure 
not to render the non-mathematical facts as non-explanatory), and given that the non-
mathematical facts doing the explaining in many extra-mathematical explanations are facts 
about causation, this further motivates the project of attempting to extend causal accounts 
of explanation to the extra-mathematical case. As I will argue in the next two sections, a 
modal account of extra-mathematical explanation can render both the mathematical and 
causal information explanatory. Indeed, it can do so in a way that is unifying whilst still 
maintaining a distinction between the explanatory facts of two kinds: both the mathematical 
																																																						
describing the explanandum’s causal history” but this doesn’t seem quite right – the number-theoretic theorem 
is stating a mathematical fact, not (at least, on the surface) describing the explanandum’s causal history). Lange, 
elsewhere, admits the existence of explanations in which both causal and mathematical facts do explanatory 
work. In a separate discussion on transitivity and self-explanation, Lange discusses an explanation (involving 
the losing of a bet and the pigeonhole principle) that “is supported not just by causal relations and not just by 
distinctively mathematical relations, but rather the two in combination” (Lange 2016a: 9). Lange’s explanandum 
with (what is, to Lange), the genuinely mathematical explanation (“in connection with predators having periodic 
life-cycles, cicadas with prime periods tend to suffer less from predation than cicadas with composite periods 
do”) lacks any causal information only because this has been built into the why-question, as it were. The existence 
of periodical predators is built into the phrasing of the explanandum (“in connection with predators having 
periodic life-cycles”). We should understand Cicadas, as canonically stated (e.g., as in Baker 2005 & Baker 2009), 
is an explanation where causal and mathematical information is involved in the explanation: Lange’s alternate 
explanation is one where the why-question has been set up such that only a mathematical fact is involved in the 
explanation but Lange does not motivate the view that a distinctively mathematical explanation must be one 
where only a mathematical fact plays a role in the explanation rather than, more weakly, just one where a 
mathematical fact is involved in the explanation. 
88 Much of this information is, of course, normally expressed mathematically but can easily be given a non-
mathematical rendering in first-order logic with identity. (One might worry that if the bridge information is not 
given in terms of the number of bridges but in terms of oddness and evenness, this is a barrier to expressing 
the fact about the bridge non-mathematically, but this is not the case, as these concepts too are susceptible to 
a non-mathematical formulation (as Tallant demonstrates in his proposed nominalisation of the concept of 
primeness (see Tallant 2013 for details)). 
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and causal information play crucial roles in allowing a user access to counterfactual 
information. 
 
4.2. Woodward’s account of causal explanation 
 
In this short section I justify focusing on Woodward’s account of explanation in carrying out 
the task of attempting to extend accounts of causal explanation to the extra-mathematical 
case, and then set out the core details of Woodward’s account, making salient those aspects 
relevant for the purposes of this chapter. 
 
4.2.1. Why Woodward? 
 
The path towards extending Woodward’s account of explanation to the extra-mathematical 
cases was cleared by the dispelling of prima facie worries about extending a causal account of 
explanation in §4.1. However, Woodward’s is not the only account of causal explanation on 
the market and there are, of course, extant worries about the account (for example, worries 
that it cannot respect our judgements about the relationship between higher- and lower-level 
explanations (Franklin-Hall 2016; Weslake 2010) and even that it gets our judgements about 
simple cases wrong (Skow ms)). Indeed, it is not even as if Woodward offers the only 
counterfactual treatment of causation or causal explanation (see, non-exhaustively, 
Hitchcock 2007; Lewis 1986; Schaffer 2005; Yablo 2004).  Why, then, attempt to extend 
Woodward’s account rather than some other account of explanation, such as Strevens’ 
Kairetic account, which focuses on difference-making?89  
 
Much of this question turns on questions internal to the causal explanation debate: reasons 
for preferring Woodward’s account to Strevens’ qua account of causal explanation. One 
might be moved by the fact that Woodward’s account seemingly accommodates 
counterexamples that plague other accounts, that aspects of the account have been accepted 
and accommodated by those working in the mechanisms literature (Craver 2007) and by the 
fact that the account makes do without appealing to a metaphysically substantive (or, as 
																																																						
89 Saatsi (Saatsi 2016b) discusses extra-mathematical explanation in relation to the Kairetic account and Strevens 
himself discusses the relationship between causal and mathematical explanation (Strevens forthcoming). I hope 
to engage with this latter piece in future work: even though the projects of making sense of extra-mathematical 
explanation using a Woodwardian framework and using Strevens’ framework are distinct, given that they are 
both in the business of using a causal theory of explanation to accommodate such cases, there are likely to be 
insights and strategies common between the two. 
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Woodward has it, ‘reductionist’) account of causation (Woodward 2003: 20-21).  If one of 
the aims of extending Woodward’s account of explanation to the extra-mathematical case is 
to vindicate anti-exceptionalism, it would be an awkward state of affairs if a Woodward-
inspired account of extra-mathematical explanation ended up being successful but 
Woodward’s account of causal explanation ended up being inadequate compared to the 
Kairetic account, for example.90 It hopefully goes without saying that it is beyond the current 
scope to evaluate the two accounts qua accounts of causal explanation, let alone compare 
them to other accounts of causal explanation. 
 
Here, then, are three prima facie reasons for attempting to extend Woodward’s account of 
explanation rather than others – reasons that do not depend on the success of Woodward’s 
account as an account of explanation qua causation. First, recall that the notion of 
dependence cropped up at various points in the discussion of rival accounts in the previous 
chapter. Some of the problems of the entailment account and the constraint account 
involved generating the wrong judgements about different variations of the cases, and there 
were outstanding questions about how Pincock’s notion of abstract dependence relates to 
other kinds of dependence appealed to in existing accounts of explanation.91 This, in turn, 
leads the way for attempting to extend Woodward’s account in particular, which gives a key 
role to notions of dependence in a sense that is distinctive when compared to similar 
accounts. Second, many of the examples of extra-mathematical explanation are drawn from 
the biology literature and interventionist accounts of explanation (including mechanistic 
accounts of explanation that draw upon an interventionist notion of causation) are often 
taken to be good candidate theories for shedding light on these explanations. Third, there is 
existing recent work on extending Woodward’s account to non-mathematical non-causal 
explanations (Bokulich 2011; Reutlinger 2014; Rice 2013; Saatsi & Pexton 2013) – appealing 
to Woodwardian resources to shed light on extra-mathematical explanation, then, can be 
positioned in a current research program. So, there are reasons for preferring Woodward’s 
account over others: it does well in an internal comparison of accounts of explanation, it 
appeals to the notion of dependence in a way that may help avoid the problems of rival 
accounts and coheres both with the literatures on explanation in the biological sciences and 
on non-causal scientific explanation. 
 
																																																						
90 This, of course, wouldn’t tell against a Woodwardian account of extra-mathematical explanation. 
91 See fn.114. 
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These, of course, are not decisive reasons for appealing to Woodward’s account of 
explanation rather than another current account of explanation. If a rival anti-exceptionalist 
account of extra-mathematical explanation can be offered, then this account will have to be 
compared with the anti-exceptionalist modal account offered in this chapter. Hopefully, 
however, it is sufficient justification to motivate the project of this chapter. 
 
4.2.2. Woodward’s account of causal explanation  
 
In this section I set out the core commitments of Woodward’s account of causal explanation: 
this will allow an analysis of how a Woodward-style treatment of extra-mathematical 
explanation is both similar and dissimilar to the analogous treatment of causal explanation.  
 
According to the counterfactual account of explanation, explanation “is a matter of 
exhibiting systematic patterns of counterfactual dependence” (Woodward 2003: 191). In 
particular, the relevant counterfactual dependencies are those that facilitate the answering of 
questions concerning how the explanandum would have been different if the explanans had 
been different in certain, particular ways. In particular: if some particular intervention had 
been carried out on an explanans variable, how would this have affected the explanandum 
variable? As Woodward says: 
 
[Explanations] locate their explananda within a space of alternative possibilities and show us 
how which of these alternatives is realised systematically depends on the conditions cited in 
the explanans. They do this by enabling us to see how, if these initial conditions had been 
different or had been changed in various ways, various of these alternative possibilities would 
have been realised instead. [Explanations] can be used to answer a range of counterfactual 
questions about the conditions under which their explananda would have been different. 
(Woodward 2003: 191) 
 
Skow offers the following one sentence summary of the view: 
 
A body of fact F causally explains some event (or, equivalently, explains the fact that the 
explanandum variable takes a particular value) E iff F exhibits a systematic pattern of 
counterfactual dependence of E on other events (or, equivalently, exhibits a systematic 
pattern of counterfactual dependence of E on the explanans variables taking particular 
values). (Skow ms: 5) 
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It is clear, of course, that not all information about counterfactual dependency can count as 
explanatory: as Woodward says, “there seems to be a perfectly good sense in which the joint 
effects […] of a common cause […] are counterfactually dependent on one another, even 
though one cannot appeal to the occurrence of one effect to explain the other” (Woodward 
1997: S29).92 Rather, on Woodward’s account of explanation, the counterfactuals that are 
explanatorily salient are those that take as their antecedent a description of an intervention. 
Woodward develops a technical notion of intervention, such that changes in the explanans 
variable that are a result of changes in the explanandum variable or a result of a different 
variable that effects the explanandum variable independently of the explanans variable are 
ruled out. To explain, then, is to provide information about counterfactual dependence 
relations (of the right type) between the explanandum (variable) and the explanans 
(variables). A helpful (though in ways that will become clear, occasionally misleading) way of 
understanding the notion of an intervention is as a manipulation on an explanan variable that 
could have physically been carried out, resulting in the explanandum variable taking a 
different value. This heuristic can, at least, see how the account offered avoids common 
cause counterfactual dependencies as counting as explanatory. It is nevertheless important 
to note that the relevant set of interventions are not those that we could, in fact, carry out. 
Woodward appeals to the notion of potential exploitability:  
 
What matters is not whether human beings can actually carry out manipulations on the 
magnitudes of X and Y but whether the relationship correctly describes how Y would change 
if a change in X were produced by a special sort of causal process that I call intervention 
(Woodward 2003: 374).  
 
Woodward says that “I call a manipulation having the right sort of structure an intervention” 
(ibid: 28) (original emphasis). For our purposes, it is safe to take the manipulations of 
variables to include all changes in variables and for the interventions to be a subset of the 
manipulations – every intervention is a manipulation (because every intervention involves a 
changing of an explanan variable) but not every manipulation is an intervention (as to count 
as an intervention, a manipulation must meet some additional criteria – it must have 
																																																						
92 Consider a perfectly accurate barometer: there will be counterfactual dependence of the barometric reading 
on the atmospheric pressure in much the same way as there will be counterfactual dependence of the 
atmospheric pressure on the barometric reading (cf. Salmon 1989: 46-50). 
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Woodward’s “right kind of structure”).93 The relevant manipulations (those that count as 
possible interventions) for Woodward are not exhausted by those manipulations that we 
could in fact carry out but also do not contain all changes in explanans variables (for 
discussion see ibid: 127-133): 
 
I suggest that as long as there is some basis for assessing the truth of counterfactual claims 
concerning what would happen if various interventions were to occur, it doesn’t matter that 
it may not be physically possible for those interventions to occur. (ibid: 130) 
 
Whether or not a more precise characterisation must be given in order for Woodward’s 
account, qua account of causal explanation, to be successful is not one I pursue here but 
return to briefly in §4.8 when discussing the causal nature of extra-mathematical 
explanations. 
 
Another crucial component of Woodward’s account to be made salient is that of an invariant 
generalization. The invariant generalization plays the role of telling us how changes of the 
explanans variable results in changes of the explanandum variable. Consider Pendulum, an 
explanation introduced at the end of chapter 2.94 The pendulum law tells us how, if we were 
to intervene on an explanan variable, the explanandum variable would take a different value. 
What is it for a generalization to be invariant? For Woodward, invariance comes in degrees. 
Consider an example given by Woodward. Newton’s law describes a relationship between 
certain variables: it tells us how these variables depend on each other. The generalization is 
invariant under a change of variables if, under that change, the values described by the 
generalization stand in the relationship described by the generalization. In Woodward’s 
example, Newton’s law of gravitation is an invariant under changes that do not involve strong 
gravitational fields or velocities comparable with light: once the variables take these values, 
the relationship that the variables stand in to each other is no longer as described by the 
generalization (ibid: 286).95  
																																																						
93 It is unfortunate that both ‘intervention’ and ‘manipulation’ have human-focused rings to them and that 
sometimes in the literature they are treated interchangeably: the above hopefully accounts for how the terms 
are used in this thesis. 
94 Whilst Pendulum has mathematical content, recall that it is not an example of a mathematical explanation in the 
sense relevant for this chapter (see §2.7).  
95	That invariance is a matter of degree does not tell us how it ought to be measured. The plausibility of measuring 
invariance simply by appealing to the number of interventions that a given generalization is invariant under 
seems to turn on open questions about the density of the possibility space (the worry being that every 
generalization will end up being invariant under an infinite number of interventions, so long as we carve up the 
space of possibilities in the right way). Elsewhere, when Woodward talks about laws of nature, he says that: 
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I will briefly attend to two interpretative questions about the account. The first concerns 
what it is for a collection of facts to exhibit information about counterfactual dependence. 
It is clearly not the case that the body of fact that constitutes the explanation explicitly states 
all of the answers to the w-questions, even though allowing a user to answer such questions is 
the source of explanatory power. As Woodward says, explanations enable “us to see how, if 
these initial conditions had been different or had been changed in various ways, various of 
these alternative possibilities would have been realised instead” (ibid: 191) (emphasis mine). 
I think we should understand this roughly in terms of knowledge, or abilities, gained by a 
user of the explanation. Once a user of an explanation comes to know the information about 
counterfactual dependence, they gain the ability to answer w-questions: questions about what 
the explanandum variable would be if the explanans variables had changed as the result of 
an intervention. 
 
A second question concerns why it is that the account described is an account of causal 
explanation, rather than of explanation simpliciter. This is in virtue of the fact that, for 
Woodward, causation is closely tied up with the notion of an intervention and, as set out 
above, the notion of an intervention is in turn used to narrow down the collection of 
counterfactuals. Woodward offers the following view on causation and intervention: 
 
A necessary and sufficient condition for X to be a (type-level) direct cause of Y with respect 
to variable set V is that there be a possible intervention on X that will change Y or the 
probability distribution of Y when one holds fixed at some value all other variables Zi in V. 
A necessary and sufficient condition for X to be a (type-level) contributing cause of Y with 
respect to variable set V is that (i) there be a directed path from X to Y such that each link 
in this path is a direct causal relationship; […] and that (ii) there be some intervention on X 
that will change Y when all other variables in V that are not on this path are fixed at some 
value. (ibid: 59) 
 
																																																						
“paradigmatic laws are simply generalizations with wide scope that are invariant under a large and important 
set of changes that can be given a theoretically perspicuous characterization” (ibid: 286). This suggests that 
invariance turns on the number of important interventions that a generalization is invariant under. This question 
needn’t be settled here: what is important is just that invariant generalizations play their role in an explanation 
by giving the user of the explanation the ability to answer w-questions about the explanandum by describing how 
the values of the variables relate to one and other, and that their invariance is a matter of degree.	
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Taking explanation to centrally involve information about counterfactual dependence, and 
taking causation to be closely related to the notion of an ideal intervention, are logically 
distinct. As is noted by Woodward in passing (ibid: 221) and has been exploited by recent 
commentators (Bokulich 2011; Reutlinger 2014; Rice 2013; Saatsi & Pexton 2013), this leaves 
open the possibility for extending the account to kinds of non-causal explanation by taking 
as, in these cases, counting as relevant some counterfactuals that result from manipulations 
of explanans variables that do not (at least, not straightforwardly) result from an 
intervention.96 It also means that Woodward’s framework can be adopted even though one 
may have reservations about the interventionist analysis of causation. This is the insight that 
guides the extension of the account to the extra-mathematical case, given in the next section.  
 
4.3. Towards a modal account of extra-mathematical explanation 
 
As noted above, the account is presented by Woodward as an attempt to model causal 
explanation. This is reflected in Woodward’s discussion of which class of counterfactuals is 
explanatorily relevant.  The explanatorily relevant counterfactuals are those that contain 
information about the consequences of interventions. The explanatorily relevant 
counterfactuals are supported by contingent explanatorily generalisations, some of which are 
laws.97 However, there is nothing in the counterfactual account to say that the explanatorily 
relevant counterfactuals must be supported by contingent generalisations: indeed, I’ll suggest 
below that in the extra-mathematical cases the explanatorily relevant counterfactuals are 
supported by the mathematics used in the explanations. As noted by others, Woodward 
himself raises this possibility when he says: 
 
The common element in many forms of explanation, both causal and noncausal, is that they 
must answer what-if-things-had-been-different questions. When a theory tells us how Y 
would change under interventions on X, we have (or have the material for constructing) a 
causal explanation. When a theory or derivation answers a what-if-things-had-been-different 
question but we cannot interpret this as an answer to a question about what would happen 
under an intervention, we may have a noncausal explanation of some sort. (Woodward 2003: 
221) 
																																																						
96 I will return to this point in more detail in §4.8. 
97 Woodward is clear that even though in many cases the invariant generalization will be a law, its lawhood is 
not what enables it to play an explanatory role: the fact that it is invariant and accurately describes the world’s 
patterns of dependence is what makes it explanatory. For details, see Woodward 2003: 286. (On some accounts 
of laws (e.g., Bird 2004), some of the explanatory generalizations will be necessary – nothing here turns on my 
assumption that they are contingent). 
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The best way to demonstrate the fruitfulness of the approach is to work through some of 
the examples set out at the end of chapter 2 and see how a Woodward-style approach can 
shed light on them. (In this section I set out the basic idea and in the next section appeal to 
recent and forthcoming proposals to introduce a bifurcation of the account). The idea is just 
that encapsulated in Woodward’s quote above. The explanatory power of extra-mathematical 
explanations is located, as with causal explanations on Woodward’s approach, in their ability 
to tell us what the explanandum depends on and in what ways: what aspects of the target 
system play a role in determining the explanandum obtaining and how the explanandum 
would be different, if these various aspects of the target system were different in various 
ways. The extra-mathematical extension functions by drawing an analogy between the role 
played by invariant generalizations in paradigm causal cases and the role played by the 
mathematical fact. In an extra-mathematical explanation, the mathematical fact (along with 
the other information in the explanation) takes us from values of the explanans variables to 
values of the explanandum variable.98 
 
Start with the simple case. In Lange’s strawberry case, the inability of the parent to evenly 
divide the strawberries amongst the children is explained by the mathematical fact that 23 is 
not evenly divisible by 3, and the non-mathematical facts that there are 3 children and 23 
strawberries.99 In this case, there are counterfactual dependence relations between the 
explanandum and the explanans that ground asymmetric changes in the explanans to changes 
in the explanandum. The explanation affords us knowledge that the number-of-strawberries 
variable has ramifications for the divisibility by three and, in turn, this has ramifications for 
the failure or success of the ability to evenly distribute the strawberries. That is: we know the 
answer to the w-question “what if the parent had 30 strawberries, rather than 23?”. Crucially, 
this dependence of the explanandum variable on the explanans variable is asymmetric. 
Whether or not the parent can successfully share the strawberries amongst their children 
without cutting any strawberries counterfactually depends on the number of strawberries 
that the parent has, but the number of strawberries that the parent has does not 
																																																						
98 Given that Lange’s account also assigns a crucial role to modality, it is somewhat infelicitous to call the 
account here the modal account. However, given that Lange has recently noted that he thinks that extra-
mathematical explanations belong to a wider class of explanations by constraint, the least inappropriate labelling 
of the views is the one used in this thesis.  
99 As explained above, the existence of paraphrases of these sentences in first-order logic with identity suggests 
that these are non-mathematical facts expressed mathematically. (For reasons familiar from §1.5, though, it is 
not a sufficient condition on a mathematical sentence being the mathematical expression of a non-mathematical 
fact that it is possible to express this content non-mathematically). 
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counterfactually depend on whether or not the parent is able to successfully share the 
strawberries.100 The mathematical fact supports the counterfactuals in the same way that the 
generalisations do in the causal cases. This simple case additionally very clearly brings out 
how the mathematical facts in extra-mathematical cases and the invariant generalizations in 
the paradigm causal cases are very different kinds of facts, despite both playing similar roles 
in their respective explanations: there is no straight-forward sense in which the mathematical 
fact about 23’s divisibility is about the strawberries in the same way that the pendulum law is 
about pendulums. I return to this point in §4.6. 
 
Next, consider Cicadas. The explanatory power in this case can also plausibly be located in 
counterfactual dependence relations between the explanans (variables) and explanandum 
(variable). Baker in fact discusses two different explananda. The first explanandum is the fact 
that cicada life-cycle lengths are prime. Second are the more specific explanations of particular 
species’ life-cycle lengths: explanations of the fact that the Magicicada septendecim has a life-
cycle length of 17 years, for example. For the first kind of explanandum, the explanandum 
variable will take the value either ‘prime’ or ‘not-prime’. For the second kind, the variable 
will take a value corresponding to the length of the life cycle measured in years – so, ‘17 
years’ is an example value.  The explanans variables are things like the existence of periodic 
rival species and predators, the ecological constraints, and so on.  
 
One of the explanans cites a fact that there are certain ecological constraints. The 
environment in which the cicadas exist is such that their life cycles must fall within a certain 
range (between 14 and 18 years). The possible values of this variable, then, are different life-
cycle ranges, with ‘14 – 18’ being an example value. Consider a manipulation of this variable, 
such that it now takes the value ‘4 – 8’. The cicada explanation seems to do a good job at 
allowing us to answer this counterfactual ‘what if things had been different?’ question. If the 
ecological constraints were different, then the cicadas would have evolved to have life cycles 
of a different length: that is, the explanandum variable would take a different value.  
																																																						
100 Information about the number of strawberries had by the parent (crucially, along with the mathematical 
background) tells us exactly what value the explanandum variable has. If the number is divisible by 3, then the 
explanandum variable will take the value ‘equally distributable’ (or ‘possible’, depending on exactly how we 
state the explanandum)), if the number is not divisible by 3 then the explanandum variable will take the value 
‘not equally distributable’ (or ‘impossible’). The value taken by the explanandum variable does, to be fair, tell 
us something about the explanan variable but not with as much specificity: if the explanandum variable takes the 
value ‘possible’ (or ‘equally distributable’) then we know that the value of the explanan variable ‘number of 
strawberries had by the parent’ takes as its value a number evenly divisible by 3, but we do not know what value 
it takes. In this sense, then, the counterfactual dependence remains asymmetric. 
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Moreover, the explanation can tell us exactly what those life-cycle lengths would have been. 
If there are any prime numbers that fall inside the range forced upon the cicada by the 
ecological constraints, then this would be the length of the cicada’s life-cycle. So in the 
example given, the cicada would have evolved to have life-cycle length of 7 years.  
 
Here’s another example. Although this is somewhat supressed in the formalisation of the 
argument that Baker provides, recall that a crucial part of the explanation provided by 
biologists requires the suggestion that in the evolutionary history of the cicadas, there were 
either periodic predators or rivals. It is this fact that makes salient the number-theoretic 
theorem. Accordingly, the explanation also affords us knowledge of another dependence 
relation: between the fact that there existed periodic predators/rivals and the fact that a 
cicada species evolved to have prime periods. There are two counterfactual scenarios to 
consider. The first: what if there had been no other periodic rival species and no periodic 
predators in the evolutionary history of the cicada? The second: what if the periodic rivals 
and periodic predators had life-cycle lengths that were not nearby life-cycle lengths? The 
answer to both of these w-questions seems to be the same: the life-cycle lengths of the cicada 
species would not have been prime.101 This is because, roughly, in such a scenario there would 
be no evolutionary advantage conferred upon the cicada by having prime life-cycles. On the 
modal account, explanatory power is grounded in facilitating the answering of what-if-things-
had-been-different questions and it is the number-theoretic theorem that allows the 
answering of these questions. In this sense, the number-theoretic theorem helps to explain 
the explanandum. 
 
This, then, is the basic idea. Taking the mathematical fact to play the role of the invariant 
generalization in Woodward-style explanations allows for a very natural extension of 
Woodward’s account, using the conceptual resources of that account to accommodate the 
extra-mathematical explanations. That the above suggested renders the mathematical fact 
explanatory, and tells us why it is explanatory, is only a minimal requirement though. The 
details of the suggestion can be brought out by attending to three naturally occurring 
questions. First: does extending an account of explanation that appeals to counterfactuals to 
the extra-mathematical case mean that some of the counterfactuals are counterpossibles, and 
if so, is this a problem? Second: how does the mathematical fact play the role of providing 
																																																						
101 Or, more accurately, the life-cycle of the cicadas would probably not be prime – even had there been no rival 
species or predators, given the ecological constraints there is still a reasonable chance that the life-cycle length 
would end up taking the prime-numbered variable that falls inside the range. 
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modal information about the system being explained, if the mathematical fact does not seem 
to be about, or seem to describe, the target system in any obvious sense? Third: does extending 
an account of explanation usually applied to causal cases mean that the extra-mathematical 
cases are in fact causal, contra the near-unanimous assumption made in the literature? In the 
rest of this chapter, I attend to these questions. 
 
4.4. The modal account and the role of counterpossibles  
 
In this section I consider whether or not counterpossibles play a role in a modal account of 
extra-mathematical explanation and, against a trend emerging in forthcoming work by other 
commentators, argue that they do not. 
 
There has been a recent flurry of work, developed in parallel, on the relationship between 
causal explanation, non-causal explanation, counterfactual information, and extra-
mathematical explanation (Baron, Colyvan & Ripley 2017; Chirimuuta forthcoming; Jansson 
& Saatsi forthcoming). In addition to flagging awareness of this work, this section clarifies 
an outstanding point about the role of counterpossibles. In this section I vindicate an 
assumption made by Jansson and Saatsi (Jansson and Saatsi forthcoming) and argue against 
an assumption made by both Baron, Colyvan and Ripley (Baron, Colyvan & Ripley 2017) 
and Chirimuuta (Chirimuuta forthcoming): that is, I argue that a counterfactual, or modal, 
account of extra-mathematical explanation need not appeal to counterpossibles resulting 
from perturbations of the mathematical facts.  
 
First, I offer a potential objection along the lines of the account having to deal in 
counterpossibles and then set out the ways in which Jansson and Saatsi, on the one hand, 
and Baron, Colyvan and Ripley and Chirimuuta, on the other, seem to take different 
positions on this issue. I then argue in favour of the former strategy. I argue that the 
counterpossible reading of the modal account mistakes the role played by the mathematical 
fact in the explanation. Clarifying this point, then, also constitutes a reply to this potential 
objection. 
 
4.4.1. The counterpossibles objection(s) 
 
Here, first, is a set-up of the counterpossibles question in terms of an objection. 
Counterpossibles are counterfactuals (or subjunctive conditionals) that take an impossible 
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statement as their antecedent. Here’s a (hopefully) uncontroversial example: if a given 
triangle T had three sides, then T would be a shape with the same number of sides as every 
square. This example demonstrates the sense in which (at least some) counterpossibles seem 
to pull us in two conflicting directions. There is, I take it, general assent that the antecedent 
of this conditional is impossible: it is impossible for an object to be a triangle and yet have 
four sides. Yet, there is some sense in which this counterpossible seems correct, even though 
there is no possible world at which its antecedent obtains (and it is therefore false that there 
is some set of relevant possible worlds at which the antecedent and conclusion are both true). 
In contrast, the counterpossible ‘if a given triangle T had four sides, then Owen Smith would 
be Prime Minister’ seems incorrect. 
 
It is standardly assumed that mathematical claims are necessarily true if true and necessarily 
false is false.102 Accordingly, if the modal account of extra-mathematical explanation requires 
us to consider what would be the case were the mathematical facts other than they are then 
the account requires countenancing counterpossibles. This generates two possible 
objections. The first claims that counterpossibles are vacuously true and mathematical 
counterpossibles are therefore incapable of doing any explanatory work, in virtue of being 
uninformative. This version of the objection involves endorsing the line on counterpossibles 
given by Lewis (Lewis 1991) and recently defended by Williamson (Williamson 2007; 
Williamson forthcoming), according to which it is false that counterpossibles can take non-
vacuous truth-values. A second objection leaves open the question as to the semantics of 
counterpossibles but argues that just having to give an account of the truth-values of 
mathematical counterpossibles at all is a theoretical cost of the modal account. On this line, 
the modal account is undesirable because it requires arguing for a kind of view about 
counterpossibles endorsed by commentators who claim about counterpossibles can be non-
vacuously true (Beall & van Fraassen 2003; Brogaard & Solerno 2013; Bjerring 2014; Ripley 
2012).103 This version of the objection makes fewer theoretical commitments – given that it 
leaves open the question about the semantics of counterpossibles – and is therefore less 
powerful for it. This second version of the objection, then, is a sort of argument via 
theoretical virtues: it identifies a theoretical cost of the modal account, rather than arguing 
directly that the modal account must be false in virtue of mathematical counterpossibles 
being uninformative. I will argue that both versions of the counterpossibles objection can be 
																																																						
102 See Wright & Hale 1992 and Field 1993 for discussion. 
103 The authors listed here do not all agree on how one ought to extend the Lewis-Stalnaker semantics to cover 
impossible worlds, just that it is possible to do so.  
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defused by making the case that the modal account does not involve counterpossibles. The 
stronger objection is defused because the uninformative and trivial nature of 
counterpossibles becomes irrelevant and the weaker objection is defused because there is no 
burden on the proponent of the modal account to offer an account of the semantics of 
counterpossibles.  
 
4.4.2. Recent work and disagreement on counterpossibles 
 
In this section I give examples of two stances taken on the above question in recent and 
forthcoming work: Baron, Colyvan and Ripley, and Chirimuuta, take it that counterpossibles 
must be involved. Jansson & Saatsi, in contrast, do not mention counterpossibles, discussing 
only counterfactual that take as their antecedent statements about the target physical systems. 
After providing and discussing these examples, in the next section I aim to vindicate the 
latter absence. The account offered in this chapter, then, contributes to this emerging line of 
research by adjudicating this outstanding disagreement. 
 
In a recent paper, Baron, Colyvan and Ripley also suggest that extra-mathematical 
explanation can be modelled counterfactually.104 Unlike the approach taken above, they do 
not see themselves as extending any particular account of explanation that appeals to 
counterfactuals: Woodward’s interventionist account is mentioned only as a passing piece of 
evidence for the claim that counterfactual information is taken to be closely related to, or to 
be identified with, explanatory information by many philosophers (Baron, Colyvan & Ripley 
2017: 18). As I will argue in the next section, a failure to consider the details of accounts that 
put counterfactual information at the heart of explanation leads to the error of thinking that 
counterpossibles are involved in modelling extra-mathematical explanation counterfactually.  
 
In the discussion, Baron, Colyvan and Ripley consider how we should think about 
perturbations (or what they call ‘twiddles’) of the mathematical facts: how much to keep 
stable, how modifications of facts about numbers ramify to change the nature of 
mathematical concepts like multiplication, and so on. The details of this sophisticated and 
																																																						
104 Baron, Colyvan and Ripley do not give much attention to ramifications for the enhanced indispensability 
argument – they, too, see themselves engaged in the project of developing an account of extra-mathematical 
explanation. Given Colyvan’s stake in the realist side of the debate, however, I take it that he holds that the 
account of extra-mathematical explanation he jointly offers bolsters the realist side even though he says nothing 
about why we should think that playing an explanatory role via offering counterfactual information is the kind 
of explanatory role that is ontologically committing. Perhaps this is an issue he will take up in future work. 
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interesting account do not bear, however, on the central question of whether or not 
extending a counterfactual account of explanation to the extra-mathematical case requires 
counterpossibles at all.105 Baron et al. are explicit that they are not interested in offering an 
account of the semantics of counterfactuals (ibid: 2) and also that their contribution does not 
constitute a defence of “these familiar tools [counterfactuals] as an account of explanation 
at all” (ibid: 18) (directing the reader to Woodward 2003 (as well as Woodward & Hitchcock 
2003 and Pearl 2000)) nor a defence of what they call “a counterfactual theory of extra-
mathematical explanation”, the proponents of which they note may include their “future 
time-slices” (ibid: 12). However, by taking as their starting assumption merely that 
counterfactuals are involved in explanation, rather than attempting to develop some particular 
account of explanation that appeals to counterfactuals (as I do above), Baron et al. go 
astray.106  
 
It is worth noting, though, that Baron et al. are not alone in the forthcoming literature in 
making this assumption. Although her narrower focus is demonstrating that so-called 
efficient coding explanations from cognitive neuroscience constitute examples of extra-
mathematical explanation, Mazviita Chirimuuta also takes it as read that extending a 
Woodwardian approach to the extra-mathematical case will involve counterpossibles. She 
says that: 
 
Instead, [in mathematical explanations] we are told how things would be under certain 
impossible scenarios in which the laws of mathematics are altered. This of course assumes that 
counterpossible statements – counterfactuals or subjunctive conditionals with impossible 
antecedents – can be non-vacuously true. (Chirimuuta forthcoming: 8) 
 
Chirimuuta’s discussion contrasts with Baron, Colyvan and Ripley’s in that she discusses a 
particular counterfactual account of explanation (she makes explicit reference to 
Woodward’s account): it coheres, though, in that it also maintains that extending such an 
account involves counterpossibles.107 
																																																						
105 Even if the technical work done in Baron, Colyvan and Ripley 2017 is not required in order to give a modal 
account of extra-mathematical explanation, the work is not done in vain: how to model counterpossibles with 
mathematical or logical antecedents is an interesting philosophical question in its own right. 
106 Baron makes much the same assumption elsewhere, stating that how plausible a counterfactual theory of 
extra-mathematical explanation is “depends a bit on how one feels about counterpossibles” (Baron 2016b: 468), 
before offering an objection to an account that appeals to counterpossibles. 
107 Chirimuuta explicitly claims that the relevant counterfactuals are counterpossibles but it is not clear that this 
claim is borne out by her examples. She says that: “in other words, the information theoretic explanation of 
the efficiency of the brain informs us about counterfactual (or counterpossible) scenarios in which the laws of 
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In a forthcoming discussion, Jansson and Saatsi make explicit reference to Woodward’s 
account, as Chirimuuta does, but demur in that they do not make any reference to 
counterpossibles.108 Their discussion focuses on degrees of abstraction and targets the view 
that in the explanations we are interested in, information about independence is explanatory, 
rather than information about dependence (which is taken, in different forms, to be a view 
endorsed by Lange and Pincock). The debate, as set out by Jansson and Saatsi, is between 
exceptionalist accounts (to use the terminology of this thesis) according to which the relevant 
explanations work is done by facts about independence and anti-exceptionalist accounts that 
see the explanatory work being done by facts about dependence, which is more familiar. As 
discussed in §3.5 and fn.113, I have some qualms with this reading of the debate (and with 
their understanding of Pincock’s view in particular), but in as much as they claim that these 
explanations should be understood as explanatory in virtue of providing counterfactual 
information (a la Woodward), I am in agreement. Nevertheless, in their discussion, Jansson 
& Saatsi do not explicitly state that they hold that extending a counterfactual account of 
explanation to the extra-mathematical case (or, as they term it, cases of abstract explanation) 
does not involve countenancing counterpossibles. However, given that the need to do so 
naturally suggests itself as an objection to such a view, I take their lack of discussion of this 
worry to signal that they hold that it is not required.109 Whether or not the absence of a 
discussion of counterpossibles signals endorsement of the view that this is not a requirement, 
																																																						
information theory are different)”, continuing that “the Shannon-Weaver definitions do not have the obvious 
modal strength of “13 is a prime number”” (Chirimuura forthcoming: 12). Two brief remarks should be made 
about this. First, it is unclear whether the relevant counterfactuals genuinely are counterpossibles: the 
antecedents appear to describe situations where the laws of information theory are different and, prima facie, 
worlds at which the laws of information theory are different are not impossible worlds. (A full discussion of 
the literature on the necessity of the laws of nature and the nature, in particular, of the laws of information 
theory would be required in order to claim this decisively). Some of the counterfactuals she considers seem 
transparently to not be counterpossibles: for example: “that the ability of the system to integrate sensory 
information for the duration of a trial is counterfactually dependent on it having a line attractor rather than a 
point attractor” (ibid: 21). Second: even if some of the relevant counterfactuals are indeed counterpossibles, the 
counterpossibles do not result from changes of mathematical facts, but rather changes in (something like) 
necessary conceptual truths about information theory. So, even though Chirimuuta explicitly agrees with Baron 
et al that counterpossibles are involved in extending a counterfactual account of explanation in this way, it is 
unclear from what she says whether or not she thinks that mathematical counterpossibles are at all involved in 
the interesting examples she sets out. (It will not do to say that because the Shannon-Weaver definitions may 
be stated mathematically, and that these definitions are the subject matter of the antecedents of the 
counterpossibles, the counterpossibles involve the mathematical facts being other than they are – as Chirimuuta 
notes, these are plausibly empirical facts stated mathematically rather than mathematical facts (ibid: 13)).  
108 As Pincock does, Jansson and Saatsi refer to abstract explanations rather than extra-mathematical 
explanations: but, just as with Pincock’s discussion, they cite some of the paradigm cases of extra-mathematical 
explanations and so it is safe to infer that they include these explanations (at least) as a subset of the explanations 
they are interested in. 
109 The same absence is present in Saatsi’s earlier discussion of this possibility (Saatsi 2016b: 1060-1063). 
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or whether it instead is simply something to be addressed in future work, in the next section 
I argue in favour of the former stance. By appending the view with such an argument, I 
adjudicate this disagreement (albeit, currently an implicit rather than explicit disagreement!) 
between emerging similar views. 
 
4.4.3. Against the counterpossibility understanding 
 
Those developing counterfactual accounts of explanation along the lines of this chapter 
assume either that counterpossibles are centrally involved in such an account or, it seems, that 
they are not involved at all. The fact that there are theoretical costs to taking one of these 
routes may well be playing a role. I think, however, this emerging disagreement is partially 
grounded by a fundamental disagreement between two different ways of accommodating the 
extra-mathematical cases into (something like) a counterfactual account of explanation. I 
have suggested here that the mathematical fact that features in a given extra-mathematical 
explanation should be understood as analogous to the invariant generalization, or law, 
present in the paradigm causal cases. This is not the only candidate for the analogy, however. 
A different way of accommodating the extra-mathematical cases is to think of the 
mathematical fact (and the corresponding mathematical objects) as analogous to the causes in 
the paradigm causal cases. This, recall, is implicit in Baker’s dismissal of the possibility of 
causal accounts being any use, when he says “[the causal account] is incompatible with the 
existence of any genuine mathematical explanations, since mathematical objects (if they exist) 
are acausal (Baker 2005: 454). 
 
With this distinction in mind, consider the following. There are two ways in which one might 
think that a modal account of extra-mathematical explanation would involve 
counterpossibles that result from holding fixed non-mathematical facts whilst changing 
mathematical facts. The first involves changes of the particular mathematical fact doing 
explanatory work: for example, considering how the explanandum variable would be 
different if prime periods maximised intersection. But now that the two ways of extending a 
Woodward-style account have been explicitly stated, this reveals itself to mistake the role 
played by the mathematical fact. I have suggested here that the fact should be understood as 
analogous to facts like the pendulum law: to invariant generalizations. In Pendulum, none of 
the counterfactual situations involve presupposing that the period of the pendulum and the 
gravitational field strength (and so on) stand in different relations to each other, rather than 
the relation expressed by the law. Rather, the pendulum law is held fixed and the variables 
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are manipulated in order to understand the ramifications for the explanandum. As 
emphasised in the exposition of Woodward’s account, qua account of causal explanation, it 
is the invariance of the generalization that is (partially) constitutive of its ability to aid in an 
explanation. This would be in tension with the suggestion that the mathematical fact in an 
extra-mathematical explanation does explanatory work by giving a user information about 
how the explanandum would take a different value if this mathematical fact were otherwise. 
Instead, I have suggested that it does work by giving us access to counterfactual information 
about the explans variables and how the explanandum variable depends on the values that 
they take. 
 
Addressing with the second way that counterpossibles might enter into the picture is 
somewhat more fraught. This second way in which one might think that a modal account of 
extra-mathematical explanation would involve counterpossibles is if some of the 
manipulations involved variations of particular mathematical facts concerning, for example, 
primeness: for example, considering how the explanandum variable would differ if 7 were 
composite rather than prime.110 In short, this challenge amounts to asking why we should 
endorse the law-analogy version of the modal account and not the cause-analogy version. 
So, here are some reasons. The first, prima facie, reason for not countenancing such 
counterpossibles involves fidelity to the presentations of the case studies in the scientific 
literature. In the presentations, biologists offer as the explanatory facts the facts about 
environmental factors, the existence of predators and the relevance of the number-theoretic 
result: in contrast, it seems as though the mathematical facts are held fixed. A second reason 
involves the form of the mathematical facts: they, just like the invariant generalizations, are 
general claims with very wide scope.111 This has already been noted by Baker in his schematic 
extension of the D-N account of explanation (see §3.2).  
 
It is important, third, to keep in mind that the counterpossibility reading of the modal 
account strictly involves more counterfactuals being invoked in understanding these cases, 
rather than an alternate collection of counterfactuals. A proponent of the counterpossibilist 
understanding of the modal account must, I take it, also think that counterfactuals involving 
																																																						
110 This is the kind of mathematical manipulation that Baron et al. consider to be involved. Baron makes much 
the same assumption in an earlier discussion (Baron 2016a) but again does not motivate endorsing the law-
analogy rather than the object-analogy. 
111 Indeed, mathematical facts (like the number-theoretic and graph-theoretic theorems involved in Cicadas and 
Bridges respectively) can be seen as special cases of invariant generalizations. 
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the non-mathematical explanandum variables taking different values also enter into the 
explanation: this is required in order to render these facts explanatory and Baron, Colyvan & 
Ripley (although they say very little on this matter) mention “the non-mathematical twiddles” 
involved in their account (Baron, Colyvan & Ripley 2017: 15). Adding this additional class 
of counterfactuals (that is, the counterpossibles) requires motivation.  
 
A response that that Baron, Colyvan & Ripley might give is the following. Counterpossibles 
concerning imagining what would happen if 13 had the property of being composite rather 
than prime (for example) are required because the mathematical object 13 is doing 
explanatory work and therefore the account must tell us how the explanandum depends on 
this object, 13. However, this perhaps subtly begs some important questions: once it is agreed 
that the mathematical fact does explanatory work by providing modal information, it seems 
an interesting open question whether or not it does so because 13 does explanatory work 
(and, therefore, its presence in the explanation means we ought to have the associated 
ontological commitment) or whether or not the mathematical fact is, whilst playing an 
indispensable role in the explanation, is nevertheless being used to express modal 
information about the target system, with this information being explanatory. In §4.6 I develop 
the account in a way that makes the second route look plausible. 
 
The reason that adding counterpossibles to the set of relevant counterfactuals requires 
motivation is because doing so comes with an additional theoretical cost. A modal account 
of extra-mathematical explanation that involves counterpossibles has the cost of having to 
make sense of the notion of dependence relations holding between the subject matter of 
mathematics and the target system. In the counterfactual treatment of the paradigm causal 
cases, the counterfactual dependencies that permit the answering of w-questions are 
underpinned by patterns of causal dependence that exist in the world: they make true the 
invariant generalization which, in turn, allows the answering of the w-questions.  As will be 
discussed in §4.8, I don’t intend to argue here that the kind of causal dependence relations 
described by Woodward are the only kinds of worldly dependence relations: so too can 
relations like constitution and supervenience be used to make sense of variables 
counterfactually depending on each other.112 But, the relationship between a mathematical 
																																																						
112 The notion of grounding (Correia & Schnieder 2012; Fine 2012) may be helpful in spelling out the exact 
relationship between the counterfactual dependencies and the worldly dependence relations that are responsible 
for them, but this is not the only option. 
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object and the target system does not seem like it is characterised by any of these kinds of 
dependence relations.  
 
There is a sense in which this debate cannot fully take place until commentators like Baron, 
Colyvan, Ripley and Chirimuuta make explicit why they think counterpossibles are involved 
rather than more familiar counterfactuals about the physical system. Until this is done, there 
is the suspicion that this emerges from the mistaken assumption that, in a causal explanation 
to the extra-mathematical case, the mathematical object should be treated as playing the role 
of the cause. In this section I have, hopefully, demonstrated that the burden is on proponents 
of a counterpossibilist understanding to offer these reasons and have, also, offered some 
prima facie reasons for thinking that they are mistaken in making this assumption. 
 
4.5. Pincock’s objection 
 
So, on the account here, extra-mathematical explanation ought to be modelled along 
Woodwardian lines: the primary difference being that the fact doing the explaining is not an 
invariant generalizing giving access to counterfactual information in virtue of accurately 
describing causal dependence relations, but is rather a mathematical fact which, also, gives 
access to counterfactual information. Pincock describes his account as one that involves 
“two kinds of dependence relations” (Pincock 2015: 876) – his second kind of dependence 
relation is that of abstract dependence, discussed in the previous chapter, which involves the 
particular target system depending on some abstract object that it is an instantiation of: 
 
Woodward uses his account of manipulations and interventions to make precise what these 
[causal] dependence relations come to, my proposal is that an abstract explanation requires 
something similar. In addition to causal dependence relations, there are what we could call 
abstract dependence relations. (Pincock 2012: 877) 
 
Whilst there is uncertainty about the notion of abstract dependence (as discussed in §3.5), 
this remark sounds consistent with much of what has been said in this chapter. Much as 
Woodward’s account tells us how causal explanations provide counterfactual information by 
latching onto causal dependencies in the world, so too can the account tell us how extra-
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mathematical explanations provide counterfactual information by latching onto worldly 
dependencies.113 
 
Despite this, Pincock takes Woodward’s account of explanation to be insufficient for 
shedding light on the kind of explanation Pincock considers. Given the closeness of what 
Pincock says, in places, to a Woodward-style treatment, it is worth briefly considering the 
reasons he gives.114 The first such reason is that discussed above: that because “nobody thinks 
that causal relations obtain in pure mathematics we have a non-causal explanation” (Pincock 
2015: 867). As discussed above, this seems to import an unjustified account of the role of 
mathematical objects in extra-mathematical explanation. Furthermore, even if this point is 
accepted, the recent work on extending Woodward’s account to different kinds of non-causal 
explanation suggests that this needn’t be a barrier. 
 
4.5.1. Pincock’s objection 
 
Perhaps for this reason, Pincock offers a second consideration against extending 
Woodward’s account.115 Pincock claims that, in the kinds of explanations susceptible to 
Woodwardian analysis, “we hold fixed the object mentioned in the explanandum and must 
be told how it would be different in appropriate counterfactual scenarios” (ibid: 868). Pincock 
argues that, in contrast, in the cases under consideration the value “lies instead in the other-
object information it provides” (ibid: 868) – that the explanations do not “tell us how any 
																																																						
113 Jansson and Saatsi say that Pincock “argues that none of the existing accounts with their focus on 
dependence can be extended to capture highly abstract explanations” (Jansson & Saatsi forthcoming: 2). It is, 
of course, correct that Pincock holds that existing accounts cannot accommodate (what he calls) abstract 
explanation. But it’s important to stress again that this isn’t because dependence is playing a crucial role in such 
cases. After all, Pincock’s account gives a central role to dependence. What makes Pincock anti-exceptionalist, 
to my mind, is that he thinks that the kind of dependence at play in extra-mathematical explanation is not 
physical dependence and that this abstract form of dependence cannot be captured using Woodward’s account. 
Whilst Pincock thinks that dependence plays a key role in both extra-mathematical and causal explanation 
(reading into his discussion an implicit endorsement that a Woodwardian approach is along the right lines when 
it comes to causal explanation), he thinks that the extra-mathematical cases require a bifurcation of the 
dependence relations at play in the two kinds of explanation. 
114 One might reasonably wonder that, given that Pincock entertains the thought, at the end of his discussion, 
that “if we are willing to countenance at least two kinds of dependence relations, then abstract and causal 
explanations turn out to have more in common than initial appearances suggest” (Pincock 2015: 858), why is 
Pincock’s view not anti-exceptionalist? It is, first, important to note that Pincock also says that “we can have 
as many kinds of explanation as there are dependence relations” (ibid: 876), suggesting that he does take abstract 
explanation to be a sui generis form of explanation. As one might expect, the answer to the original question 
turns on how, exactly, one draws the exceptionalist/anti-exceptionalist divide: on one carving, Pincock’s 
suggestion is anti-exceptionalist because dependence relations (of various kinds) are involved in both causal 
and (what he calls) abstract explanations, but on another, it is anti-exceptionalist because he is explicit that 
existing accounts of explanation can’t accommodate the case. 
115 Pincock also discusses a consideration against extending the Kariatric account (Pincock 2015: 869-871). 
	 127 
particular physical system will change under an intervention” (ibid). I admit to finding this 
objection difficult to understand. Even if Woodward intends his account of explanation to 
yield explanations only of particular explanandum variables, it is easy to understand 
explanations of the behaviour of objects and systems of a particular type behaving in a certain 
way along the same lines (cf. Jansson & Saatsi forthcoming: 14-15).116 
 
It is worthwhile considering an earlier objection Pincock offers along these lines, to try and 
get a grip on what the objection in Pincock 2015 might amount to. (It’s not clear to me 
whether this objection, and the same-object objection in Pincock 2015 are the same objection 
approached from different sides – Pincock is unclear here and does not explicitly refer back 
to the discussion in Pincock 2012 - but given that it was somewhat difficult to get clear on 
the same-object objection, it is worthwhile discussing this version).  
 
Pincock discusses Bridges in Pincock 2012 when discussing (what he calls) acausal 
representations – but his comments here might shed light on this objection to the Bridges 
case qua explanation. Pincock claims that Bridges is “clearly” not a causal representation, and 
then works through some of the standard accounts of causation. He says that “an advocate 
of a broad manipulation account might read some claims of counterfactual dependence into 
our representation and so insist that it is causal after all” (Pincock 2012: 53). Now, I am 
parking for the moment the question about whether explanations like Bridges are causal (see 
§4.8) – but other than that, a “broad manipulation account” seems to describe the account 
discussed in this chapter quite well. Pincock even makes remarks that resemble the kind of 
w-questions discussed above (“for example, some of the bridges could be a cause of the 
impossibility of the circuit because removing those bridges and shifting to a system [with an 
even number of bridges] would make the circuit possible” (ibid)). Pincock maintains that this 
suggestion cannot be made to work because the explanation “does not have this additional 
fact [about the ramifications of a bridge being removed for the possibility of completing a 
circuit] as part of its content precisely because it does not involve any other graphs besides 
																																																						
116 It’s worth briefly noting that this response can be further supported by appealing to some things that 
Woodward says elsewhere. In discussion about the distinction between data and phenomena, Woodwards says 
that phenomena are “relatively stable and general features of the world which are potential objects of 
explanation and prediction by general theory” (Woodward 1989: 393) and include “weak neutral currents, the 
decay of the proton, and chunking and recency effects in human memory” amongst the examples (Bogen & 
Woodward 1988: 306). I introduce these examples here not to take a stand about whether data or phenomena 
are the proper objects of explanation and prediction. Rather, they are presented as evidence that Woodward 
takes rather general features of the world to be the objects of scientific explanation and that this is perfectly 
consistent with what Pincock says about the case study he describes. 
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the one pictured [referring to a graph of a non-tourable bridge system]. Yet, on the face of 
it, this is just as puzzling as the same-object objection (or, the same-object version of the 
objection): if I explain why a window broke by demonstrating that its breaking depended on 
a rock being thrown at it, there is a weak sense in which this counterfactual is describing a 
different window (one that did not have a rock thrown at it), but there is also a perfectly 
naturally sense in which I am providing information about this very broken window!  
 
There are some counterfactuals that Pincock thinks count as “part of” the explanation, but 
he says that they are “quite special and should not be mixed in with the sorts of 
counterfactuals that are central to causal representations” (ibid: 54): an example is the fact 
that the physical constitution of the bridge is not something that its tourability 
counterfactually depends on. Pincock says that it is not coherent to ask how the bridges 
under examination would change if they had a different physical constitution because “it is 
arguably essential to the bridges that they be made of stone. So there is no possible 
manipulation of these bridges that would change their constitution” (ibid: 54). Perhaps this 
drives a wedge between the Bridges case and the broken window case: but if Pincock’s 
objection is grounded by a substantive view about essential properties, he should do more 
work to fully spell out what this view is and how it is motivated. Until this is done, the 
proponent of a Woodward-style account can simply say that information about what the 
explanandum does not depend on is still information about which parts of the system the 
explanandum depends on and so, putting aside essentialist views about physical constitution, 
these counterfactuals are not, contra Pincock, “special”. 
 
4.6. The modal account and the in virtue of question 
 
In this section I set out a remaining question about the claimed analogy between the role 
played by the invariant generalization in paradigm causal explanations and the role played by 
the mathematical fact in extra-mathematical explanations. Drawing on some recent remarks 
by Mary Leng, I also suggest a possible answer to this question. 
 
4.6.1. The question 
 
Let’s take stock. So far, I argued that prima facie reasons for not extending causal accounts of 
explanation to the extra-mathematical case are unpersuasive. I then endorsed a general 
picture on which that Woodward’s account of explanation can be extended to accommodate 
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the extra-mathematical cases, and that doing so does not require appealing to 
counterpossibles resulting from pertubations of the mathematical facts (in line with some 
recent suggestions on these lines and against others). There are a couple of remaining 
questions that must be addressed.  
 
Suppose one asks the following question of the proponent of the counterfactual account of 
causal explanation: in virtue of what does the invariant generalization that features in causal 
explanations allow a user access to counterfactual information and to the answers to w-
questions? Call this the in virtue of question. A natural answer suggests itself: the generalization 
just is a fact about the world – in particular, it is a fact about dependence relations that hold 
in the world, which underpin the counterfactual dependence relations that a user of the 
explanation is given access to. It is by latching onto this information that that part of the 
explanation does explanatory work. The generalization allows the answering of w-questions 
because it accurately describes (part of) the world’s system of dependence relations (and, in 
the canonical cases, the world’s system of causal dependence relations). In Pendulum, the 
pendulum law accurately describes the dependence relations between the length of the 
pendulum, the gravitational field strength and so on. If the pendulum law expressed a false 
claim about the world’s causal dependence relations, the thought goes, we would have no 
explanation. There is a very tight connection between the truth of the generalization featuring 
in a paradigm causal explanation and the counterfactual dependence relations.117 
 
So: a natural answer suggests itself to the in virtue of question in the regular causal case. 
However, the same answer, it seems, cannot be given in the extra-mathematical case. On 
their surface, at least, the mathematical facts involved in extra-mathematical explanations do 
not describe worldly patterns of dependence: (at least some of) the facts in these cases are 
purely mathematical in character and describe the behaviour and properties of the subject 
matter of mathematics.118 The graph-theoretic fact, if it exhibits information about 
dependence at all, tells us how properties of graphs depend on other facts about graphs: the 
graph-theoretic fact is about graphs, in the same way that the pendulum law is about pendulums 
(of a certain kind). What, then, is the connection between the mathematical fact and the 
																																																						
117 Indeed, for the Humean about laws, the fact about dependence expressed by the law-like statement is made 
true just by the relevant set of facts. 
118 This is complicated by the fact that, for example, the number theoretic theorem in Cicadas appeals to the 
notions of ‘periods’, a biological phenomenon. 
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target system? Whatever grounds the truth, or correctness, of the mathematical fact, it is 
decisively not facts about worldly dependence. 
 
4.6.2. Towards an answer to the question 
 
What is required is an account of in virtue of what a mathematical fact (jointly with other non-
mathematical facts) exhibits information about counterfactual dependence, in the same way 
that an invariant generalization does by directly describing the world’s patterns of 
dependence. In this section I tentatively offer an answer to this question, drawing on some 
recent remarks by Mary Leng. The answer raises some additional questions of their own but, 
felicitously, at least some of these questions will naturally be addressed in chapters 5 and 6. 
 
In recent work, Leng has stressed the structural nature of mathematical explanations.119 This 
seems to stop short of being an account of mathematical explanation – little is said about 
whether or not mathematical explanations being structural in this way means that they are 
sui generis (that is, whether Leng’s remarks qua account of mathematical explanation mean 
that the resulting account is anti-exceptionalist) or whether other, non-mathematical, 
explanations are taken to be structural in the same way. For this reason, these remarks can 
be understood as describing a characteristic of extra-mathematical explanations, one that can 
be drawn on to flesh out aspects of different accounts.120 In using this feature of extra-
mathematical explanations to answer the in virtue of question, I therefore incorporate this 
Leng’s insight into an existing account of explanation. 
 
The general idea behind Leng’s structural suggestion is that the target system involved in a 
given extra-mathematical explanation instantiates a mathematical structure (described by 
specifying the axioms that govern that structure). This is what connects the mathematical 
fact to the non-mathematical target system and makes the mathematical fact capable of 
providing modal information about the explanandum even though the fact does not describe 
the dependency relations found in the world, like an invariant generalization does. Leng says 
the following about structural explanations: 
 
																																																						
119 Although Pincock does not explicitly build this notion into his descriptive account of extra-mathematical 
explanation discussed in the previous chapter, he does appeal to this fact in his discussion of limits of inference 
to the best explanation (Pincock 2012: 211-217). 
120 Indeed, the fact that extra-mathematical explanation has this structural feature seems strongly related to 
Pincock’s sense that the explanations are distinct in virtue of being in some sense abstract. 
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We can think of a mathematical structure as characterized by axioms. A physical system 
instantiating that structure is one where those axioms are true when interpreted as about that 
physical system. A structural explanation will explain a phenomenon by showing that (a) that 
the phenomenon occurs in a physical system instantiating a general mathematical structure, 
and (b) the existence of that phenomenon is a consequence of the structure-characterizing 
axioms once suitably interpreted. (Leng 2012: 990-991) 
 
There is a sense, then, in which this response to the in virtue of question involves disputing 
the central motivating observation: that whilst the invariant generalization does its work by 
describing the world’s patterns of dependence, the mathematical fact must be doing 
something very different. On this line, the mathematical fact is characterizing or describing 
the world, in virtue of this part of the world being an (approximate) instantiation of the 
relevant axioms that also characterize the mathematical domain in question. This allows the 
dependence relations in the mathematical domain carry over to the non-mathematical domain: 
a dependence relation between two numbers and intersection will also be a dependence 
relation between the intersection and two life-cycles that have these lengths. Grasping the 
mathematical fact, and grasping that the target system being explained is an (approximate) 
instantiation of the axioms that characterise the domain that the mathematical fact describes, 
gives us access to a set of counterfactuals about the target physical system. And, as I 
suggested above, it is in virtue of having access to these counterfactuals that we have an 
explanation at all. Now, not all of what I have said here is consistent with the letter of Leng’s 
schematic presentation of this structural account (ibid: 988-991) At places the account is 
described as akin, in some ways, to the DN account of explanation (ibid: 988). As noted, 
Leng does not say whether or not she takes structural explanations to be distinct in kind 
from other kinds of explanation. I have suggested here that her insights about the structural 
nature of these explanations need not lead one into thinking that such explanations are sui 
generis: rather, they can be appealed to in order to explain why it is that a mathematical fact 
provides a user with information about counterfactual dependence. The result is an account 
of extra-mathematical that appropriately draws on the structural character of such 
explanations but nevertheless locates the explanatory power of the explanation in the modal 
information it conveys. No doubt there are existing questions to be answered by this answer 
to the in virtue of question. Some of these (such as what it means to say that the target system 
has a structure such that it is true to say that the structure of the target system (approximately) 
instantiates a collection of axioms) will naturally rear their heads again in chapter 6, whilst 
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others will have to wait for future work. This will be sign-posted in more detail in the thesis 
conclusion.121 
 
In this section, I have raised an outstanding question for any attempt to extend the modal 
account of explanation to the extra-mathematical case and made some steps towards 
providing an answer to this question. I will return to this question in the conclusion of the 
thesis, when I discuss the ramifications of this view about extra-mathematical explanation 
for the debate about mathematical ontology, and for the relationship between mathematics’ 
representational and explanatory capacities. 
 
4.7. The modal account vindicated 
 
The criteria set out at the end of chapter 2 were used, in chapter 3, to argue that rival accounts 
are unsatisfactory. In this section I argue that the modal account fares better in comparison. 
 
As the worked examples from §4.3. demonstrate, it seems as though the modal account tells 
us in virtue of what the mathematical fact in the explanation is explanatory: the mathematical 
fact is explanatory in virtue of providing counterfactual information about the explanandum, 
with which users of the explantion can answer w-questions. The modal account, then, can 
accommodate the case studies. Recall, also, the requirement introduced in this chapter after 
the discussion of the causal information present in many extra-mathematical explanations: 
that a successful account of extra-mathematical explanation must demonstrate how both the 
causal and mathematical explanans are explanatory. As well as the fact about the non-
divisibility of 23 by 3, the facts about the number of strawberries had and the number of 
children also play a role in the explanation and our account of extra-mathematical 
explanation ought to respect this. It seems that the modal account can do so, and can do so 
in a unified way. In Cicadas, for example, both the causal information about the ecosystem 
and the existence of periodical predators and the mathematical fact explain by belonging to 
a collection of facts that exhibit information about counterfactual dependence and permit 
																																																						
121 In a recent discussion, Baron considers and then rejects an account of extra-mathematical explanation that 
he calls the ‘mapping’ account (Baron 2016b: 464) – it is worthwhile distinguishing what is said here from the 
sketch he provides. The kind of account Baron considers takes a piece of mathematics to explain some fact 
just in case there is a structural mapping between the mathematics and the target system: Baron rejects it for 
the obvious reason that it is trivial to generate cases of structural mappings and that “such a case would, on the 
mapping theory, count as an extra-mathematical explanation just because it features a morphism” (ibid). It 
should be clear that on the account offered here, the holding of a structural mapping between vehicle and target 
is not sufficient for the mathematics to be explanatory. 
	 133 
the answering of w-questions. It is not the case, then, that the account falls into the trap of 
yielding the outcome that only the mathematical information in the explanation is 
explanatory. 
 
What, then, of the second requirement: that the successful account of extra-mathematical 
explanation shed light on the different kinds of mathematical explanation that there are? 
Recall that on the entailment account (see §3.2) both Pendulum and Cicadas came out as being 
cases of a mathematical fact explaining a non-mathematical fact, in virtue of their both being 
mathematical sentences that (together with non-mathematical facts) jointly entail the 
explanandum. One might worry that this is also a problem with the modal account. If both 
the simple pendulum law and the number-theoretic theorem do their explanatory work by 
allowing a user of the explanation to answer w-questions, what is the difference between the 
explanations that appeal to these two facts? If it is a desideratum that an account of extra-
mathematical explanation explains why these explanations are judged to be importantly 
different, it seems as though the modal account fails.  
 
This worry can be responded to by drawing attention to the difference between invariant 
generalizations and mathematical facts that was drawn out and commented on in the 
previous section. The simple pendulum law is mathematically stated but, as discussed above, 
seems to have as its content a claim about a physical regularity, concerning the relationship 
between period length and gravitational field strength and so on. Until its terms are 
interpreted, it seems that the simple pendulum law fails to express any content: it is only true 
and false of the physical world rather than expressing some mathematical fact. The fact being 
expressed (and expressed mathematically) is the invariant generalization – the description of 
the world’s patterns of counterfactual dependence. This is not the case of the kinds of 
mathematical facts appealed to in the extra-mathematical explanations. The graph-theoretic 
fact appealed to in Bridges and the fact about primes appealed to in Cicadas are mathematical 
facts rather than non-mathematical facts expressed using mathematics. This, then, is perhaps 
how the modal account can cleave apart mathematical explanations from mathematicised 
explanations. In mathematicised explanations, the explanatory work is being done by a 
physical regularity which is expressed using mathematics but in the cases of mathematical 
explanations, it is a mathematical fact that allows us access to modal information.122 
																																																						
122 Other accounts of extra-mathematical explanation could, of course, also appeal to this difference between 
the mathematical facts appealed to by extra-mathematical explanations and the non-mathematical facts 
expressed mathematically by mathematicised explanations. Two brief comments: this distinction is naturally 
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4.8. The modal account of extra-mathematical explanation and 
causation 
 
In the preceding sections I have made the case that Woodward’s account of causal 
explanation can plausibly be extended to accommodate the extra-mathematical cases, 
adjudicated an emerging disagreement between recent accounts making suggestions on these 
lines. A mathematical fact contributes to the explanation in the same way that an invariant 
generalization does in the paradigm causal cases: by (jointly with the other explanans) 
exhibiting counterfactual information and allowing the user of the explanation to answer w-
questions. I have also tentatively suggested an explanation as to how the mathematical fact can 
play this role, even though the mathematical fact does not describe the world’s dependence 
relations in the same way that an invariant generalization does. A natural question to ask is: 
does this mean that extra-mathematical explanations are causal, after all? §4.1 cleared up 
some prima facie concerns about extending a causal account to these cases, but this does not, 
of course, amount to a positive case.123 
 
There is an obvious sense in which one’s answer to this question depends on what account 
of causation is endorsed, and this is not a thesis about causation. Two substantive points can 
be made, though. To claim that a causal theory of explanation can be extended to the extra-
mathematical case is distinct from making the claim that mathematical objects cause the 
explanandum to take place. I expect that this is the view that philosophers balk at when 
considering extending a causal account in this way: both our intuitive notion of causation (in 
as much as we have one) and many accounts of causation will forbid this.  
 
The fact that Woodward’s account of causal explanation has been extended suggests that 
what we should be asking is whether or not the interventionist notion of causation means 
																																																						
suggested by the modal account and, importantly, none of the accounts in the previous section were rejected 
only because they could not answer the question about how to distinguish extra-mathematical from 
mathematicised explanations. 
123 As is clear from the discussion in the previous chapter and in section two of this chapter, Pincock and Lange 
explicitly take these explanations to be non-causal. Jansson and Saatsi do not respond to this question, taking 
it to be orthogonal to their concerns (Jansson and Saatsi forthcoming: fn.1) Whilst the answer to the question 
is, of course, orthogonal to the task of understanding how extra-mathematical explanations function, it does 
bear on questions about how these relations relate to other kinds of explanation and how they are similar and 
dissimilar. As signalled in the introduction, this is one of the background questions that can hopefully have 
light shed on it by this thesis, so I briefly consider it here. It is to no detriment of Jansson and Saatsi’s discussion 
that they do not. 
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that the extra-mathematical cases are causal explanations. The answer to this question turns 
on something that was noted earlier, in §4.2. Recall that, for Woodward, the relevant set of 
interventions contain all the actually possible manipulations of the explanans variables that we 
could carry out but also some others: the meaning of ‘intervention’ is extended in a way that 
stops short of including all the (logically) possible manipulations of explanans variables but 
contains some manipulations that we are not in fact able to carry out. 
 
Assuming the success of the modal account of extra-mathematical explanation set out above, 
and assuming something like the interventionist account of causation, whether or not a given 
extra-mathematical explanation counts as causal (in this, plausibly quite narrow and technical, 
sense) depends on whether or not the manipulations of the explanans variables count as 
interventions. Chirimuuta also takes this question to turn on whether or not the changes in 
explanans variables can be understood as resulting from manipulations (Chirimuuta 
forthcoming: 6). 
 
One way of considering whether or not a change of explanans variables ought to count as a 
intervention (and therefore whether the explanation ought to count as causal, assuming an 
interventionist understanding of causation) is to consider whether the change has some other 
hallmarks that we associate with causation. For example, Chirimuuta suggests that a 
particular coding explanation from cognitive neuroscience ought to count as non-causal 
because “there is no spatio-temporal separation between putative cause and putative effect. 
To change the dynamical properties is just to change the information processing capacities 
of the network” (Chirimuuta forthcoming: 21) and Pincock also ties the notions of cause 
and effect to temporal notions in his discussion of causal and acausal representations 
(Pincock 2012: 52-53). I will park, for now, issues about whether or not introducing these 
temporal aspects is faithful to Woodward’s presentation of the notion of a manipulation and 
reflect on what ramifications there would be for carving up the case studies of extra-
mathematical explanation into causal and non-causal explanations. The lack of spatio-
temporal separation between the explanan manipulation and explanandum variable taking a 
different value seems to apply to Bridges but less well to the optimality examples. This would 
vindicate the claim above that whether or not a given extra-mathematical explanation counts 
as causal depends on the details of the dependency relations involved in the explanation.124 
																																																						
124 Lange, of course, would argue that the lack of spatio-temporal separation is more evidence that the genuine 
extra-mathematical explanations are not the optimality explanations that have been taken to be canonical: see 
fn.87 for details. 
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In contrast to this conservative approach, recent work in the mechanist literature has 
suggested that some seemingly non-causal worldly dependence relations (ones that can 
underpin counterfactual dependence relations between explanan and explanandum values) 
standardly taken to be non-causal can, in fact, be taken to be causal on an interventionist 
reading. Here’s one example of this kind of strategy, intended to be illustrative. It is 
standardly taken that in mechanistic models, mechanisms take part in causal relationships 
but the relationship between the mechanism and its components is one of constitution and, 
further, in virtue of being a relationship of constitution the relationship between a 
mechanism and its components cannot be a causal relationship. This, it is often held, is in 
virtue of the fact that the relations stood in by the behaviour of the mechanism (taken as a 
whole) and of the mechanism’s component parts are synchronic, symmetric and involve non-
distinct variables (Craver & Bechtel 2007; Craver 2007; cf. Harinen 2014). However, in a 
recent discussion, Harinen argues (introducing the notion of causal inbetweennness) that on a 
principled extension of the notion of an ideal intervention, these constitution relations 
between the mechanism and its components can be understood as causal, on an 
interventionist understanding of causation (Harinen 2014: 13-17). Here, I have elided many 
of the interesting details about this accommodation of seemingly non-causal constitutive 
dependence into a causal account: it is presented here merely as evidence that, as well as 
conservative claims that seemingly non-causal dependence relations are indeed non-causal, 
those in this literature are willing to consider extensions of the notion of an intervention that 
allow synchronic and symmetric dependence relations to come out as causal, after all. 
 
For a given kind of (seemingly) non-causal dependence, then, it seems an open question as 
to whether or not there exists a principled extension of the notion of an ideal intervention 
such that, under this extension, the kind of dependence comes out as (non-paradigmatically) 
causal. I can’t, here, offer an account of when we should or should not think that extensions 
of terms have determinate contents and how we can come to know this. In addition to these 
two options (one conservative, one liberal), there is a third option that it is worth briefly 
mentioning.  
 
Much of Mark Wilson’s Wandering Significance is concerned with what he refers to as 
‘tropospheric complacency’, which Maddy helpfully unpacks as the fact that “we tend to 
think that our concepts […] mark fully determinate features or attributes, that there is a 
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determinate fact of the matter as to where they apply and where they don’t, that this is so 
even for questions we haven’t yet been able to settle one way or the other” (Maddy 2011: 
106). It’s worth briefly considering one of Wilson’s examples, that of ice: 
 
Water, in fact, represents a notoriously eccentric substance, capable of forming into a wide 
range of peculiar structures. (Wilson 2006: 55) 
 
The author [of a textbook] doesn’t regard the clathrate structure as true ice […] but is it clear 
that our everyday conception of ice requires – as opposed to accepts – this distinction? (I, for 
one, had never thought about such matters at all.) (ibid: 55-56) (emphasis and bold in the 
original) 
 
As Maddy notes in her discussion of Wilson, his point is that:  
 
nothing in our ordinary use or understanding of the term ‘ice’, indeed nothing in the 
underlying chemical facts that we subsequently discover about the many ways water can form 
into a solid – in short, nothing in our heads, in our language, or in the world will force either 
answer to this question” (Maddy 2011: 107). 
 
Perhaps the case of extensions of Woodward’s notion of an intervention is analogous to the 
open question about the extension of the use of the term ‘ice’ in Wilson’s example. On this 
line, nothing “in our heads, in our language, or in the world” forces us to decide that the 
changes of explanans variables in the extra-mathematical cases either do or do not count as 
interventions. If interventions had to be those that we could, in practice, carry out then this 
would decide the matter – but as discussed, this is not the case. It may be the case that the 
changes in explanans variables in some cases (say, Bridges) are such that we are inclined to 
judge them to fall outside the extension of ‘intervention’ whilst those in Cicadas (such as 
intervening to change the environmental conditions that affect the life-cycle lengths) fall 
within the extension. But, again, it isn’t clear that any particular answer is forced upon us 
either by our standard use of ‘intervention’ nor scientific practice. 
 
I have briefly surveyed two possible ways of addressing the question of this section. The first 
is to suggest some criteria with which we might determine, in a given case, whether or not a 
particular change to an explanans variable counts as an intervention in the technical sense of 
Woodward’s account of explanation. This might vindicate the assumption that the extra-
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mathematical cases are non-causal or it may, like with Harinen’s treatment of constitutive 
explanation, demonstrate that extra-mathematical explanation is causal after all. The second 
kind of way of addressing this question is to suggest that there are no facts that dictate a 
particular answer to such a question. Whether or not a given case of extra-mathematical 
explanation counts as causal or non-causal, then, depends both on there being a determinate 
answer to what the proper modification of the notion of an ideal intervention is and, then, 
if the answer to this question is ‘yes’ whether or not this modified notion counts the changes 
of explanans variables as interventions. I will return to these questions in the conclusion of 
the thesis and indicate where work should be done in order to make progress towards an 
answer. 
 
The fact that the account here does not decisively settle the question as to the causal status 
of extra-mathematical explanations (at least, not without being supplemented with a set of 
rules that govern how ‘manipulation’ can and cannot be extended to edge cases) does not 
threaten its status qua account of extra-mathematical explanation. As discussed briefly in the 
introduction, the existence, and nature, of non-causal explanation is an area of burgeoning 
research. Future work should draw both on the account here, and on the various 
demarcations and discussions in this literature, to adjudicate more decisively whether or not 
there is a substantive answer to the causal status of extra-mathematical explanations and, if 
the answer is affirmative, what this answer is. That the account here may leave it open as to 
whether or not any of these explanations are causal may be unsatisfying in some sense: but 
it is important to note that it leaves practice as it is and, nevertheless, sheds light on how 




The mathematical fact in extra-mathematical explanations does explanatory work by allowing 
a user of the explanation to answer what-if-things-had-been-different questions. The explanatory 
practice found in these cases, then, is continuous with other forms of counterfactual 
explanation in science: where the exceptionalist thinks we have two fundamentally different 
kinds of explanation, we in fact find one. The future of shedding light on extra-mathematical 
explanation is surely by paying close attention to our existing accounts of explanation. I have 
argued here that by failing to pay attention to the particularities of such accounts, trading 
only on the notion that explanation is often related to counterfactual information, Baron et 
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al. go wrong by thinking that the mathematics in an extra-mathematical explanation must 
play a role analogous to the cause in the paradigm causal cases. Yet, when we turn to 
Woodward’s account, it is far more natural to understand the mathematical fact as playing 
the role of the invariant generalization. Having located what I take to be the source of this 
apparent disagreement between these recent suggestions in the literature, I argued that 
Jansson & Saatsi’s contribution is the more plausible accommodation of these extra-
mathematical cases into a Woodward-style account. More generally, the moral is that 
extending causal accounts of explanation to the extra-mathematical case need not take the 
mathematical object to be playing the role of the cause. 
 
In this chapter, then, I have offered a positive proposal, offered a corrective to some recent 
proposals that plough the same furrows, and discussed what needs to be done in order to 
answer the question about the causal status of extra-mathematical explanations. Some open 
and pressing questions remain about the account: I have suggested an answer to the in virtue 
of question here and will return to some more questions in the thesis conclusion. Before 
moving on, a natural question is: what are the wider ramifications of this fact for the 
background debates in the philosophy of science and mathematics?  
 
Consider, first, the debates about exceptionalism and anti-exceptionalism, and monism and 
pluralism. The success of the modal account of extra-mathematical explanation vindicates a 
form of anti-exceptionalism. Although there are differences between Woodward’s account 
of causal explanation and the account of extra-mathematical explanation endorsed here, the 
same kind of information is explanatory. The account here is one part of a piecemeal defense 
of explanatory monism. Consider, second, the debates about ontology and explanation. On 
the one hand, the account here seems to vindicate the claim that mathematical facts play a 
crucial role in scientific explanation: extra-mathematical explanations did not end up being 
surrogates for underlying, more fundamental, non-mathematical explanations and the 
mathematical fact in extra-mathematical explanations and the invariant generalizations 
involved in (paradigm cases of) causal explanation play the same kind of explanatory role in 
substantively different ways. On the other hand, in answering the in virtue of question, it 
seemed that although the mathematics is (plausibly indispensably!) involved in the 
explanation, it plays its role by helping us grasp facts about the target system. I will return to 
this question after discussing, in more detail, mathematical representation. This is the task of 




Scientific and epistemic representation 
 
 
In the next two chapters I make steps towards shedding light on the representational capacity 
of mathematics. This is motivated by two aspects of the discussion so far, and it is worthwhile 
recalling them here. In chapter 1, I argued that in order for the Representation Conditional 
to be assessed, an account of mathematical scientific representation must be produced: 
without this, it is impossible to assess the representationalist nominalist inference from 
Representationalism to the claim that our world-oriented uses of mathematics do not commit 
us to realism. In short, an account is needed if we are to find out whether the representational 
capacity of mathematics is ontologically innocent.  In chapter 4, I argued that the modal 
account of extra-mathematical explanation must be supplemented with an account of in virtue 
of what a piece of mathematics can convey modal information. I argued that one natural way 
of making sense how mathematical facts can play this role is to appeal to the idea that the 
natural numbers stand in structural relations to the life-cycles of cicadas measured in years, 
that the structure of the connected graph is instantiated by a concrete bridge system, and so 
on. In the next chapter, I consider attempts to make this hunch precise, by considering recent 
work on mathematical scientific representation that appeal, in one way or another, to 
structural similarity.  
 
However, turning to the recent literature on scientific representation understood more 
generally, there are two challenges that appear to undermine both the narrow focus of 
accounts of mathematical representation and their reliance on structural similarity. Callender 
and Cohen argue that it is a mistake to think that there are any interesting questions about 
scientific representation that are not also questions about representation more generally. As 
is clear, their view about representation equally threatens attempts to say anything interesting 
about mathematical scientific representations in particular. Suárez and Frigg separately provide 
a set of objections that claim to undermine accounts of scientific representation that give a 
pivotal role to structural relations, or relations of similarity. Yet, these notions are crucial to 
recent accounts of mathematical representation, as will become apparent in chapter 6. 
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I consider the worries of Callender and Cohen, and Suárez and Frigg, in this chapter, prior 
to the discussion of particular accounts of mathematical scientific representation in the next 
chapter, for three reasons.  
 
The first is that these worries are in some sense foundational, or at least prior, to the questions 
addressed by the accounts considered in the next chapter. The second reason is that, as I will 
argue below, accommodating the two objections places constraints on what accounts of 
mathematical scientific representation look like. In particular, they place constraints on what 
sorts of relations between vehicle and target are responsible for different facts about the 
representational vehicle. I will say much more about what these features of a representation 
amount to in this chapter and in the next. Accordingly, it should be concluded neither that 
Callender and Cohen, and Suárez and Frigg’s objections entirely miss the mark nor that they 
genuinely undermine work on mathematical scientific representation: rather, that they are 
insights that can guide such an investigation. The third reason concerns the anti-
exceptionalist hypothesis. Just as extra-mathematical explanation can be accommodated by 
(an extension of) an existing account of explanation, in the next chapter I argue that 
mathematical representation can be accommodated by an existing account of representation. 
Accordingly, it is appropriate to set out this account of representation and this is naturally 
done in the context of discussing scientific representation simpliciter. 
 
In section one I set out some examples of representations. In section two I set out Callender 
and Cohen’s reductionism about scientific representation. In section three I first discuss the 
reasons that Callender and Cohen give for accepting reductionism. I then argue that there 
are questions to be asked about scientific representation, contra Callender and Cohen that 
(a) are not questions about the representational capacity of mental states (b) are not questions 
about the relationship between the representational capacity of derivative representations 
and the representational capacity of mental states and (c) are plausibly not questions the 
answers to which are determined wholly by the pragmatics of representational practices. This 
is in virtue of scientific representation being a form of epistemic representation. Accordingly, 
in section four I discuss Contessa’s interpretational account of epistemic representation and 




In section five I set out Suárez and Frigg’s objections that purport to threaten any account 
of representation that appeals to notions of structural similarity is fatally mistaken. In section 
six I argue that Suárez and Frigg’s objections fail because they mistake the role that structural 
relations ought to play in an account of epistemic representation. I then conclude.  
 
5.1. Examples of representations 
 










Figure 1. IKEA bookshelf instructions 
	
The first distinctive feature is that, unlike lots of the other representations considered in this 
thesis, it is entirely non-linguistic and entirely non-mathematical.126 The second is that it 
provides the user with information about the target: namely, how to arrange its parts such 
																																																						
125 Note: representational vehicles are sometimes known as representational sources and representational 
vehicles are sometimes known as representational objects (Suárez 2003; Suárez 2004). 
126 The above image includes the IKEA logo, which is linguistic: but it seems reasonably safe to not include 









Image removed due to copyright. 
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that they result in a stable bookcase. Whilst other pictures often give a viewer information 
about its target, it is the function of the IKEA instructions to do so. If a portrait is accurate, 
then one can learn facts about what its target looks like and one can discern at least one fact 
about the referent of a linguistic object from considering only the object (namely, that it is 
referred to by that linguistic object, in some contexts) it is not the function of these 
representations to allow a user to learn about the representational target. The third distinctive 
feature is that it is clearly not a scientific representation. 
 
The Glasgow subway map 
 
Consider the following map of the Glasgow subway system, known to some (but not to any 











Figure 2. Glasgow subway map 
 
The target is the Glasgow subway system: a complex physical object, or collection of physical 
objects, constituted by stations and rail tracks.127 The representational vehicle is the collection 
of symbols and words that, spatially arranged in a certain way, jointly constitute the map.128 
The first distinctive feature of the representation is that it can be used to learn facts about 
the subway system. Whilst the subway map and the linguistic object ‘the Glasgow subway 
system’ both denote the Glasgow subway system, only the former can be used to infer facts 
																																																						
127 Perhaps the relations between the stations are part of the Glasgow subway system or perhaps they are merely 
relations between parts of the representational target without being part of the target itself.  
128 I take it that the same map can have many instances but that not all maps of the same representational target 
are identical. I doubt that there is anything fully general that can be said about identity conditions for 
representational vehicles, other than that identity of representational targets is insufficient. Identity conditions 








about the Glasgow subway system. The second distinctive feature is that we would not 
naturally refer to the subway map as a scientific representation. A third distinctive feature is 
that it is only partially linguistic. Whilst the linguistic objects (‘Bridge Street’, ‘Inner Circle’ 
and so on) carry some of the representational burden, so do its topographical properties: the 
linguistic objects without the symbols will fail to represent in the same way, so would the 
linguistic and symbolic objects arranged differently. 
 
The Lotka-Volterra equations 
 
The Lotka-Volterra equations constitute a mathematical representation of certain features of 
a biological system. In particular, the differential equations represent the effect of predation 
and reproduction on predator and prey populations: 
 
 ()(* = 𝑟𝑉 − 𝑎𝑉 𝑃 
 
 (0(1 = 𝑏 𝑎𝑉 𝑃 −𝑚𝑃 
 
In the above equations, V is the number of predators, P is the number of prey, r is the rate 
of reproduction for the predators, m is the rate of death for the prey, a is a parameter 
representing how many prey are eaten by existing predators and b measures the rate at which 
consumed prey are converted into new predators. The equations capture that an increase in 
prey results in an increase in prey eaten by a predator which, in turn, results in an increase in 
the number of predators (via reproduction) and that there being too many predators will 
reduce the prey population which, in turn, reduces the population of predators.  
 
The first interesting aspect of the equations is that the target of the representation can be 
different in different contexts – I say more about this in §6.7 when discussing the example 
in more detail. Second, the representation can be used to investigate the predator-prey 
populations: as Weisberg notes, the representations can be used to demonstrate the Volterra 
principle (Roughgarden 1979: 439): “the population of prey will increase relative to the 
number of predators upon application of a pesticide” (Weisberg 2006: 735). Third, it is 
unclear whether or not Lotka-Volterra equations are a causal representation. Pincock 
suggests that “no biologist should take it to be an accurate representation of the causes 
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operating in any biological system (Pincock 2012: 59): however, the considerations offered 
in §4.5 seem to transfer over to this case of representation.  
 
The Phillips hydraulic machine 
 
In the late 1940s, Bill Phillips developed a hydraulic model of the macroeconomy. The 
representational vehicle is a physical 3D model (“the most famous 3D model in economics” 
(Morgan & Boumans 2004: 369)). Exactly what the representational target is unclear: it will 
differ in different contests.129 As Morgan & Boumans explain, the model “represents the 
macroeconomy by flows and stocks of coloured water in a system or perspex tanks and 
channels” (Morgan & Boumans: ibid). The first distinctive feature of the hydraulic machine 
is that it is a scientific representation.130 Second, the hydraulic machine itself is an entirely 
non-linguistic and non-mathematical representation: what does the representing are physical 
objects. Third, the hydraulic machine is constructed with the aim of being able to infer from 
facts about the machine to facts about a given economy (or to facts about all economies 
satisfying certain conditions). 
 
5.2. Reductionism and the non-specialness of scientific representation 
 
In this section I consider Callender and Cohen’s argument concerning the specialness of 
scientific representation.  
 
5.2.1. Callender and Cohen’s reductionism  
 
Callender and Cohen argue that there is “something wrong with the questions being asked 
about scientific representation” (Callender & Cohen 2006: 68). The fault lies with the 
assumption that there is something special about scientific representation that is in need of 
explanation. This is because, according to Callender and Cohen, a form of reductionism is 
the appropriate approach to scientific representation: in some important sense spelled out 
below, the vast majority of representations reduce to a privileged set of representations and 
there are no idiosyncratic or special questions about the former representations. 
 
																																																						
129 Phillips designed the model to represent the economy of the United Kingdom. 
130 There is, of course, debate as to whether or not economics ought to be considered a science: I’ll bracket this 
here. 
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Callender and Cohen claim that the sorts of questions asked of scientific representation 
would be strange questions to ask of other kinds of representation. They ask: 
 
Are stop signs at intersections isomorphic or partially isomorphic to the imperative ‘stop!’ 
that they represent? Do they non-logically entail more true propositions than false ones? […] 
[D]o the marks ‘cat’ in any way resemble real cats? Are philosophers of language worried 
that the marks ‘cat’ aren’t furry or that cats lack constituents that are part of an alphabet? 
These questions about non-scientific representations strike us as bad ones, and we hope they 
strike you that way too. This suggests to us that there may well be something wrong with the 
questions being asked about scientific representation. (ibid: 68) 
 
It is true that these are bad questions and it is true that there are parallels to these questions 
being asked in the literature on scientific representation. The above passage is unsuccessful, 
however, when understood as an argument for thinking that these latter questions are wrong-
headed. The fact that a question is a silly one to ask about linguistic representation only 
licenses inference to the claim that the question is also a silly one to ask about scientific 
representation if we already have good reason to think that linguistic and scientific 
representation are so similar that there are no silly questions to ask about linguistic 
representation that are not also bad questions to ask about scientific representation. 
However, this is effectively the claim that there are no special, or distinctive, problems of 
scientific representation.  
 
Instead, the force of the critique ought to be located in the substantive view about 
representation that Callender and Cohen offer. This is a view – which I will call reductionism 
- appears to have as its consequence that there are no special problems of scientific 
representation.131 I will take reductionism to consist in two claims. 
 
The first, which Callender and Cohen call General Griceanism, states that “among the many 
sorts of representational entities (cars, cakes, equations, etc.), the representational status of 
most of them is derivative from the representational status of a privileged core of 
representations” (ibid: 70). For Callender and Cohen, a representation is fundamental if its 
representational status is not explained by citing information about other representational 
																																																						
131 Callender and Cohen’s view has deflationary characteristics: however, Suárez refers to his view as 
deflationism about scientific representation (Suárez 2004), so it would muddle matters to refer to Callender and 
Cohen’s view as ‘deflationism’. Callender and Cohen’s view reduces the problems of most kinds of representation 
to the problems of mental representation – hence the name ‘reductionism’. 
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states and is used to explain the representational status of other representations. A 
representation is derivative if its representational status is explained by citing information 
about other representational states.132 According to General Griceanism, almost all 
representations are derivative: including scientific representation. Callender and Cohen take 
mental states to be the fundamental bearers of representative content. This isn’t a 
requirement of reductionism - nevertheless, if we accept the reductionist picture, mental 
states seem a good candidate for fundamental representation. Many prominent accounts of 
mental representation, for example, seek to explain (in a variety of ways) how mental states 
get their contents by appealing to facts about the causal relations that the states stand in 
(Dretske 1981; Devitt 1996; Millikan 1984; Papineau 1987) and not by facts about other 
representations.133 
 
General Griceanism is silent when it comes to how derivative representations come to derive 
their representational status and content from some fundamental representation: it just says 
that they do. The second claim that I take to be constitutive of reductionism, then, is the 
following: stipulation is sufficient for a derivative representation to derive its content from a 
fundamental representation. In order to motivate this second claim, Callender and Cohen 
note that for any pair of objects a and b, it is possible for a to be a representation of b 
(Callender & Cohen 2006: 73). Derivative representation is, in some sense, cheap to come 
by. Callender and Cohen offer the example of linguistic representation. For Callender and 
Cohen, a linguistic representational vehicle represents in virtue of its utterer intending it to 
do so, and its utterer intending for the hearer to believe that it so represents. Disparate, yet 
also non-fundamental, representations can be equally reduced to mental representation: 
 
																																																						
132 Callender and Cohen introduce two distinctions: the natural/non-natural distinction and the 
fundamental/derivative distinction. It is not stated explicitly how these relate, but I take it that the interaction 
between these distinctions should be understood as follows. A natural representation is one that has its 
representational status in virtue of some other non-representational state of affairs, or independently of mental 
states: the examples given are the rings of a tree representing its age and smoke representing fire. In order for 
a representation to be a fundamental representation it must be a natural representation (as being non-natural is 
inconsistent with being fundamental) but not all natural representations are fundamental representations. The 
rings of a tree are natural but are not fundamental because they do not explain the representational status of a 
derivative representation. Mental states are both natural and fundamental because their representational status 
is grounded in some non-representational fact and some non-derivative representations derive their 
representational status from them. 
133 This is complicated by the fact that a view of mental representation could suggest that mental representations 
get their content in virtue of some other mental representation. 
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The upshot is that, once one has paid the admittedly hefty one-time fee of supplying a 
metaphysics of representation for mental states, further instances of representation become 
extremely cheap. (ibid: 74) 
 
Beyond the observation about representation being easy to come by, there’s no argument 
given for thinking that the mechanism by which derivative representations get their content 
is by stipulation. The view is certainly not entailed by General Griceanism. The claim about 
stipulation is an answer to the question: ‘in virtue of what does a given derivative 
representation come to inherit the representational content of a mental representation’? 
General Griceanism is compatible with many other answers to this second question. The 
only constraint on permissible accounts to the nature of this derivation is that it respects the 
view that for any pair of objects a and b, it is possible for a to be a representation of b. Whilst 
stipulation seems sufficient for representation in some cases (consider, for example, proper 
name reference and initial baptisms), without doing more work in the philosophy of 
language, the claim about stipulation should be treated as one possible answer to the question 
about the mechanism connecting derivative and fundamental representations.  
 
5.2.2. From reductionism to non-specialness  
 
How does reductionism result in the view that there are no special problems of scientific 
representation? Recall that the representational capacity of a derivative, non-fundamental 
representation, is explained by appealing to the representational capacity of fundamental 
representations and then a substantive philosophical account is given of the representational 
capacity of “the fundamental bearers of content” (ibid: 73). Assuming that the fundamental 
bearers of content are mental states, the core work on representation is to be done in the 
philosophy of mind, deciding between rival accounts of mental representation. Outside of 
the philosophy of mind, the work to be done is merely to explain the relation between the 
representational capacity of a given derivative representation and the representational 
capacity of the relevant mental states.  
 
It is clear to see how this picture of representation threatens to render work on representation 
in the philosophy of science surplus to requirements. Take, as an example, the Lotka-Volterra 
equations: a paradigm case of mathematical scientific representation. According to 
reductionism, there are two questions to answer. The first is ‘in virtue of does the vehicle 
represent the target?’ and Callender and Cohen’s answer is via stipulation: stipulation is 
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sufficient to activate a mental representation of the representational target. The second 
question is ‘in virtue of what does the mental state represent the predator and prey 
population?’. Philosophy of mind, not philosophy of science, will tell us in virtue of what a 
particular mental state has this particular content. A scientific representational vehicle 
represents its target because the user intends it to and intends the audience to believe that it 
does. As Callender and Cohen say: 
 
[Scientific representation] is constituted in terms of a stipulation, together with an underlying 
theory of representation for mental states, isomorphism, similarity and inference generation 
are all idle wheels. (ibid: 78) 
 
Accordingly, those pursuing questions about scientific representation, appealing to notions 
like similarity, isomorphism and inference generation, are in error. This error extends, I 
assume, to those pursuing questions about mathematical scientific representations.  
 
5.3. Recovering some special problems 
 
5.3.1. The argument for reductionism 
 
Other than the comparison to analogous questions about linguistic representation discussed 
above,  there is no explicit argument given in Callender and Cohen’s paper.134 The main 
reason given in favour of adopting General Griceanism is that it is “economical and natural” 
(ibid: 70) Given that much of the argument against the specialness of scientific representation 
relies on an endorsement of General Griceanism, much in turn relies on the considerations 
given in favour of this account of representation.  
 
First, consider the claim that General Griceanism is economical. In one sense, this is surely 
true. The Gricean is required to provide an account of the fundamental form of 
representation (the “admittedly hefty one-time fee”), and then provides (roughly) the same 
account for all the non-fundamental forms – the account concerning their derivability from 
the fundamental form. A non-Gricean approach to representation must also provide an 
account of the fundamental form of representation, at some point, but must also provide 
several, local accounts. The non-Gricean cannot appeal to the representational capacity of 
																																																						
134 If General Griceanism is something like a methodological stance then the demand for an argument might 
be out of place.  
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mental states to explain non-mental forms of representation. However, once if we accept 
that this form of armchair economising is a plausible way of choosing which working 
hypotheses to adopt, the balance between economy and fruitfulness becomes very important. 
It is plausible that by addressing non-mental forms of representation more narrowly, more 
progress can be made – philosophers can solve smaller, easier (!) problems about this or that 
form of representation.135 Of course, Callender and Cohen will avow that such progress is 
not progress at all, but this is a consequence of General Griceanism. 
 
Consider the claim that it is “natural” to describe all kinds of representation as derivative 
from a fundamental form of representation. If it is natural at all to describe all kinds of 
representation as being derivative from a fundamental form, this stems from taking 
denotation to be all there is to representation. In order to illustrate the point that for any a 
and b, it is possible for a to represent b, Callender and Cohen give an example of a saltshaker 
representing Madagascar, where this representation relation is brought into existence by 
stipulation (ibid: 73). In this case, I agree that the saltshaker denotes Madagascar, and that 
creating conditions such that the saltshaker denotes Madagascar are trivial in the sense that 
Callender and Cohen discuss. There is good reason for thinking that Callender and Cohen 
take ‘represent’ and ‘denote’ to come to the same thing. For example, they say: 
 
[W]hether and how a model is about something shouldn’t hang on this classification [of a 




[S]cientists routinely use entities other than models – language, pictures, mental states, and 
so on – to represent the very same targets that models represent. (ibid: 71) 
 
Consider also the examples they provide: the saltshaker representing Madagascar, the 
upturned left hand representing Michigan, a lantern in the window representing the coming 
of the British. In these cases, the function of the representational vehicle is just to denote 
the target: so long as the lantern in the window denotes the coming of the British, it can do 
its job of alerting others to this fact. If denotation is indeed the sole function of all vehicles, 
																																																						
135 Consider, also, that Callender and Cohen note that they do not give an argument for mental representation 
being the fundamental form of representation – it acts only as a placeholder. The Gricean approach, then, 
requires us to (a) identify the fundamental form of representation and then (b) provide an account of it.  
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and this function can be fulfilled in the way set out by way described by the combination of 
General Griceanism and the claim about stipulation, then Callender and Cohen’s claim 
appears plausible – indeed, as they say, “natural”. However, as I argue below (and indeed, as 
has been acknowledged by many commentators – see references below), many 
representations (including those used in science) have epistemic value and functions that are 
not accommodated by the mere fact that they denote, or refer to, their targets.136 These 
generate special problems of scientific representation. 
 
5.3.2. Some special problems of scientific representation 
 
I have argued above that what argument is given for reductionism fails. In this section I argue 
that there are some special problems of scientific representation that (a) are not questions 
about the representational capacity of mental states (b) are not questions about the 
relationship between the representational capacity of derivative representations and 
fundamental representations and (c) are plausibly not questions the answers to which are 
determined wholly by the pragmatics of representational practices. This is consistent with 
holding that General Griceanism is correct about the relationship between derivative and 
fundamental representations. 
 
Consider the Glasgow subway map above and the linguistic object ‘the Clockwork Orange’, 
used in an utterance in a context such that it refers to the Glasgow subway (rather than to 
the book or to a mechanical citrus fruit). In the sense of representation that is explained by 
reductionism, the map and the words represent the target equally and, as Callender and 
Cohen are at pains to emphasise, in much the same way. Both plausibly come to denote the 
target identically. Yet, even though the two representations are both are about, or denote, or 
refer to the subway system in the same way, the functions of the two vehicles are not the 
same. In short, a user can use the map to learn facts about the representational target, whilst 
this is not the case for the linguistic object.137 As noted above, one can read off from the 
map information about the quickest way to a particular station from another station. None 
of these acts of surrogative reasoning – reasoning from facts about the vehicle to claims 
																																																						
136 It does not seem uncharitable to understand Callender and Cohen as taking denotation as the subject of their 
Gricean analysis but to be referring (!) to it as “representation”. The problem is that scientific representation 
involves more than denotation. 
137 Of course, once one learns that ‘Molly’ denotes a particular dog, a user can use the representation to learn 
one fact about the target: namely, that the name ‘Molly’ denotes it (in particular contexts of utterance). 
However, it is not the function of the name ‘Molly’ to facilitate learning about the target. 
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about the target138 – can be performed by considering the words ‘the Clockwork Orange’ 
(although see fn.137). Return to the quote above, where Callender and Cohen note that 
scientists often use words and thoughts to represent the targets that are represented by their 
models. What all these representations share is that they all denote the same object – they 
are all representations of the same target. Yet, only the model can be used to learn about the 
target that is common across all the representations. 
 
So: some representations can be used to learn about their target (like scientific models and 
maps) and some cannot – and there can be representations of the former and latter kind that 
share targets. Moreover, it seems that the function of the former kind of representation is to 
facilitate this kind of learning. The following are questions that naturally arise about 
representations like these – but crucially not of representations like ‘the Clockwork Orange’ 
and the thoughts of scientists. In virtue of what can users learn about representational targets 
by reasoning about the vehicles? What is it that makes some representations good epistemic 
tools for performing surrogative inference and some less good? What’s the relationship 
between the similarity of vehicle and target and the extent to which the vehicle facilitates 
learning about the target? These are natural questions to ask about scientific representations 
and reductionism sheds no light on the answers to these questions, even if we accept its truth. 
Stating that scientific representations represent their target in virtue of the creator of the 
representation intending them to and the audience of the representation taking the vehicle 
to represent its target gets us no closer to answering these questions about the epistemic role 
of scientific representations. It seems similarly clear that a convincing account of mental 
representation equally sheds little light on these questions. 
 
In line with the recent literature (Bolinska 2013; Bolinska 2016; Chakravartty 2010; Contessa 
2007; Contessa 2011; Suárez 2010), call representations like the subway map and scientific 
representations epistemic representations. Scientific representations seem to be paradigmatic 
examples of epistemic representations. If the form of distinctively mathematical scientific 
representation being considered in the next chapter (and this thesis more generally) is a 
																																																						
138 It would be infelicitous to say that users of the map infer from facts about the vehicle to facts (rather than to 
claims) about the target. Inference from vehicle-facts to target-facts takes place only when the map is a good 
one (or, in terms of the distinctions drawn in the next section, when the map is a (at least partially) faithful 
map). A surrogative inference to a false claim about the target is an act of surrogative inference all the same – 
it is just not an act of sound surrogative inference.  
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species of epistemic representation, it will be useful to discuss epistemic representation in 
more detail, which I do in §5.4. 
 
It should be clear that the problem of epistemic representation is not applicable in all cases 
of representation: there is no puzzle about how we can infer from facts about the word ‘cat’ 
to facts about cats, in virtue of the fact that we generally can’t (but see fn.137). It is true that 
the problem of epistemic representation applies to cases of representation that are not 
scientific: for example, we can infer from facts about the subway map to facts about the 
subway system and this seems to demand explanation, but the subway map is not a scientific 
representation. In this thesis I will not consider the question as to whether there are any deep 
features that distinguish scientific epistemic representations from non-scientific epistemic 
representations.139 In this sense it is correct that there are no problems that are unique to 
scientific representations. However, there are questions about scientific representations that 
do not involve explaining how they derive their representational status from mental states. 
 
5.3.4. Epistemic representation and pragmatics 
 
So: scientific representations are a form of epistemic representations and there are questions 
about epistemic representation that are not trivial questions about how an epistemic 
representation derives its representational content from a fundamental representation. The 
work in the philosophy of science, dealing with the “idle wheels” (Callender & Cohen 2006: 
76) of like isomorphism, similarity and inference generation should be understood as 
shedding light on this special property of scientific representations and we have prima facie 
reason to think that this area of research is in good standing.140  
 
Callender and Cohen might note that they at no point denied that some representations are 
to be preferred over others: it is no part of their view that, if one wants to navigate the 
																																																						
139 By ‘deep features’ here, I mean any features of the representations themselves that ground their status as 
either a scientific or non-scientific epistemic representation. The difference between scientific and non-
scientific epistemic representation is shallow if it is grounded entirely by one’s demarcation criteria for science. 
Everything I say here about epistemic representation and mathematical representation is consistent with both 
views. 
140 As I discuss later in this chapter, some of the philosophers discussed by Callender and Cohen present their 
views as views of what constitutes the representation relation and for others it is ambiguous exactly what aspect 
of the representational practice the structural similarity is supposed to account for. I agree with Callender and 
Cohen that it is a mistake to think that the fact that the vehicle represents the target is accommodated by the holding 
of some structural relation and I agree that it’s at least plausible that some reasonably trivial notion like 
stipulation is sufficient to make it such that the model represents its target.  
	 154 
Glasgow subway system, a map from 1950 would be just as good as one from 2017, in virtue 
of the fact that they both successfully denote the subway system. Some representations, for 
some purposes, are better than others and this indeed may be because they are better tools 
for coming to learn about the target system. But these considerations, this response claims, 
are part of the pragmatics of our explanatory practices: 
 
[I]t should be clear that the constraints ruling out these choices of would-be representational 
vehicles are pragmatic in character: they are driven by the needs of the representation users, 
rather than by essential features of the artefacts themselves. (ibid:  76) 
 
What is it for something to be part of the pragmatics of the explanation? There are two 
options. The first is that the facts that determine which subway map is a better 
representation, for the purposes of navigating the subway system, are determined entirely by 
properties and interests of the users of the representation and not by any facts about the 
representational vehicle. For obvious reasons, this can’t be what makes it such that these are 
pragmatic questions. The reasons for which people prefer one representation over another will 
have to do with that user’s preferences and goals, obviously: but what makes a representation 
preferable once those purposes are chosen are facts about the representational vehicle.  
 
The correct claim, then, is that the facts that determine which subway map is a better 
representation, for the purposes of navigating the subway system, are determined in part by 
properties and interests of the users of the representation and so only partly by facts about 
the representational vehicle. So, on this picture, what makes one subway map better than 
another, or one representation of the atom better than another, is a combination of facts: 
some facts about the goals of a user and then some facts about the representational vehicle 
and target. The problem with the second version of the response is that Callender and Cohen 
and the vast majority of the philosophers engaging in the research program that they think 
is unwise agree on this point. Appeals to facts about the user of the representation are 
commonplace in the literature about scientific representation (Bueno & French 2011; 
Contessa 2007; Suárez 2003): we should understand discussions about epistemic 
representation as being discussions about what features of a representational target make it 
better for the purposes of learning about the target. 
 
The situation is as follows. There are some questions that naturally arise from the use of 
scientific representations that are not questions about the representational capacity of mental 
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states and are not questions about the relationship between the representational capacity of 
derivative representations and fundamental representations. Furthermore, whilst they are not 
unique to scientific representation, they are not questions that apply to the other derivative 
representations that Callender and Cohen list alongside scientific representation. Whether or 
not these questions about epistemic representation count as question about the pragmatics 
of our explanatory practices or not is primarily a question about where one draws this 
boundary. Regardless of whether or not questions about epistemic representation (and, 
therefore, questions about how the particularly mathematical character of mathematical 
representations affects their epistemic character) are part of the pragmatics of representation 
or not is orthogonal to whether or not they are questions worth addressing. Callender and 
Cohen suggest that, if we accept reductionism, there is “no longer any reason to think that 
there is a conflict between, say, Giere’s similarity and Suárez’s inference generation, and so 
no reason that there should be a dispute between proponents of such accounts” (Callender 
& Cohen: 78). But this does not follow. If we understand accounts of scientific 
representation as accounts of what makes vehicles epistemic representations (or what makes 
some vehicles better or worse epistemic representations), these accounts can still be 
understood as rival accounts of what property is responsible. 
 
Callender and Cohen’s reductionism does, however, generate the following requirement on 
plausible accounts of mathematical scientific representation. The relation between vehicle 
and target that makes it such that the vehicle denotes the target ought to be distinct from the 
relation between the vehicle and target that makes it such that the vehicle is an epistemic 
representation of the target. This is an important lesson to keep in mind and it will play a 
role in the discussion of mathematical representation in the next chapter. (Although, it could 
be pressed that this is a lesson that one can learn merely by reflecting on the fact that (for a 
weak meaning of ‘represent’ where it merely comes to mean ‘denote’) anything can be a 
representation of anything else and this is not an insight unique to Callender and Cohen’s 
reductionism). 
 
5.4. Epistemic representation 
 
In the previous section I argued that epistemic representation generates problems that 
cannot easily be identified as the same problem as either (a) understanding fundamental 
representation or (b) understanding the relationship between fundamental and derivative 
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representations. In this section, I set out Contessa’s recent account of epistemic 
representation and explicate how it can be understood as answering these questions. I pay 
particular attention to the role played by structural relationships in Contessa’s interpretational 
account of epistemic representation, as it is these relationships that play a crucial role in the 
accounts of mathematical representation discussed in the next chapter. In particular, 
structural relations between the vehicle and target should not be understood as securing 
either the vehicle’s status as denoting the target, nor as securing the vehicle’s status as an 
epistemic representation: rather, structural relations should be understood as fixing (what 
Contessa calls) the representation’s faithfulness. 
 
 
5.4.1. Epistemic and non-epistemic representation 
 
Return to the subway map above, and contrast it with the linguistic object ‘the Glasgow 
subway’. In the sense discussed above, only the former is an epistemic representation: only 
the map has the function of allowing a user to learn information about its target. Contessa 
characterises epistemic representation in the following way: 
 
A vehicle is an epistemic representation of a certain target for a certain user if and only if the user 
is able to perform valid (though not necessarily sound) surrogative inferences from the 
vehicle to the target. (Contessa 2007: 52)  
 
Strictly speaking, the inferences are from facts about the vehicle to claims (or putative facts) 
about the target. An inference from a claim about a vehicle to a claim about the target is valid 
if it is licensed (in a sense discussed below) by the vehicle and an inference from a fact about 
a vehicle to a fact about a target is sound if it is a valid inference that has as its conclusion a 
true claim about the target. The inference to ‘Hillhead station is next to Kelvinbridge station’, 
using the map above, is both valid and sound. If the label ‘Kelvinbridge’ was swapped with 
the label ‘Ibrox’, resulting in a different map, then the inference to ‘Hillhead station is next 
to Ibrox station’ would be a valid but unsound inference. 
 
5.4.2. Contessa’s interpretational account of epistemic representation 
 
In his 2007, Contessa sets out his interpretational account of epistemic representation. The 
notion of an interpretation is crucial to Contessa’s account of surrogative inference: 
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“interpretation is what grounds both scientific representation and surrogative reasoning” 
(ibid: 51). Being able to reason about the target by reasoning about the vehicle is, for Contessa, 
symptomatic of having interpreted the vehicle in terms of the target. 
 
It is useful to think of an interpretation is to think of the user as taking facts about the vehicle 
to stand for claims or putative facts about the target. Consider the subway map again: the 
conventions of the representational vehicle take each circle on the map to stand for a station, 
for lines between circles on the map to stand for tunnels between stations and so on. These 
conventions permit the translation of facts about the vehicle (this dot is three places away 
from that dot) into claims about the target (this station is three stops away from that station). 
Contessa offers what he calls an analytic interpretation as one particular kind of interpretation. 
The user identifies: 
 
A (nonempty) set of relevant objects in the vehicle (ΩV = {ov1, …, oVn}) and a (nonempty) 
set of relevant objects in the target (ΩT = {oT1, …, oTn}), a (possibly empty) set of relevant 
properties of and relations among objects in the vehicle (PV = {nRV1, …, nRVm}), where nR 
denotes an n-ary relation and properties are construed as 1-ary relations) and a set of relevant 
properties and relations among objects in the target (PT = {nRT1, …, nRTm}), and a set of 
relevant functions from (ΩV)n […] to ΩV (ΦV = {nFV1, …, nFVm), where nF denotes an n-ary 
function and (ΩV)n is the Cartesian product of ΩV with itself n times and a set of relevant 
functions from (ΩT)n to ΩT (ΦT = {nFT1, …, nFTm) (ibid:  57). 
 
Having identified the above, the user must take the representational vehicle (as a whole) to 
denote the representational target (as a whole). In addition to this denotation step, the user 
must interpret the target in terms of the vehicle in the following sense: 
 
1. The user takes every object in ΩV to denote one and only one object in ΩT and every 
object in ΩT to be denoted by one and only one object in ΩV 
 
2. The user takes every n-ary relation in PV to denote one and only one relevant n-ary in PT 
and every n-ary relation in PT to be denote by one and only one n-ary relation in PV 
 
3. [The user] takes every n-ary function in ΦV to denote one and only one n-ary function 
in 𝜓T and every n-ary function in ΦT to be denoted by one and only one n-ary function 
in 𝜓V. (ibid: 58)   
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The aforementioned map/subway interpretation is analytic. Contessa also details a set of 
inference rules such that if an inference is drawn from the vehicle to the target according to 
one of the rules, the inference is valid – these are set out in appendix A.141 It is important to 
note that Contessa’s account entails that, much like representation qua denotation, epistemic 
representation is trivial to come by. This is grounded by the fact that Contessa’s notion of 
interpretation is, essentially, a collection of denotation relations. Epistemic representation, 
then, can be achieved as easily as denotation can.142 Consider Callender and Cohen’s example 
of a salt shaker coming to represent, qua denotation, Madagascar. The salt shaker can just as 
easily come to be an epistemic representation of Madagascar. One might take each of the 
holes at the top of the salt shaker to denote one particular city in Madagascar, and take the 
relative distances and locations of the holes to denote the relative distances and locations of 
the cities of Madagascar. A user of the salt shaker, taken to be an epistemic representation 
of Madgascar, could perform inferences to claims about Madagascar from facts about the 
salt-shaker. Of course, unless one has a peculiar salt shaker, these are likely to be valid but 
unsound inferences: the epistemic representation may well be completely unfaithful. I discuss 
faithfulness in the next section. 
 
5.4.3. The completeness and faithfulness of epistemic representation 
 
It is clear that Contessa’s account address some questions about representation (namely: in 
virtue of what are some representations ways of learning about their targets in a sense that 
other representations are not?) that are not addressed by an account of the derivation relation 
between fundamental representations or by an account of fundamental representation. A 
vehicle denoting its target is fixed by some act of the user. A vehicle coming to be an 
epistemic representation of its target is brought about by a user interpreting the target in 
terms of a vehicle.  
 
So far, then, there is no space for structural relations between the vehicle and target: whatever 
the denotation relation is, it is not a morphism of some kind and both the initial establishing 
of a denotation relation between vehicle and target and coming to interpret the target in 
																																																						
141 It’s important to note that Contessa’s notion of analytic interpretation of the vehicle in terms of the target 
is not the same as an isomorphism between vehicle and target, even though both involve one-one 
correspondences between parts of the vehicle and parts of the targets. 
142 I assume that denotation is easy to come by, although this is (strictly speaking) distinct from claiming (as 
Callender and Cohen do) that stipulation is sufficient to establish denotation (see §5.2.1).	
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terms of the vehicle involve only denotation.143 In this section, I suggest a friendly 
modification to Contessa’s account and then discuss the proper role that should be played 
by structural relations: that of grounding a representation’s faithfulness. In the next section 
I discuss the fact that allocating this role to structural relations has the felicitous consequence 
of resulting in an account of epistemic representation that both allocates a crucial role to 
structural relations whilst avoiding influential criticisms of views that assign structural 
relations a role in explicating representation. 
 
First, the friendly modification. Recall the user who, unwisely, takes the salt shaker not only 
to represent Madagascar qua denotation but to be an epistemic representation of Madagascar. 
This epistemic representation will yield valid inferences to claims about Madagascar, but 
these are likely to be inferences to false claims. Contessa is clear that the inferences permitted 
by a user’s interpretation and the inference rules needn’t always have as their conclusion a 
true claim about the target. The difference between the salt shaker and a map of Madagascar 
(where both are taken to be epistemic representations of Madagascar) is what Contessa calls 
faithfulness (ibid: 50). A vehicle represents a target completely faithfully only if all the valid 
inferences are sound. A completely faithful epistemic representation is a representation that 
only licenses sound inferences – inferences that have as their conclusion facts about the target. 
Correspondingly, a partially faithful epistemic representation licenses inference to at least one 
sound inference: at least one inference to a fact about the target. 
 
It, of course, seems completely right that faithfulness comes in degrees: vehicles can be better 
or worse epistemic representations. Contessa’s account, however, has the following 
counterintuitive consequence. Consider a detailed map of Madagascar, including information 
about the names and locations of Madagascar’s cities, rivers and roads. Consider a second, 
simpler, map which only charts the locations and names of the cities of Madagascar. Imagine 
that all of the inferences licensed by the detailed map and the simpler map are sound 
inferences (that is, they are inferences to facts about Madagascar rather than to false claims 
about Madagascar). Therefore, both maps are equally faithful epistemic representations: 
indeed, they are both completely faithful epistemic representations because they license 
inference to zero false claims about their target. Yet, this will ring oddly in the ears of many: 
there is surely some sense in which the detailed map is more faithful!  
																																																						
143	The salt shaker will trivially bear some structural similarity with Madagascar, but it is certainly not in virtue of 
these structural similarities that it represents its target.	
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As it stands, Contessa’s account cannot accommodate this. I suggest that this can be 
remedied by introducing a second axis along which we can locate epistemic representations. 
Let the completeness of an epistemic representation be determined by the number of facts 
about the target that the vehicle licenses inference to.144 This captures our judgement that, 
even though the detailed map and the simple map are equally faithful (in Contessa’s sense), 
the detailed map is a better representation in some sense: it is more complete, in that it licenses 
inference to a greater number of facts about the target. An up-to-date map of the Glasgow 
subway system is a completely faithful epistemic representation but it is not a complete 
epistemic representation. It is a fact about the subway system that Partick station was called 
Merkland Street until 1977, but inference to this fact is not licensed by the subway map. 
Nevertheless, we would refrain from saying that this makes the map less accurate, or less 
faithful. It does, however, make it less complete. 
 
The faithfulness and completeness of an epistemic representation will be reasonably 
independent. A complete epistemic representation may be only partially faithful, in cases 
where the representation licenses inference to some false claims about the target in addition 
to licensing inference to all the facts about the target and, as just noted, almost all completely 
faithful epistemic representations will fail to be complete epistemic representations.145 A third 
dimension along which we may evaluate an epistemic representation is, of course, its 
usefulness. Whilst the usefulness of an epistemic representation will plausibly track its 
faithfulness (if only in the minimal sense that a very unfaithful epistemic representation is 
unlikely to be useful), it will less closely track its completeness: for an epistemic 
representation to be maximally useful, there will almost always be no need for the epistemic 
representation to be complete.146 
 
That epistemic representation is binary and faithful epistemic representation comes in 
degrees is one important difference between the two. This yields a second important 
difference: that the conditions under which epistemic representation and (partially) faithful 
																																																						
144 One worry is that the completeness of an epistemic representation will be determined by how we carve up 
facts – both with regards to individuation of facts and distinguishing relevant from irrelevant facts. Perhaps 
we should understand completeness as being indexed to a particular subset of the facts. 
145 Indeed, every scientific representation will be a (at least partially) faithful epistemic representation rather 
than a complete epistemic representation.  
146 What makes an epistemic representation useful will, clearly, be determined by the users of the representation 
and their goals. Beyond this, there is plausibly little that can be helpfully said about usefulness that would not 
take this thesis too far afield.  
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epistemic representation are achieved are distinct (of course, the conditions under which 
(partially) faithful epistemic representation is achieved will include all the conditions under 
which epistemic representation is achieved). The conditions for epistemic representation, 
according to Contessa, are that the vehicle is taken to denote the target (brought about via 
stipulation, or some more complex user-initiated activity) and that the user interprets the 
vehicle in terms of the target (which is, again, just the establishing of more denotation 
relations). However, these conditions being met does not guarantee that the epistemic 
representation will be at all faithful, or accurate, – a subway map with swapped around labels 
will count as an epistemic representation if an interpretation is adopted, but it will be a very 
(or perhaps totally) unfaithful epistemic representation. 
 
So, what makes an epistemic representation faithful? The fact that the two kinds of 
denotation relation involved in representation and epistemic representation do not suffice 
for the faithfulness means that something more sophisticated is required. Contessa notes 
when referring to Suárez’s arguments discussed below that a natural answer is to gesture 
towards similarity between the target and the vehicle (ibid: 50).147 Why is a subway map with 
swapped-labels less accurate, and therefore less useful, than the subway map above? That is, 
why does it license inference to fewer facts about the subway system? On the map above, 
the object on the map takes to denote Hillhead is next to the object on the map that the user 
takes to denote Kelvinbridge – whilst, on the swapped-map, the same objects on the map 
fail to be next to each other. I take it that this structural account of faithfulness adds the 
following component to Contessa’s remarks above. 
 
4. There is a structure-preserving mapping between the vehicle and target that is 
responsible for the soundness of (at least some of) the inferences licensed by the 
denotation relations (1-3) and the rules of inference. 
 
Recall, once more, that stipulation (or some other user-fixed input) secures a vehicle’s status 
as a representation qua denotation, the various denotation relations set out in (1), (2) and (3) 
jointly secures a vehicle’s status as an epistemic representation and (4) secures a vehicle’s status 
as a (partially) faithful epistemic representation. Many of the substantive questions about the 
kind of structural account suggested in this section will raise their heads when accounts of 
																																																						
147 Contessa says: “insofar as [similarity accounts of representation] can be interpreted as either accounts of 
scientific representation or accounts of faithful scientific representation, they would seem to be accounts of 
faithful scientific representation” (Contessa 2007: 50) (cf. Contessa 2011: 127-130). 
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mathematical scientific representation are considered in the next chapter – so beyond a brief 
discussion in the next section, I will delay discussion until then. 
 
5.4.4. Faithfulness and the role of structural relations in epistemic representation 
 
The suggestion above that it is structural relations between the vehicle and the target that 
secure the (partial) faithfulness of an epistemic representation should bring to mind claims 
made in the literature on scientific representation that representation, in some sense, depends 
on the structure of the vehicle and target. In this section I briefly distinguish the role played 
by structural relations in the account above, and the role (purportedly) played by structure in 
these accounts. This is important – that structural relations play the role of determining the 
faithfulness of an epistemic representation is vital in responding to the Suárez-Frigg 
objections, which take aim at accounts of representation that incorporate the notion of 
similarity. 
 
Chakravartty’s distinction between functional and informational accounts of representation 
can help shed light on the different roles that structural similarity can play in an account of 
representation (Chakravartty 2010). According to an informational account of scientific 
representation, what makes it such that a representational vehicle represents its target is that 
some form of relation holds between the target and vehicle (Chakravartty 2010: 198). 
Putative examples include Ronald Giere’s similarity account (Giere 2004), Bartels’ account 
that focuses on homomorphisms (Bartels 2006), and the work of da Costa and French 
involving partial isomorphisms (da Costa & French 2003).148 According to functional 
accounts of representation, as one might expect, representations ought to be distinguished 
from non-representations by gesturing towards their functions: “their uses in cognitive 
activities performed by human agents in connection with their targets” (Chakravartty 2010: 
199). On this distinction, Suárez’s inferential account and Contessa’s interpretational account 
of representation are functional accounts. After introducing this distinction, Chakravartty 
argues that the distinction is a false one: whilst functional accounts of representation should 
be understood as accounting for the ends of a representation, the informational accounts 
should be understood as the means. 
																																																						
148 I’m not certain that all of the philosophers that Chakravartty mentions make as flat-footed a claim as that 
which says that the existence of the candidate structural relation is solely constitutive of the representational 
relation. However, what’s important here is to contrast such accounts (whether or not any of the examples 
Chakravartty provides count as such accounts) with what is being endorsed in this chapter.  
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What should we make of the structural informational accounts of scientific representation, 
in light of the above structural epistemic account of representation and in light of 
Chakravartty’s dissolving of the tension between informational and functional accounts? 
One suggestion, made by but not fully endorsed by Chakravartty (ibid: 209-210) is that the 
proponents of the above structural accounts of representation may wish to repurpose their 
accounts as accounts of the structural relations that are responsible for the accuracy or 
faithfulness of a representation. However, it is yet to be seen as to whether or not the same 
structure-preserving mapping between the vehicle and target are responsible for the vehicle 
being (partially) faithful in every case of representation. There may be nothing fully general 
to be said about which structure-preserving mapping is responsible for (partially) faithful 
epistemic representation: it is a necessary condition on (partially) faithful epistemic 
representation that there is some structure-preserving mapping between vehicle and target, 
but this condition will be satisfied by different relations in different cases of representation. 
That there is a structure-preserving mapping between vehicle and structure is a fully general 
explanation for why a given epistemic representation is (partially) faithful but that there is an 
isomorphism (for example) between vehicle and structure will not be a fully general 
explanation (if, as it seems likely, there are cases of (partially) faithful epistemic representation 
where the relation between vehicle and target is weaker than isomorphism). I will return to 
this point when considering some more examples of mathematical scientific representations 
in the next chapter. 
 
5.5. The Suárez-Frigg objections 
 
According to the account endorsed above, for a given epistemic representation, some user-
generated denotation relation makes it such that the vehicle represents the target, another set 
of user-generated denotation relations between objects, properties and relations in the 
vehicle and target make it such that the vehicle is an epistemic representation of the target 
and structural similarity between the vehicle and target makes it such that the vehicle is a 
(potential) partially faithful epistemic representation of the target.149 In the next chapter, I 
argue that mathematical representation can be understood as a kind of (partially) faithful 
																																																						
149 Structural similarity suffices only for the potential of being a partially faithful epistemic representation: without 
a user bringing it about that the vehicle represents the target and taking (relevant) objects and properties in the 
target to be denoted by objects and properties in the vehicle, a vehicle being structurally similar to a potential 
target does not suffice for being an epistemic representation. 
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epistemic representation. Part of what makes mathematical representation amenable to 
treatment using the epistemic representation framework is the role given to structural 
relations.  
 
However, one of the lessons of the recent literature on scientific representation is supposed 
to be that building the notion of structural similarity into one’s account of representation 
leaves the account open to obvious objections. This stems from arguments owing to Suárez 
(Suárez 1999; Suárez 2003) and Frigg (Frigg 2002; Frigg 2006). This poses the same kind of 
fundamental challenge to the project of the next chapter as Callendar and Cohen’s objection 
discussed in §5.2: if Suárez and Frigg are correct, then any account of mathematical 
representation appealing to structural relations is mistaken. This is especially relevant, given 
that Pincock’s account of mathematical representation discussed in the next chapter is often 
described as being a version of the structural account of scientific representation (for 
example, Pero & Suárez 2016) and so is presumably threatened by these objections.150 In this 
section I discuss these objections and demonstrate that the account of representation 
endorsed here avoids them. 
 
Suárez takes his arguments to be targeting the following views: 
 
 [sim]: A represents B if and only if A is similar to B. 
 
[iso]: A represents B if and only if the structure exemplified by A is isomorphic to the 
structure exemplified by B. (Suárez 2003: 227) 
 
Suárez accepts that isomorphism (and so presumably other kinds of structural mappings) is 
a kind of similarity, noting that “it is possible in general to understand isomorphism as a 
form of similarity” (ibid: 228). It is harmless to take the view that Suárez as targeting as being 
the following, where being structurally similar is understood as there being some morphism 
between A and B.151 
 
[sim-iso] A represents B if and only if A is (structurally or non-structurally) similar to 
B. 
																																																						
150 In §6.4 I argue that this is mistaken. 
151 Suárez originally takes aim at structural accounts of scientific representation that appeal to isomorphisms, 
but later levels similar objections to views that appeal to other morphisms (Pero & Suárez 2016). 
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Suárez then proceeds to present a series of arguments against this view. I will briefly set them 
out below before demonstrating that the view endorsed in the preceding section is not 
susceptible to them.  
 
5.5.1. The arguments 
 
According to the logical argument, [sim-iso] fails to respect the logical properties of 
representation.152 Representation, as Suárez notes, “is an essentially non-symmetric 
phenomenon […] Representation is also non-transitive and non-reflexive” (ibid: 232). 
However, if A and B are similar, then A is similar to A and B is similar to A, and if A and B 
are isomorphic then A is isomorphic with A and B is isomorphic with A. This is in tension 
with our judgements that, for example, the hydraulic machine represents the economy but it 
is not the case either that the hydraulic machine represents itself or that the economy 
represents the hydraulic machine. 
 
According to the argument from misrepresentation (ibid: 233), [sim-iso] entails that particular 
vehicles are representations of particular targets, even though we judge this to be false. To 
adapt Suárez’s example: a painting of Homer is not a representation of Homer’s brother 
Herbert, even though Herbert is incredibly similar to Homer (and therefore to the painting). 
There fails to be a representation relation between the painting and Herbert, but “there is no 
failure of similarity to explain it” (ibid: 234).153 Suárez continues to note that [sim-iso] has 
problems in dealing with the fact the accuracy (or in the terms used above, faithfulness) of a 
representation comes in degrees.154 Suárez argues that views appealing to isomorphisms fail 
to account for the gradable nature of faithfulness, given that whether or not a vehicle is 
isomorphic to (the structure of) its target is binary but accuracy is not. 
 
According to the non-necessity argument (ibid: 235), there can be a representation relation 
between a vehicle and a target in the absence of a relation of (structural) similarity. Suárez 
introduces Picasso’s Guernica and an arbitrary equation as examples. Guernica represents both 
the bombing of Guernica and the looming threat of fascism (ibid: 236): yet if the painting is 
																																																						
152 Goodman (Goodman 1976) offers an early version of the logical argument, as understood as targeting 
similarity accounts of representation in the philosophy of art.  
153 This is much the same point as made by Putnam and his discussion of the ant who, by chance, traces a shape 
in the sand that resembles Churchill (Putnam 1981). 
154 Suárez refers to both of these problems as ‘the argument from misrepresentation’. 
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similar to either of these representational targets, it is only in the reasonably trivial sense in 
which it is equally similar to many other things that it fails to represent. Similarly, Suárez 
claims, Newtonian mechanics represents the solar system even though it is “clear that 
Newtonian mechanics, without general relativistic corrections, is empirically inadequate and 
non-isomorphic” to planetary motion (ibid: 236).  
 
As one might imagine, Suárez’s non-sufficiency argument claims that there can be a relation 
of (structural) similarity between a putative vehicle and target without it being the case that 
the vehicle in fact represents the target (ibid: 236). There are many pairs of objects that are 
similar to each other, without it being the case that either represents the other: similarly, 
Suárez describes a trajectory in phase space that (without us knowing) is isomorphic to the 
motion in physical space of a classical particle. Despite the relation of isomorphism holding 
between the phase space model and the motion of the particle, we judge that the model fails 
to represent the particle. 
 
5.5.2 Responding to the arguments 
 
One possible way to defend a broadly structural view of representation is to specify the kind 
of (structural) similarity in more detail: for example, opting for morphisms other than 
isomorphism restores the parity of at least some properties and thereby hopefully avoiding 
the logical objection, at least. Bartels (Bartels 2006) takes this route, opting for 
homomorphism. Similarly, appealing to partial isomorphism restores the properties of 
asymmetry and non-transitivity (Bueno & French 2012: 887). (Although see fn.178 for an 
important caveat regarding the partial structures framework that distinguishes it somewhat 
from Bartels’ suggestion). Further, one might press that proponents of the views that Suárez 
and Frigg are objecting (taking (structural) similarity to be necessary and sufficient for 
representation) might be harder to find than they think.155 
 
There are some prima facie reasons for not endorsing this strategy of specifying the structural 
relation in more detail. The first concerns the details of such proposals. As Pero and Suárez 
note in their response to Bartels, the homomorphism structural account still requires 
																																																						
155 There are also passages in which proponents of structural views do sound like they think (structural) similarity 
is sufficient for representation. One tangible benefit of Suárez’s contribution to this literature is the emphasis on 
being much clearer on exactly what aspect of our representational practices a particular account is being offered 
to accommodate. 
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appealing to non-structural features to ground some features of representation (Pero & 
Suárez 2016). Similarly, it is not clear that the logical objection can be responded to merely by 
specifying the relevant structural relation in detail: whilst homomorphism and the 
morphisms of the partial structures framework retain the asymmetry of representation, they 
are nevertheless reflexive. Furthermore, both specifying the structural relation in more detail 
and reiterating that the holding of such a relation is not sufficient for representation will do 
nothing to respond to the purported cases of representation in the absence of such relations 
(the non-necessity argument). I think, though, what the above discussion of Contessa’s account 
reveals is that it is a mistake to think what a structural relation between vehicle and target 
does in cases of representation is to make it such that the vehicle represents the target (what 
Suárez calls the constituents of representation): this is what goes wrong with these possible 
responses to the Suárez-Frigg objections. (This is not to say, of course, that the defender of 
Bartels’ homomorphism account (for example) could not do more than gestured at here to 
respond to the Suárez-Frigg objections – the below is an alternate route). 
 
Once the role of (structural) similarity is shifted to grounding the faithfulness of an epistemic 
representation, these arguments lose their force. The account endorsed here avoids the 
logical objection, in virtue of the fact that the denotation relations responsible for the fact 
that the vehicle denotes the target and that the objects/properties/relations in the vehicle 
denote the objects/properties/relations in the target restore the directionality of (epistemic) 
representation: the same goes for the argument from misrepresentation. The non-sufficiency 
and non-necessity objection is avoided merely in virtue of the fact that the structural 
epistemic representation account does not state that the holding of a structural relation 
between vehicle and target is sufficient for either representation qua denotation nor for 
epistemic representation. Guernica, the proponent of the epistemic representation account 
should claim, is about the bombing of Guernica and is about the rise of fascism but it is not 
an epistemic representation of either of these things.  
 
It is, of course, unsurprising that Contessa’s account, descended from Suárez’s own 
deflationist account of representation, should have properties that allow it to avoid the 
objections that Suárez raises! Contessa takes himself to be building on Suárez’s account 
(Contessa 2011: 51) and this, of course, is the reason that the above responses to the Frigg-
Suárez objections fall out so easily from the account. This is not novel, but it is important.  
Indeed, it is a widely appreciated feature of Contessa’s approach: Bolinska notes that 
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adopting an epistemic representation account “avoids some of the objections that have been 
raised in response to accounts that appeal to some sort of structural similarity between 
vehicle and target system” (Bolinska 2013: 220), referring to the Frigg-Suárez objections. 
However, she problematically goes on to say that “without relying on structural relationships 
between vehicle and target [the epistemic representation approach] manages to say 
something substantive about scientific representation” (ibid: 221). This can’t be quite right. 
As noted above, taking an epistemic representation approach should rely on structural 
relationships but it should not do so in grounding the fact that the vehicle denotes the target 
or is an epistemic (rather than non-epistemic) representation. Proponents of the epistemic 
account should not (as is sometimes done) understand the account as eschewing structural 
similarity, but rather putting it in its proper place.  
 
Before concluding, consider the following recent passage from Pero and Suárez, in which 
they seem to make a similar point as Chakravartty makes and that I have been making in this 
section: 
 
It is in particular often unclear […] whether isomorphism and its cousins are intended to 
provide an analysis of the notion of representation itself, or whether they are merely intended 
to describe some of the ways in which representations in science achieves some of its 
characteristic ends, such as for instance, the aim of accuracy. […] Defenders of the structural 
accounts are often imprecise in shifting from evidence for the weaker case to claims in favour 
of the stronger constitutive claim. (Pero & Suárez 2016: 57) 
 
I take this to be broadly correct and one of the aims of this chapter has been to make precise 
exactly what role should be played by structural relations. However, the distinction between 
structural relations being part of “an analysis of the notion of representation itself” or being 
invoked only to explain how we achieve some of our goals using representations is a false 
dichotomy. The view endorsed here says that structural relations are not part of the analysis 
of representation qua denotation, but they are part of the analysis of faithful epistemic 
representation. Recall that Contessa justifies adding the interpretation condition to Suárez’s 
earlier inferential account of representation on the basis that not doing so makes our ability 
to perform inferences from vehicle to target mysterious.156 The same sort of argument 
																																																						
156 Suárez’s inferential account states that A represents B only if (i) the representational force of A points 
towards B and (ii) A allows competent and informed agents to draw specific inferences regarding B (Suárez 
2004). Both Contessa and Suárez’s views, then, place surrogative inference at the heart of epistemic 
representation: it’s important to briefly clarify in what sense the views are distinct. Suárez demurs from placing 
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justifies adding the necessary condition that the vehicle stands in a structural relation to the 
target: without this addition, it is left unexplained how it is that a user is able to infer to facts 
about the target.157 The best explanation of the (partial) faithfulness of epistemic 
representations is that the vehicle is structurally similar to the target and this explanation is 




In this chapter I considered two recent claims about scientific representation that threaten 
the narrower project of the next chapter. The first claim, Callender and Cohen’s reductionism 
about scientific representation, is that there are no questions about scientific representation 
that aren’t understood as questions about how mental representations get their content or 
about how derivative representations inherit their representational status. In response, I 
argued that there are functional differences between derivative representations and that how 
epistemic representations perform their role is a question left unanswered by Callender and 
Cohen’s reductionism. I then set out Contessa’s account of epistemic representation: I 
suggested that such representations can be compared regarding their completeness as well as 
their faithfulness and that structural relations ought to be invoked to ground an epistemic 
representation’s degree of faithfulness. This account is not threatened by the Suárez-Frigg 
objections. In the next chapter, when considering Colyvan & Bueno and Pincock’s proposed 
accounts of distinctively mathematical scientific representation, one of the questions I 
investigate is whether or not these accounts give structural relations the kind of role that 
avoids the Suárez-Frigg objections. 
																																																						
any other sufficient condition on epistemic representation beyond denotational force and surrogative inference. 
Contessa (and following him, Bolinska (Bolinska 2013)) argues that this “leaves one with the mistaken 
impression that there is something mysterious about our ability to use models to perform pieces of surrogative 
reasoning about their target systems” (Contessa 2007: 51). There is a sense in which this objection is not quite 
right: Suárez’s view is not that we should mysterians about any question of the form “for this particular given 
epistemic representation, in virtue of what features of the user, vehicle and target can the user perform 
surrogative inferences from facts about the vehicle to (putative) facts about the target?”. He admits that in 
particular cases, there will be some set of features with which we can explain the user’s ability to perform sound 
surrogative inferences: “in every specific context of inquiry, given a putative target and source, some stronger 
condition will typically be met; but which one specifically will vary from case to case. In some cases it will be 
isomorphism, in other cases it will be similarity, etc.” (Suárez 2004: 776). Contessa takes himself to be supplying 
an explanation as to why a user can provide surrogative inferences. Suárez is correct that there is no one-size-
fits-all answer to the question ‘what particular relation between vehicle and target grounds the vehicle’s degree 
of faithfulness?’. What is illicit is the inference from ‘there is no relation between vehicle and target that grounds 
the degree of faithfulness of an epistemic representation, in all cases’ to ‘there are no necessary conditions on 
epistemic representation beyond denotation and the ability to perform surrogative inference’.   
157 It’s important to reiterate that structural similarity between vehicle and target is a necessary condition on 
faithful epistemic representation and not on either denotation nor epistemic representation simpliciter. 
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Chapter 6 




The previous chapter attended to two issues concerning scientific representation simpliciter: 
the first concerned whether or not there are any distinctive, or special, problems about 
scientific representation and the second concerned what role structural similarity ought to 
play in one’s account of representation. This chapter is about distinctively mathematical 
scientific representation. A quirk of the recent literatures on scientific representation and the 
applicability of mathematics is that there is relatively little dialogue between the two. Much 
of the discussion of mathematical scientific representation goes under the name of the 
applicability of mathematics: but what constitutes the applicability of mathematics, if not the 
construction and utility of distinctively mathematical scientific representations?158 ‘Scientific 
representation’ and ‘mathematical scientific representation’ are not co-extensional, but the 
latter is a subset of the former. The Lotka-Volterra equations, for example, should be 
accommodated both by one’s general account of scientific representation and by one’s 
account of mathematical scientific representation given they exist at the intersection of these 
two categories.  
 
What could explain the lack of explicit dialogue? Perhaps it is assumed that the best theory of 
scientific representation will be straightforwardly compatible with the best theory of 
mathematical scientific representation. Although in this chapter I argue that we can 
understand mathematical scientific representation using the epistemic representation 
framework, this is not a trivial matter and there is work to be done. Furthermore, the little 
that has been said about the relationship between accounts of scientific representation 
simpliciter and accounts of mathematical representation seems to misunderstand one or the 
other. This chapter, then, does not instigate the task of thinking about how mathematical 
applicability and general theories of scientific representation relate to each other. It does, 
																																																						
158 See §0.4 for comments about the relationship between offering an account of the representational capacity 
of mathematics and offering a solution to the problem of the unreasonable effectiveness of mathematics. 
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however, provide a corrective to what has been said so far in the literature and suggest 
another way of approaching the question.  
 
In section one I set out some examples of mathematical scientific representations. In section 
two I set out the details of Pincock’s mapping account. In section three I set out the details 
of Bueno and Colyvan’s inferential conception, which is presented as an improvement over 
the mapping account. In section four I argue against a recent way of understanding how 
these accounts relate to accounts of scientific representation simpliciter, suggested by Pero and 
Suárez. I argue that deficiencies with this proposal naturally point in a different direction: 
that of demonstrating the mapping account and inferential conception are consistent with 
Contessa’s epistemic framework, which I do in section five. In section six, I canvas the 
reasons one might have for thinking that the mapping account and the inferential conception 
are in tension and argue that there is substantive agreement between the accounts. In section 
seven I set out what I take to be the common core of the two accounts and work through 
an example. This common core can be accommodated by the epistemic representation 
framework and is what provides the answer to the question ‘in virtue of what does a piece 
of mathematics (epistemically) represent something non-mathematical’? It is with this core 
in mind that the debates about the plausibility of representationalist nominalism ought to be 
addressed. Accordingly, in section eight, more tentatively, I discuss the metaphysical 
commitments of the account endorsed. I evaluate Bueno and Colyvan’s claim that their 
account is metaphysically neutral and Pincock’s claim that in order to understand the content 
of a mathematical representation, it is necessary to hold that the mathematical content of the 
representation is true.159 
 
6.1. Examples of mathematical representations 
 
Here is the first example, familiar from the previous chapter. Consider the Lotka-Volterra 
equations: 
 
(1)    ()(* = 𝑟𝑉 − 𝑎𝑉 𝑃 
																																																						
159 Both of the two accounts I discuss here, and the common core that I suggest they share, give a crucial role 
to structural relations between the mathematical vehicle and the (assumed structure of the) physical target. 
Many other commentators suggest that they, too, believe that the representational power of mathematics is 
grounded (in some sense) by structural relations between the mathematical and physical domains (Azzouni 
2004; Balaguer 1998; Baker 2003; Leng 2002; Shapiro 1997).  
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(2)    (0(1 = 𝑏 𝑎𝑉 𝑃 −𝑚𝑃 
 
What is being represented is either some particular predator-prey population, or predator-
prey populations in general. (I give more detail about the Lotka-Volterra example in §5.1 and 
§6.7.2). The first distinctive feature is that this is a case both of representation qua denotation 
and qua epistemic representation. The representation both denotes the predator-prey 
population and can be used to learn facts about it. The second distinctive feature is that this 
is an example of scientific epistemic representation: the equations are used in various 
scientific contexts to represent various target systems of scientific interest.  
 
Here is a second example of mathematical representation, drawn from a textbook on 















Figure 3. Suspension bridge 
 
The origin O is set at the lowest point of the cable, understanding the cable to be “modelled 
as subjected to a distributed load w(x)” (Xie 2010: 4). The shape of the cable is given by the 
following second-order ordinary differential equation, taking H to be the tension in the cable 




160 My presentation of this simple case follows Xie’s: see Xie 2010 §1.2 for more examples. The uses of 
differential equations in engineering are not exhausted by examples like the above, of course, nor are the uses 
of representational mathematics outside of scientific practice limited to engineering.  
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(3) (89(:8 = ;(:)=  
 
Just as with the Lotka-Volterra case, this is an example of both representation qua denotation 
and (at least partially) faithful epistemic representation.161 Furthermore, just as with the 
Lotka-Volterra case, this is an example of distinctively mathematical epistemic representation. 
However, unlike the Lotka-Volterra equations, the suspension bridge equation is not 
straightforwardly a case of scientific representation. As in the previous chapter, when drawing 
a distinction between the Lotka-Volterra equations and the subway map, in this thesis I will 
not defend a particular account of the demarcation between science and non-science: no 
account is offered of what makes it the case that the context in which the above 
representation is deployed is non-scientific and the context in which the Lotka-Volterra 
equations are deployed is scientific. Nevertheless, I will take it that there is nothing intrinsic 
about the representations that make some scientific and some non-scientific.162 
 
6.2. The mapping account 
 
In this section, I set out Pincock’s mapping account of mathematical representation. 
Although it is discussed in earlier papers, (Pincock 2004a; Pincock 2004b; Pincock 2007) 
Pincock’s account is set out in the most detail in Mathematics and Scientific Representation 
(Pincock 2012). I will accordingly refer back to Pincock’s earlier discussions when it is 
required to disambiguate aspects of his mature view. In this section I attempt to set out the 
core of Pincock’s account, focusing on aspects that are relevant to the later comparisons 
both with Bueno & Colyvan’s account and Contessa’s account of epistemic representation. 
I cannot attend to the richness of Pincock’s discussion in this space: recall, though, that what 
we’re trying to get at is in virtue of what a piece of mathematics represents something non-
mathematical (both epistemically and qua denotation). Further details will be given as and 




161 The same questions arise concerning exactly what the representational target is in in any given use of the 
equation: I return to this point when working through the Lotka-Volterra case in §6.7.2. 
162 There is a sense, then, in which the question as to whether or not a given epistemic representation counts 
as a scientific representation is being off-loaded to those philosophers of science working in the viability of a 
demarcation criterion. Everything said about these representations here is consistent with there being no viable 
demarcation criterion, with the relevant indicators being either descriptive or normative, or (I take it) some 
other view. For a good recent overview, see part 1 of Pigliucci and Boudry 2013. 
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An important initial distinction, on Pincock’s account, is between a model and a 
representation (Pincock 2012: 26) – a model, for Pincock, is “any entity that is used to 
represent a target system” (ibid: 26) whilst a representation is a “model with content” (ibid: 
26). This allows for a natural understanding of how (for example) the Lotka-Volterra 
equations can be used to represent different target systems on different occasions: in 
Pincock’s vocabulary, then, the same model is used across different representational 
contexts: the model is the same but the representation is different because the model has 
different contents in different contexts.163 For Pincock, contents “provide conditions under 
which the representation is accurate”: offering a mathematical scientific representation is to 
claim that the “concrete system S stands in the structural relation M to the mathematical 
system S*”. A representation is correct if “both systems exist and the structural relation 
obtains” (ibid: 28).164 Pincock states that, for any mathematical representation, we can identify 
its content by asking the following questions: 
 
1. What mathematical entities and relations are in question? 
2. What concrete entities and relations are in question?165 
3. What structural relation must obtain between the two systems for the representation 
to be correct? (ibid: 27) 
 
The notion of a structural mapping between vehicle and target plays a crucial role, hence the 
name of the mapping account. It is worthwhile briefly making clear what is meant by a 
structure in this context. The standard notion of structure takes a structure 𝒮 to be a pair, 
																																																						
163 As discussed in the previous chapter when considering whether or not the 3D hydraulic model and the 
subway map (for example) are representations in the same sense, there is ambiguity as to the relationship 
between models and representations. There is a natural way of using the two terms in which models are built 
from representations and, as such, representational vehicles are more basic. However, on Pincock’s use of the 
two terms, all representations are models but not all models are representations – a model becomes a 
representation once it has been given some content. Investigating the relationship between models and 
representations, and whether there is any principled way of using the two terms in which they come apart, is 
beyond the scope of this thesis. I will continue to use the terms vehicle and target (even though Pincock and 
Bueno & Colyvan do not use these terms) in order to remain as neutral as possible.  
164 It is important to note what seems to be a tension in two parts of Pincock’s account. Pincock assumes the 
truth of mathematical realism when setting out the details of his account (hence the talk of “both systems 
exist[ing]”), but walks this back when discussing what he thinks the metaphysical commitments of the account 
are. As is discussed in §6.8.2, Pincock holds that the account only requires truth-value realism: upon making 
this clear, he does not offer a restatement of the accuracy conditions. These two aspects of Pincock’s account 
seem, therefore, to be in tension. 
165 Pincock’s use of the term “in question” seems infelicitous – I take it that what he means is, we should be 
able to answer the question “what are the mathematical and concrete objects and relations involved in the 
representation?”. 
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consisting of a set of objects 𝐷 of the structure (or the domain or universe of the structure) 
and a set of relations extensionally defined on 𝐷.166 
 
6.2.1. Structural relations and specification 
 
In addition to a structural relation between vehicle and target, the mapping account involves 
another kind of relation, which is logically prior to the structural relation. What Pincock calls 
the specification helps inform the content of the vehicle, and includes some form of 
interpretation of the mathematics in terms of the target. Pincock introduces the idea of a 
specification as follows: 
 
The conditions of correctness that such representations impose on a system can be explained 
in terms of a formal network of relations that obtains in the system along with a specification 
of which physical properties are correlated with which parts of the mathematics. (ibid: 25) (emphasis added) 
 
Suppose we have a concrete system along with a specification of the relevant physical properties. This 
specification fixes an associated structure. Following Suárez, we can say that the system instantiates 
that structure, relevant to that specification, and allow that structural relations are preserved 
by this instantiation relation. This allows us to say that a structural relation obtains between 
a concrete system and an abstract structure. (ibid: 29) (emphasis added) 
 
These quotes make clear that the specification plays two roles: it provides an interpretation 
of the physical structure and it selects a mathematical structure with which to denote the 
target system (or, in Pincock’s vocabulary, it selects a model). A physical system is taken to 
instantiate a particular structure, which facilitates the standing of the system in structural 
relations with the mathematical structure. Some parts of the vehicle are “assigned denotation 
or reference relations” (ibid: 257) – I assume what the parts are taken to denote/refer to are 
objects (or properties or relations) in the physical system.  
 
Pincock offers the following, typical, definition of a structural relation, which coheres with 
that given above: 
 
																																																						
166 Below, I give an example of a structural relation that is stated using mathematics but, obviously, once 
mathematically-stated structural relations are permitted it is impossible to provide an exhaustive list. 
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A structural relation is one that obtains between systems S1 and S2 solely in virtue of the 
formal network of the relations that obtains between the constituents of S1 and the formal 
network of the relations that obtains between the constituents of S2, [where a] formal 
network is a network that can be correctly described without mentioning the specific 
relations which make up the network. (ibid: 27) 
 
Pincock mentions isomorphisms and homomorphisms as potential structural relations that 
might play this role in particular mathematical representations (ibid: 27-30). In addition, 
Pincock permits incorporating mathematical notions in the structural relations: “including 
those whose specification requires mathematics” (ibid: 27) Pincock expands his discussion of 
content, to distinguish between several (more sophisticated) kinds of content that can be had 
by a mathematical representation. I will return to some of this when considering the mapping 
account in relation to the inferential conception in §6.6.1. 
 
6.3. The inferential conception 
 
Motivated by what they take to be deficiencies in Pincock’s account (as set out in Pincock 
2004), Bueno and Colyvan have recently offered an alternate account, the inferential 
conception. Bueno and Colyvan’s account take as the motivating insight the fact that “the 
fundamental role of applied mathematics is inferential”: 
 
[B]y embedding certain features of the empirical world into a mathematical structure, it is 
possible to obtain inferences that would otherwise be extraordinarily hard (if not impossible) 
to obtain. (Bueno & Colyvan 2011: 352) 
 
The claim that facilitating inference is the “fundamental” role of applied mathematics should 
remind us of the discussion in §1.4.2 about the various roles played by mathematics and 
whether or not any of these depend on each other in substantive ways. Although Bueno & 
Colyvan state that inference is the fundamental role played by mathematics in science, this 
need not stand in tension with the suggestion that representation is (in some sense) basic and 
grounds the various other uses (such as inference and confirmation) that mathematics is put 
to: this is because, for Bueno & Colyvan, inference is grounded by mathematics’ 
representational capacity in virtue of the fact that the notion of inference plays a crucial part 
in explicating mathematics’ representational role. Following Hughes’ DDI account of 
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scientific representation (Hughes 1997), for Bueno & Colyvan is (partially) explicated by 
appealing to inference. 
 
It is clear that by ‘embedding’, Bueno and Colyvan mean that mappings are established 
between the target system and the mathematical vehicle. So, like the mapping account, the 
inferential conception relies (in some sense) on structural relations that hold between the 
vehicle and target. Bueno and Colyvan engage directly with a worry that is mentioned in 
passing by Pincock: physical target systems don’t seem to be the right kind of thing to stand 
in structural relations with mathematical structures, as they are neither set-theoretic nor 
mathematical objects.167 Bueno and Colyvan’s response is to assume that: 
 
[T]here is some natural structure of the [target system] or that an appropriate structure can 
be imposed upon the [target system] (ibid: 372) 
 
This assumption about the structure of the target system is part of what Bueno and Colyvan 
call the “empirical set up” of a mathematical scientific representation.168 With the empirical 
set up in hand, the inferential conception takes there to be three steps involved in making 
use of a mathematical scientific representation. Bueno and Colyvan set them out as follows: 
 
[T]he [immersion] step consists in establishing a mapping from the empirical set up to a 
convenient mathematical structure. We call this step immersion. The point of immersion is to 
relate the relevant aspects of the empirical situation with the appropriate mathematical 
context. […] [S]everal mappings can do the job here, and the choice of mapping is a 
contextual matter, largely dependent on the particular details of the application. 
 
[T]he [derivation] step consists in drawing consequences from the mathematical formalism, 
using the mathematical structure obtained in the immersion step. We call this step derivation. 
This is, of course, the key point of the application process, where consequences from the 
mathematical formalism are generated/ 
 
																																																						
167 Pincock is similarly noncommittal about how we should think about the target system having a particular 
structure: he says that there is “an important difference between talking about a concrete system made up of 
objects and linked together by concrete relations involving quantities and properties and a set-theoretic 
structure” (Pincock 2012: 29). 
168 It is also important to briefly distinguish Bueno & Colyvan’s suggestion here from a more radical suggestion. 
Instead of assuming that the world has a structure or can have one imposed on it, one could also identify the 
world with a particular mathematical structure.  
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[In the interpretation step] we interpret the mathematical consequences that were obtained 
in the derivation step in terms of the initial empirical set up. We call this step interpretation. 
To establish an interpretation, a mapping from the mathematical structure to the empirical 
set up is needed. This mapping need not be simply the inverse of the mapping used in the 
immersion step – although, in some instances, this may well be the case. (ibid: 353) 
 
Bueno & Colyvan stress that the mappings between the mathematical structure and the 
empirical set-up can, in some cases, be the mappings set up in the partial structures 
framework (da Costa & French 2003; Bueno, French and Ladyman 2002; French and 
Ladyman 1998). As a result, in addition to standard set-theoretic mappings like isomorphism 
and homomorphism, the structural relations will, in some cases, be partial mappings like 
partial isomorphism. The details of the partial structures framework are set out in appendix 
B. This distinctive feature of the account plays a role in the accommodation of idealizations, 
which will be discussed in more detail in §6.6 and in fn. 178. 
 
Here are two brief interpretative remarks. First, it is unclear whether or not the mathematics 
used to derive the consequences, in the interpretation step, are part of the content of a given 
representation. Pincock calls mathematics that is part of a representation intrinsic and 
mathematics appealed to when making use of a representation extrinsic. Second, that the 
account is presented in terms of a sequence of steps that are carried out obscures the fact 
that the immersion step can be repeated prior to the derivation step, such that the 
mathematical structure into which the empirical structure has been embedded is embedded 
into a further mathematical structure. Similarly, the working through of the three stages can, 
itself, be repeated (Bueno & Colyvan 2011: 354).169 
 
 
6.4. Mathematical representation and scientific representation 
simpliciter 
 
Setting out the core commitments of the mapping account and the inferential conception 
gets us a little closer to understanding the nature of mathematical representation: they are 
both ways of making more precise the common view that mathematical representation has 
																																																						
169 Raz and Sauer make this point and offer what they refer to as the dynamical inferential account (Raz & Sauer 
2015): but as far as I can see, this point is recognised by Bueno and Colyvan and can be incorporated by the 
inferential conception. 
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something to do with structural relations, but both also make clear that there is more to 
mathematical representation than there just being a structural mapping between some 
structure and some part of the world. A natural question, given the purposes of this thesis, 
is: how does mathematical representation relate to representation simpliciter? Is mathematical 
representation different in kind to other kinds of representation, or, rather, is mathematical 
representation distinctive in virtue of the vehicle being mathematical? This is, essentially, the 
question of whether or not anti-exceptionalism is true about mathematical representation. 
 
Little has been explicitly said on this question. I will present a positive account of this 
relationship in §6.5, arguing for a kind of anti-exceptionalism. Before doing so, however, it 
is necessary to briefly discuss a rival understanding of how the accounts above relate to 
existing accounts of scientific representation. 
 
6.4.1. Pero & Suárez’s anti-exceptionalist understanding of mathematical 
representation 
 
The notable exception to the general lacuna noted in the introduction is two recent papers 
(one written jointly with Francesca Pero) by Mauricio Suárez. Pero and Suárez understand 
Pincock as offering a structural account of representation of the kind that they take the Frigg-
Suárez objections to undermine.170 Recall that the Frigg-Suárez objections are objections to 
(structural) similarity accounts of representation that exploit the (purported!) fact that these 
accounts identify representation with (structural) similiarity. The non-necessity argument offers 
up, for example, cases of representation where (structural) similarity is missing, the non-
sufficiency argument invokes cases of similarity without representation, and so on.171 It seems 
clear that Pero & Suárez take accounts of mathematical representation that invoke structural 
similarity to fall victim to these objections. 
 
Pero & Suárez explicitly contrast the mapping account with Contessa’s account discussed in 
the previous chapter: 
																																																						
170 Pincock’s account is not the focus of these papers. However, given that Pero & Suárez 2016 and Suárez 
2015 are two of the few discussions of the accounts of mathematical representation that explicitly relate them 
to accounts of scientific representation simpliciter, it is worthwhile discussing what is said. Also – whilst the 
comments by Pero and Suárez are anti-exceptionalist in that they think that the mapping account is a version 
of an existing kind of account of scientific explanation, they clearly do not think that it can be the correct way to 
accommodate mathematical representation. 
171 See §5.5.1 for discussion of all of the Suárez-Frigg objections and §5.5.2 for discussion of how they can be 
responded to whilst retaining a key role for structural similarity. 
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There is by now a long tradition of structural approaches to scientific representation, starting 
in van Fraassen and Suppes to the most sophisticated accounts by Bartels and Pincock. The 
tradition’s critics (Contessa, Frigg, Giere, Suárez, van Fraassen) have invoked putative 
counterexamples to structural notions (Pero & Suárez 2016: 71) 
 
Carving up the associated views in a similar way, in a discussion of what he refers to as 
‘substantive’ accounts of representation (where this is understood as accounts of 
representation that “claim that representation is some substantive or objective property or 
relation” (Suárez 2015: 37)), Suárez groups Pincock’s account in with the structural accounts 
discussed in the previous chapter, saying that “champions of substantive accounts include 
Pincock, who defends structural isomorphism […] yet other attempts at substantive accounts 
include Bartels, who defends homomorphism, French and his disciples, who defend partial 
isomorphism” (ibid: 37).  
 
Pero and Suárez’s comments misunderstand Pincock’s account in two ways.172 First, it is false 
that Pincock’s account holds that representation should be identified with one particular 
structural relation between vehicle and target. Although structural relations clearly play a 
crucial role in Pincock’s account, the specification also sets up denotation relations between 
the vehicle and target: these relations between vehicle and target are user-fixed. The intentions 
of the user enter into the picture in setting up the denotation relations both between the 
vehicle and the target and between parts of the vehicle and parts of the target. The second 
misunderstanding of the mapping account present in Pero & Suàrez’s comments is the claim 
that Pincock thinks that isomorphism is the structural relation involved in every case of 
mathematical representation. This is a misreading first because, as just discussed, there are 
multiple relations between vehicle and target involved in each case of mathematical 
representation (on Pincock’s account) – only some of these are structural, the others are 
denotational. Second, even limiting to the structural relations involved, Pincock is explicit 
that he holds that the relationship between vehicle and structure involved in representation 
can include both other set-theoretically stated relations (like homomorphism) as well as 
relations that must be stated mathematically (Pincock 2012: 31). It should be clear, then, that 
																																																						
172 Suárez and Pero & Suárez do not mention the inferential conception: but given that the mapping account 
is lumped in with structural accounts of scientific representation in virtue of the fact that it appeals to 
morphisms of various kinds, I assume that they hold that the same goes for the inferential conception given 
that it also gives a key role to such morphisms.	
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Pincock’s account as set out in Pincock 2012 is not subject to the Suárez-Frigg objections 
for much the same reason as the account of epistemic representation endorsed in the 
previous chapter is not. It is no part of the view that structural relations between vehicle and 
target are either identified with or sufficient for representation. It is for this reason that the error 
made by Pero & Suárez, corrected in this section, is not an insignificant one. Rather, it is 
misleading because it suggests that Pincock’s account (and Bueno & Colyvan’s) is vulnerable 
to objections that it is in fact not vulnerable to.  
 
Nevertheless, what is commendable about Pero & Suárez’s remarks (however brief) is that 
they offer an answer what has (so far) largely been a neglected question: that of working out 
how the mapping account and the inferential conception relate to the accounts of 
representation simpliciter. As demonstrated above, however, it is a mistake to think that 
Pincock’s account identifies the representation relation with a structural relation, or takes 
structural similarity to be sufficient for representation. Instead, representation also involves 
the setting up of denotation relations. Recall, also, that the discussion in the previous chapter 
demonstrated that there is a crucial place in the epistemic representation framework for 
structural relations. Taking the lead from this observation, from the fact that mathematical 
scientific representations seem like they are epistemic representations par excellence, and from 
Pero & Suárez’s explicitly contrasting of Pincock’s account with Contessa’s, in the next section 
I argue for the opposite conclusion – that the mapping account and inferential conception 
can, in fact, be demonstrated to be consistent with the epistemic representation approach. Even 
though the two accounts give crucial roles to structural similarity, it is too quick to conclude 
that the accounts are guilty of identifying the representation relation with the structural relation 
(in the way that Suárez at least thinks leading accounts of scientific representation do).  I will 
take the above grouping of the mapping account in with accounts that (purportedly) reduce 
representation to structural similarity as the foil of the next two sections. I first recall the 
crucial features of epistemic representation and then, in the following section, by arguing 
that the mapping account and inferential conception have these features. This both offers a 
corrective to Pero & Suárez’s assumption, and allows for an anti-exceptionalist 
understanding of mathematical representation, shedding light on what mathematical and 





6.4.2. The core features of epistemic representation 
 
In this section I briefly recall the key features of the epistemic account endorsed in the 
previous chapter, in order to argue for the anti-exceptionalist conclusion in following 
sections.  
 
The first relevant dimension of epistemic representation is that separate relations between 
the vehicle and target are responsible for the different functions of a (partially) faithful 
epistemic representation. I will refer to this as the tripartite condition. Being explicit about the 
relations between vehicle and target that ground the tripartite nature of faithful epistemic 
representation made plausible a view of representation that (a) allows that a minimal kind of 
representation (representation qua denotation) can be achieved near trivially (b) avoids the 
Frigg-Suárez objections whilst (c) allowing structural relations to nevertheless play a central 
role in scientific representation. This results in the second condition, which is as follows. A 
vehicle counting as a representation of a target (qua denoting its target) and a vehicle counting 
as an epistemic representation of a target are binary: a vehicle either denotes or it does not, 
and a target has either been interpreted in terms of a vehicle or it has not. Faithfulness, 
however, comes in degrees. Contessa refers to this aspect of epistemic representation as 
faithfulness being gradable (Contessa 2011: 129) so I will, accordingly, call this the gradability 
condition.  
 
Much as with the accommodation of extra-mathematical explanation into Woodward’s 
account of explanation, in this thesis I do not offer a full defence of Contessa’s account of 
representation. Rather, making it plausible that Contessa’s account is viable and focusing on 
the anti-exceptionalist accommodation of distinctively mathematical scientific representation 
is a productive strategy. I take its three features, (a), (b) and (c) above to (partially) ground its 
plausibility. How the anti-exceptionalist account of distinctively epistemic mathematical 
representation here fares against other potential anti-exceptionalist accounts (which would 
attempt to accommodate mathematical representation into a different pre-existing 
representational framework that can also be independently motivated) is a task to be carried 






6.5. Mathematical representation as epistemic representation 
 
In this section I argue that the mapping account and inferential conception can be 
understood as having the core features of the epistemic representation framework by 
demonstrating that they meet the tripartite condition and the gradability condition. This 
means that there is something substantive and (plausibly) fully general that can be said about 
all kinds of epistemic representation, ranging from maps to mathematical representations. 
 
6.5.1. The tripartite condition 
 
The tripartite condition says that different (sets of) relations should ground the fact that a 
vehicle denotes its target, the fact that a vehicle is an epistemic representation of its target 
and that a vehicle is a (partially) faithful epistemic representation of its target. The first 
motivation for the tripartite condition, remember, is the fact that representation qua 
denotation and epistemic representation are easy to achieve whilst faithful epistemic 
representation is not. The second motivation is the desire for an account that gives structural 
similarity an important role whilst not being susceptible to the Frigg-Suárez objections. If 
the mapping account and inferential conception appeal to structural relations in order to 
ground a representation’s status as a representation qua denotation, then they seem left open 
to these objections. In this section, I will argue that they do not. 
 
In what is perhaps the most succinct summary of his view concerning how a mathematical 
representation is set up, Pincock says the following: 
 
First, we must fix the abstract structure which we are calling the model. […] Then some 
parts of this abstract structure must be assigned physical properties or relations. At this 
second stage the parts of the purely mathematical entity are assigned denotation or reference 
relations. Finally, a structural relation must be given which indicates how the relevant parts 
map onto the target system or target systems of the representation. At the end of these three 
steps, the representation has obtained its representational content. (Pincock 2012: 257) (cf. 
ibid: 27) 
 
Straightforwardly, then, for Pincock a representation obtains once these three steps are 
carried out and the three steps mirror Contessa’s three (sets of) relations. The specification 
relations set up the two collections of denotation relations and the structural relation holds 
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between the (structure of) the target and the vehicle once the denotation relations have been 
set up. Even though Pincock at one point contrasts his account with Contessa’s (see §6.6.2 
for discussion of this point), this three-step setting up of a representation clearly brings to 
mind, and even mirrors, Contessa’s presentation of the three steps involved in setting up a 
(partially) faithful epistemic representation (Contessa 2007: 57) – the selection of a vehicle 
(and the setting up of a denotation relation between it and the target), the establishing of 
denotation relations between parts of the vehicle (for Pincock, the model) and parts of the 
target (via an interpretation) and then the holding of a structural relation. The above passage, 
I think, reinforces the argument made in §6.4 that (contra Suárez), the mapping account does 
not in any sense take the structural relation to be sufficient for representation – the first two 
steps are also crucial and without them, there is no representation (either qua denotation or 
epistemic representation). The mapping account does not, therefore, assign a problematic role 
to structural relations: they ground a representation’s faithfulness (or, for Pincock, set the 
conditions of accuracy) rather than making it such that the representation denotes the target 
(which is what seemed to leave naïve views open to the Suárez-Frigg objections). If there 
were a structural mapping between a given model (to use Pincock’s vocabulary) and a target 
system, without denotation relations having been set up, a representational relation of any 
kind would not hold, according to Pincock’s account. 
 
Things are not quite as straightforward for the inferential conception. On the inferential 
conception, the vehicle denotes the target in virtue of the intentions of the agent, in that the 
representational vehicle is selected by the user: the mathematical structure is a representation 
of that particular target system by stipulation, or something similarly user-fixed. However, 
recall also that Contessa requires that different relations are responsible for the fact that the 
vehicle is an epistemic representation and for the fact that the representation is faithful – for 
Contessa, the interpretation of the vehicle in terms of the target secures epistemic 
representation, while some kind of structural relation between the vehicle and target is 
responsible for the vehicle’s degree of faithfulness. However, on the inferential conception, 
the relation that seems closest to being constitutive of the user’s interpretation of the vehicle 
(to use Contessa’s vocabulary) seems to be the structural relation invoked in the immersion 
step, when the user takes a given structural mapping to hold between the empirical set up 
and mathematical structure. This involves “relat[ing] the relevant aspects of the empirical 
situation with the appropriate mathematical context” (Bueno & Colyvan 2011: 353). Yet, on 
first glance, it seems as though this very same structural relation is responsible for the vehicle’s 
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faithfulness, if we are to follow Contessa’s suggestion that structural relations are responsible 
for the faithfulness of a given epistemic representation. This generates worries that the 
inferential conception, unlike the mapping account, does not allow for different relations 
between (or facts about) the vehicle and target to be responsible for the different dimensions 
of epistemic representation.  
 
It’s first important to note that the utility of the tripartite nature of Contessa’s account is 
grounded in its ability to yield a response to the Suárez-Frigg objections. All that’s required 
in order for the response to be successful is that the account does not make the existence of 
a structural relation to be either necessary or sufficient for either representation qua 
denotation or epistemic representation. Secondly, and most importantly, there is a subtle 
difference between the two ways that a structural relation plays a role in setting up a (partially) 
faithful epistemic representation on the above understanding of the inferential conception. 
The interpretation of the vehicle in terms of the target occurs when the user of the 
representation takes the structural relation to hold between the physical and mathematical 
domains – and this taking is user-fixed. This is what happens on Bueno and Colyvan’s 
immersion step, with “the relevant aspects of the empirical situation” being related to the 
“mathematical context” (ibid), via taking a mapping to hold between the two. It is at this 
stage that we should understand denotation relations as being set up between the vehicle and 
target. In contrast, a structural relation actually obtaining between the vehicle and target is what 
makes the representation faithful and the eventual inferences sound. On this line, the 
establishing of denotation relations between (parts of) the vehicle and (parts of) the target is 
something like a by-product or symptom of taking there to be structural similarity – see fn.173 
for another way of articulating this idea. This seems right – whatever fixes the interpretation 
of the vehicle in terms of the target ought to be something user-fixed and taking the two 
domains to be structurally similar in the way stated in the immersion step seems like this sort 
of fact. Whatever makes a representation faithful, and the inferences sound, should be 
something non-user fixed, and worldly (as it were) – something about the vehicle and target, 
and not about the user. The vehicle and target in fact being structurally similar (in the way 
that the user takes them to be) is what plays this role.  
 
One might worry at this stage that this bifurcation is ad hoc, and is motivated only by the anti-
exceptionalist aim of making the inferential conception and Contessa’s account harmonious. 
This worry can be assuaged by considering a non-mathematical example of epistemic 
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representation. Suppose a city trekker versed in the vocabulary of set-theory takes a map to 
be a map of Berlin, and states that they take the map to be isomorphic to Berlin (or, speaking 
more carefully, to some structure that Berlin can be taken to instantiate). One might worry 
that on the letter of Contessa’s account, a case of epistemic representation has not been 
established: the map is taken to denote the city and a structural relation is taken to obtain 
between Berlin and the map, but denotation relations have not been established between 
parts of the map and parts of Berlin. Yet, it seems obvious that in this case, parts of the map 
have been taken to denote parts of Berlin when the user of the representation takes the two to be 
isomorphic! Taking the two to be isomorphic involves establishing a function that takes as its 
input exactly one map-object (or property or relation) and maps this to exactly one city-
object (or property or relation), but these mappings can also very easily be understood as 
denotation relations, or at least as also yielding denotation relations. In this case, an 
isomorphism between Berlin and the map are playing the dual role of acting as an 
interpretation and in grounding the faithfulness of the map.173  
 
Here is a final worry along these lines. In the Berlin map case, it seemed very natural to think 
that in taking the map to be isomorphic to Berlin, denotation relations were being set up 
between objects (and properties and relations) in the map and objects (and properties and 
relations) in Berlin, however implicitly. One might worry that the same will not be true of all 
cases drawn from scientific practice in which a mapping is proposed between a physical and 
mathematical structure: that the account is guilty of a certain naivety, resulting from taking 
the analogies with epistemic representations like maps too seriously. One intuitively 
problematic case is permutation invariance. The basic idea here is that there are physical 
systems with particles such that these systems are invariant under permutations of these 
particles. This might be taken to threaten the idea that, in stating that a morphism of 
particular kind is taken to hold between the physical and mathematical structure, denotation 
relations are implicitly being set up between objects in the two domains: because, in this case, 
																																																						
173 Again, being slightly more careful: the user taking Berlin to be isomorphic to the map is what grounds the 
interpretation of the map in terms of Berlin and Berlin in fact being isomorphic to the map is what makes the map 
faithful. So, even though a structural relation between vehicle and target is in some sense playing the dual role, 
the user having a belief with the isomorphism as its object is playing the role of fixing an interpretation, but the 
isomorphism in fact obtaining is playing the role of grounding faithfulness. The same kind of bifurcation should 
play a role in understanding the inferential conception qua account of mathematical epistemic representation: 
to immerse the empirical set up into the mathematics is to take the chosen structural relation (which will, in 
mathematical cases, not be isomorphism) to hold between the empirical set up and the mathematical structure 
is to interpret (in Contessa’s vocabulary), but the inferences produced will only be sound if this chosen 
structural relation actually does hold between the empirical set up and the mathematical structure (and this is not 
user-fixed). 
	 187 
it is understood by the user of the representation that these objects in the target system are, 
for the current purposes, indistinguishable. There has been extensive philosophical 
discussion of this kind of symmetry, and of permutation invariance – most relevantly, but 
non-exhaustively, on whether or not permutation invariance reveals that quantum particles 
are, in fact, not individuals (what French & Rickles call ‘the Received View’ (French & Rickles 
2003)) and on the consistency of permutation invariance and an ontology of particles 
(Jantzen 2010). It would be unsurprising, then, that this should be a case that might threaten 
the joint assumption that denotation relations are established between parts of the vehicle 
and target, in addition to between the vehicle and target. Having flagged up this potential 
open question here, I will return to it when discussing the limits of the anti-exceptionalist 
accounts offered in the conclusion. 
 
6.5.2 The gradability condition 
 
On Contessa’s account of epistemic representation, faithfulness comes in degrees. Following 
Contessa, I am referring to this as gradability. Although the fact that faithfulness comes in 
degrees is a component of Contessa’s particular account, I also take it to be a platitude about 
epistemic representation to be accommodated by any such account: two representations that 
denote the same target can be more or less faithful epistemic representations (where this will 
be connected (non-trivially!) to the representation’s usefulness). Although in this context 
meeting the gradability condition is a worry about making the accounts of mathematical 
representation consistent with, or part of, the epistemic representation framework, it is an 
instance of a more general worry, already noted by both Suárez and Contessa. Contessa notes 
that taking structural relations between vehicle and target to ground a representation’s 
faithfulness (as he suggests) generates the tension that faithfulness is a matter of degree whilst 
the holding of a structural relation is not (Contessa 2011: 129): 
 
A more serious problem is that the notion of faithful epistemic representation is a gradable 
notion, but that of morphism is not; whether or not that morphism holds between the 
structure instantiated by the vehicle and that instantiated by the target is a yes-or-no question 
but how faithful an epistemic representation of a certain system is of a certain target is a 
matter of degree (Contessa 2011: 129) (emphasis added) 
 
Suárez’s argument from inaccuracy, too, pointed out that structural relations holding is 
binary whilst accuracy is not (§5.5.1.) This is not, then, a new problem that arises from 
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attempting to achieve the irenic aim of rendering the mapping account and inferential 
conception consistent with Contessa’s approach. It is unsurprising that, with their natural 
focus on structural relations, this problem raises its head here. This means that there exist 
the resources to resolve the apparent tension.  
 
First, though, note the following aspect of the mapping account. Pincock’s approach focuses 
on accuracy conditions rather than inference, in a sense that is potentially problematic. On 
Pincock’s account, mathematical scientific representations set accuracy conditions on the 
world (Pincock 2012: 28). Accuracy conditions are understood as restrictions on how the 
world must be if the representation is accurate. As should now be obvious from Contessa 
and Suárez’s comments recalled above, this has the consequence that the accuracy or 
correctness of a representation is binary, rather than gradable – a representation is accurate 
if the world ‘holds up its end of the bargain’ (so to speak), and it is inaccurate if it does not. 
Pincock, therefore, seems to have a deviant notion of accuracy, one that does not admit of 
degrees. This suggests a worry that we will be unable to compare two representations of the 
same target. 
 
There is, furthermore, something of a related tension in Pincock’s account. Pincock says, as 
noted in the quotes above, that the content of a mathematical representation is entirely 
structural. Yet, it also seems clear from his comments that the existence of a structural 
relation between the (structure of) the vehicle and the (structure of) the target is insufficient 
for the former to represent the latter – denotation relations must also be set up via the 
specification. So, even though these denotation relations aren’t part of (what Pincock calls) 
the content of a representation, they do nevertheless play a necessary role in bringing it about 
such that the vehicle represents the target. Both this tension and Pincock’s idiosyncratic 
notion of accuracy can have light shed on them by appealing to the epistemic representation 
framework. Furthermore, although I have brought out this tension by appealing to the details 
of Pincock’s account, the first worry transfers over to the inferential conception: a structural 
relation holding is binary, whilst faithfulness comes in degrees and the inferential conception 
appeals to the structural relations of the partial structures framework (see fn. 175). 
 
Recall, however, that once structural mappings are assigned the role of fixing faithfulness 
rather than fixing whether or not the vehicle is a representation of the target at all (a 
suggestion made, in different ways, by Chakravartty and Contessa, and endorsed in §5.4.4), 
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those who are sympathetic to structural accounts of scientific representation needn’t try and 
identify a single morphism to constitute the structural relation between vehicle and target 
across all scientific representation (Contessa 2011: 129). Rather, different representations will 
make use of different structural relations (or, more carefully, different representations will 
be faithful in virtue of different structural relations). Some epistemic representations will 
make use of relations as strong as isomorphism to ground the faithfulness of the 
representation, but others may appeal to weaker relations. According to this natural thought, 
the degree of faithfulness of a representation is determined by how structurally similar the 
vehicle and the target are – and this, in turn, is fixed by (or, rather, is identical to) how strong 
the morphism is between the structure instantiated by the target and the vehicle structure 
are.  
 
Contessa appeals to this idea in unpublished work (with permission given to cite). Building 
on the work in Contessa 2007 and Contessa 2011, he suggests that the faithfulness of a given 
epistemic representation is determined by the strength of the morphism between the vehicle 
and structure (Contessa ms: 87 – 94). Whilst this offers a useful way to address an apparent 
tension between the accounts of mathematical representation discussed here and the 
epistemic account, it nevertheless generates questions about Contessa’s account. There are 
now two independent ways to measure the faithfulness of a given representation. The first 
is (something like) the ratio of sound to unsound inferences licensed by the representation: 
the greater the percentage of these inferences that are sound, the more faithful the 
representation. The second is (something like) the strength of the morphism between the 
structure of the target and of the vehicle determines the faithfulness of the representation: 
the stronger the morphism, the more faithful the representation.174 
 
Nevertheless, it seems like a similar solution can be given in order to render faithfulness a 
matter of degree on the mapping account and inferential conception. Different 
representations can be compared with respect to their faithfulness by considering the 
structural relations that ground their respective faithfulness. As long as a good enough story 
can be told about the relationship between the number of sound inferences licensed by a 
vehicle and the strength of the morphism between the structure of the vehicle and the 
																																																						
174 Given that Contessa has moved away from working on scientific representation, it is unclear as to whether 
or not a canonical answer will be given to this question, as it were. I suspect that by appealing to the fact that 
the relevant structure of the vehicle is one chosen by the user, these two ways to measure faithfulness can be 
rendered consistent: this is a topic for future work. 
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structure of the target, the faithfulness of an epistemic representation can be measured by 
the strength of the morphism that obtains between the two domains.175 
 
6.6. Inferences, maps, means and ends  
 
This irenic result that both the mapping account and the inferential conception can be 
accommodated by the epistemic representation freamework tells against the inference from 
the surface level focus on structural similarity to the thought that the accounts, therefore, 
identify representation with structural similarity. This is the inference that I took to be present 
in Pero and Suárez’s remarks and their contrasting of the mapping account with the epistemic 
representation account. It is also an anti-exceptionalist outcome. However, it does sit slightly 
oddly with the view that the former two accounts are presumably supposed to be understood 
as competing accounts of mathematical representation. In this section I will accordingly suggest 
one way of dissolving the apparent differences between the two accounts.176  
 
6.6.1. Purported advantages of the inferential conception over the mapping account 
 
Bueno & Colyvan discuss difficulties with the mapping account that, they, claim, can be 
resolved by their proposed alternative (Bueno & Colyvan 2011: 356 – 359). The first is the 
purported fact that the mapping account does not “have the resources to accommodate the 
fact that mathematical theories often have more structure than the empirical set up, and some 
of the additional structure (suitably interpreted) has empirical implications” (ibid: 356). They 
suggest that the inferential conception has the ability to avoid this problem in virtue of the 
fact that the structure selected at the various steps of the process are “completely dependent 
on context” – that “the choice here [between various mathematical structures and various 
																																																						
175 A suggestion much along Contessa’s line above has already been suggested by da Costa and French in their 
discussion of the partial structures framework (which, recall, is appealed to by Bueno and Colyvan) – so all that 
is needed is to deploy it for the slightly different purpose of rendering the inferential conception harmonious 
with the gradability condition. Recall that, on the inferential conception, the structural relations between vehicle 
and target that ground both the vehicle’s status as an epistemic representation and the representation’s 
faithfulness will often be those found in the partial structures framework. The relations of the partial structures 
framework are commonly understood as an ordered triple, 𝑅 = <𝑅A, 𝑅B, 𝑅C>, where 𝑅A is the set of n-tuples 
that hold for R, 𝑅B is the set of n-tuples that do not hold for R and 𝑅C is the set of n-tuples for which it is not 
known, or for which it is not defined, whether or not they belong to R (see appendix B for details). da Costa 
and French, in proposing the partial structures framework, suggest that it can be used to measure the degree 
of similarity or approximation involved in a model. I take it that, for Bueno and Colyvan, this is one of the 
advantages of appealing to the partial structures framework.  
176 The suggestion here is not that Bueno and Colyvan misunderstand Pincock’s view: the version of Pincock’s 
view that they target in Bueno & Colyvan 2011 is less sophisticated than that which is set out schematically at 
the beginning of Pincock 2012 and then developed throughout.  
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structures of the target system] will emerge from a careful consideration of the benefits and 
costs of each option” (ibid). It is unclear, from their discussion, exactly how the fact that the 
particular morphism is selected by appealing to contextual factors is supposed to 
accommodate this worry: but, in as much as it does, in his later presentation Pincock also 
stresses that the relevant structural relation between vehicle and target taken to play a role in 
a given representation will be informed by contextual factors (Pincock 2012: 31-33). 
 
The second concerns the worry about assumed structure of the target system, discussed 
above: the need to “impose some structure on the world in order to begin the modelling 
exercise” (Bueno & Colyvan 2011: 357). However, it seems clear that Pincock’s specification 
step should be understood as exactly imposing some structure on the world – given that it 
involves dividing the target system into the salient objects, properties and relations in the 
target such that they can stand in denotational relationships with mathematical objects, 
properties and relations. There are, of course, deep questions about whether or not any one 
of the potential structures that the physical world is taken to instantiate is (in some sense) a 
privileged structure and whether or not an account of mathematical representation along 
these lines is committed to holding that the answer to this question is yes and that this 
privileged structure is latched on to.177 But, for the purposes of comparing whether or not 
the inferential conception has any resources over and above the mapping account in answering 
this question, these needn’t be settled here. 
 
The third concerns accommodating idealizations. Bueno and Colyvan argue that, because 
the inferential conception appeals to the partial structures framework (see appendix B), 
idealizations can be accommodated in a way that the mapping account cannot. There are two 
ways of dissolving this potential difference between the accounts. First, there appears to be 
nothing in the details of the accounts that prevents the mapping account from also appealing 
to the partial structures framework (although see fn.178). Second, in the updated 
presentation of the mapping account in Pincock 2012, Pincock devotes much discussion to 
how his account can accommodate idealizations, or falsehoods incorporated into a 
representation. Here’s a quick example to demonstrate the basic strategy, following Pincock’s 
discussion (Pincock 2012: 29-31). Pincock distinguishes between basic contents (“simple 
																																																						
177 For reasons that are familiar from the debate about forms of structural realism, this is not an easy question 
to address. As Newman demonstrated (Newman 1928), any target system is isomorphic to any structure that 
has the same cardinality as the target and so could be taken to instantiate that structure. See Ketland 2004 and 
Ainsworth 2009 for discussion. 
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kinds of structural relations that are defined in terms of the basic elements of the concrete 
and mathematical systems” (ibid: 29)) and schematic contents, which involve “derived 
elements […] used to represent physical entities beyond those that can be related directly to 
the mathematical entities that appear in the domain of the mathematical structure” (ibid). He 
introduces the example of the heat equation being used to represent an iron bar changing 
temperature: 
 
(4) 𝛼B𝑢:: = 𝑢* 
 
Pincock first suggests that his account might say that “we should say that this representation 
is accurate when we have an isomorphism between the temperature at each point at each 
time and the set of ordered pairs (x, t) picked out by the solution” of the equation (ibid). 
Given the oddness of this, Pincock then suggests that, rather, if it is permitted to use 
mathematics to specify the structural relation, instead “we may posit an isomorphism 
between the temperatures at times and u in the mathematical structure subject to a spatial 
error term 𝑒 = 1mm” (ibid). Pincock then goes on to give a description as to how his account 
accommodates contexts in which the iron bar is represented as equally long (see ibid: 31-33 
for details). 
 
In short, idealization is accommodated by allowing the structural relations involved to be 
“more complicated than just simple isomorphisms and homomorphisms […] we allow the 
specification of the structural relation to include mathematical terminology” (ibid: 31).  (See, 
also, his later remark that “the content of [mathematical representations] is analysed in terms 
of the existence of a structural relation whose features depend on the mathematical structure 
involved and in some cases additional aspects of the relation itself that must be specified in 
mathematical terms” (ibid: 197)). The fact that Bueno & Colyvan’s discussion locates a lacuna 
in Pincock’s account where there, perhaps, is not one can be explained by the fact that they 
are responding to an earlier presentation of the account, where Pincock indeed describes the 
structural relations in a way that suggests that they are limited to the standard set-theoretic 
mappings: 
  
Counting, for example, involves isomorphisms from the objects counted to an initial 
segment of the natural numbers. More sophisticated applications will involve other kinds of 
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mappings, such as homomorphisms that respect certain features of the physical situation, 
e.g., the mass of physical objects. (Pincock 2004b: 69) 
 
What is interesting is that even though the crucial role played by inference is what most 
obviously distinguishes Bueno & Colyvan’s account from Pincock’s, its heavier emphasis on 
the inferential capacity of mathematics seemingly plays no role in articulating the supposed 
advantages of their account. Accordingly, the more sophisticated account set out in Pincock 
2012 can appeal to much the same resources as the inferential conception does in addressing 
these worries (such as allowing for a role to be played by contextual factors, and allowing the 
relevant structural relations to be more sophisticated that isomorphism and homomorphism 
(although, again, see fn.178)). 
 
6.6.2. Mathematical representation and means and ends  
 
It is clear that Bueno and Colyvan think that the inferential conception is superior to the 
mapping account, but this is not clearly borne out by the details of the most recent version 
of the latter account. What, then, does Pincock think the relationship is between the 
inferential conception and the account set out in the first half of Pincock 2012? Pincock does 
not offer a direct comparison at any point between the mapping account and the inferential 
conception (beyond noting that working out how the inferential conception relates to the 
mapping account is a “delicate matter” (Pincock 2011: 211). Instead, he seems to group the 
inferential conception with a wider collection of views about representation and contrasts 
the mapping account with these. Given that he says reasonably little, it is worthwhile quoting 
it in full: 
 
Perhaps the main competitor to an approach based on accuracy conditions tends to put 
inferential connections at the heart of their picture of representation [listing Bueno & 
Colyvan 2011, along with Contessa 2007 and Suárez 2010b in a footnote]. Inferential 
approaches must explain the scientific practice of evaluating representations in terms of their 
accuracy. Although there does not seem to be any barrier to doing this, I have found it more 
convenient to start with the accuracy conditions. On my approach, inferential claims about 
a given representation follow immediately from its accuracy conditions: a valid inference is 
accuracy-preserving. (Pincock 2012: 28) 
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In this passage, Pincock construes inferential approaches as competitors to his account, yet 
spells out his motivations for starting with accuracy conditions as those involving 
convenience, rather than in virtue of such an approach yielding explicitly stated benefits. 
Something about this state of affairs should remind us of a tension discussed in the previous 
chapter. One way of approaching the relationship between the mapping account and the 
inferential conception, and their differing emphasis on inference and accuracy conditions, is 
to return to Chakravartty’s distinction between functional and informational accounts of 
scientific representation, discussed in §5.4.4.  
 
Recall that Chakravartty distinguished between informational and functional accounts of 
scientific representation (Chakravartty 2010: 198): the former set out relationships between 
vehicle and target that make it such that the vehicle represents the target whilst the latter 
explicate the difference between representations and non-representations via their functions. 
In his discussion, Chakravartty suggests that the supposed disagreement between the two 
may be illusory – informational accounts are involved in detailing the means of 
representation, whilst functional accounts explicate their ends (ibid: 199).  
 
Given what I have said in this chapter about the relationship between scientific 
representation simpliciter and mathematical scientific representation, it should not be 
surprising that this distinction needs to be drawn again in this context. As might be taken 
from Pincock’s comments above, perhaps we ought to reconfigure the mapping account and 
the inferential conception in the same way that I suggested in the previous chapter (leading 
on from Chakravartty and Contessa’s suggestions): informational accounts of representation 
should be repurposed as accounts of accuracy or faithfulness of a representation, rather than 
offering the relations between vehicle and target as being constitutive of representation. 
Something like this move can be made here, too.  
 
We should understand Pincock’s setting out of the content of a mathematical representation 
as consistent with what Bueno and Colyvan say in their discussion. The structural relations 
that Pincock invokes in his account should be understood as those involved in grounding 
the faithfulness of a given representation, rather than being involved in making it such that the 
vehicle represents the target. Pincock says that the holding of the structural relation between 
vehicle and target is what makes a representation accurate (Pincock 2012: 28) and this seems 
akin to the structural relations grounding the faithfulness of a representation. In the 
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vocabulary of Contessa’s epistemic account, then, Pincock’s view as stated is a view of faithful 
epistemic representation: that the vehicle is an epistemic representation simpliciter of the target 
is secured by the two types of denotation relation involved in what Pincock calls the 
specification step – the first two steps that, for Pincock, are involved in setting up a 
representation. 
 
On the letter of Pincock’s account, a representation is accurate if a relevant structural relation 
holds between the (structure of) the vehicle and the (structure of) the target and an accurate 
representation licenses sound inferences. On the letter of Bueno & Colyvan’s account, a 
representation licenses sounded inferences if the relevant structural relation holds between 
(the structure of) the vehicle and the (structure of) the target, and a representation is accurate 
to the extent that it licenses sound inferences. The distinction is one of priority and emphasis 
rather than one of substance: the common core of both accounts states that a representation 
is accurate, and licenses sound inferences, if the relevant structural relation holds between 
the (structure of) the vehicle and the (structure of) the target. 
 
With the incorporation of any particular informational account of representation into a 
particular functional account (understanding the former as offering information about the 
faithfulness of a representation, as in §5.4.4), there are likely to be remaining problems, both 
interpretative and substantive. The same goes here. I’ll flag up one outstanding disagreement, 
concerning the nature of the structural relationships between the physical and mathematical 
domains. Bueno & Colyvan take it to be the case that these relations will be complete or 
partial morphisms whilst Pincock is explicit that he thinks that the structural relations 
between vehicle and target will, in some cases, be such that mathematics is required to 
articulate them, as in his discussion of the error term in the heat equation case study. 
Interestingly, both Bueno & Colyvan’s move to the tools of the partial structures framework 
and Pincock’s move from relations that can be stated set-theoretically (or, indeed, using only 
second-order logic) to relations that are standardly constructed using mathematics are made 
for the same reason: to accommodate idealizations into their respective accounts, in order to 
accommodate the fact that there will be cases in which a vehicle’s usefulness can come apart 
from its faithfulness. Even granting that both accounts can be accommodated into the 
epistemic representation framework, this seems to nevertheless be a point of disagreement. 
How our accounts of scientific representation should accommodate idealizations is the 
subject matter of a different thesis and I cannot discuss this further here: it requires, also, a 
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full account of the relationship between the usefulness and the faithfulness of a 
representation. I think, however, this bracketing is safe enough. This should be understood 
as an internal question about the resulting account of mathematical scientific representation, 
one about what relations the physical and mathematical domain stand in. Whether or not the 
relations that the (structure of) the target system and the (structure of) the physical system 
stand in must sometimes include those that must be stated using mathematics does not 
clearly have ramifications for the fact that both accounts agree that what grounds a 
mathematical vehicle epistemically representing a target is a collection of denotation relations 
and what grounds a mathematical vehicle partially faithfully epistemically representing a target 
is the existence of some structural mapping between the (structure of) the vehicle and the 
(structure of) the target. Having flagged this up as an area of future work, I will return to it 
in the thesis conclusion.178 
 
6.7. Mathematical epistemic representation 
 
In the previous section I suggested that, whilst there are remaining interpretative questions, 
there is something of a common core between the mapping account and the inferential 
																																																						
178 Here’s another outstanding question that would take us too far afield. Those working in the partial structures 
tradition generally take themselves to be describing scientific practice at (what French calls) the meta-level, 
where this contrasts with the object-level: whilst scientists use representational devices at the object level to 
represent the world, these philosophers of science take themselves to be involved in representing those 
representational devices used by scientists (da Costa & French 2003). To represent the representational devices used 
by scientists as set-theoretic structures is supposed to be non-committal to whether or not such devices are in 
fact set-theoretic structures. Those that favour this distinction hold that their view is consistent with the fact 
that, for example, “in the context of the quantum revolution, it was group theory, not (partial) set-structures 
that were effectively doing the (physical, mathematical and hence object level representational) work” (French 
2012: 21). Rather than directly describing the representational relations going on at the object-level, what is 
offered is (something like a) rational reconstruction of scientific practice at the object-level. Curiously, the 
object/meta-level distinction does not explicitly raise its head in the mathematical representation literature. 
Even though Bueno and Colyvan directly appeal to partial structures, in their presentation it sometimes seems 
as if that partial structures are being offered as the structural relations that are being used at the object level, holding 
between representational devices and the world (taken to be appropriately structured) rather than at French’s 
meta-level. This is obviously a departure from how those working in the partial structures tradition understand 
the framework. A reader of Bueno & Colyvan 2011 (and Bueno 2016) who was ignorant of the background 
commitments of partial structures framework would be forgiven for taking partial structures to be the structural 
relation between the target and the vehicle (rather than as a representational device used to represent the relation 
between target and vehicle, a la French). Different aspects of Bueno & Colyvan’s presentation pull in different 
directions: they say that “although there are no full mappings between the empirical world and the mathematical 
structures, there are partial mappings between these empirical and mathematical structures” (Bueno & Colyvan 
2011: 358) (emphasis in original) but also that “we can represent formally the partiality of that information and 
the structural relations between the various components involved in terms of the notions of partial structure 
and partial relation” (ibid) (emphasis added). Assuming that Bueno & Colyvan are working at French’s meta-
level, whether this reveals a deep tension between Pincock and Bueno & Colyvan’s account, or a way to dissolve 
the apparent disagreement between the two accounts regarding which structural relations are involved in 
mathematical representation, is a question for future work that discusses the partial structures framework in 
more detail (for example, considering whether or not the meta-level perspective is required at all. (See Contessa 
2006; Landry 2007 and response in French 2012)).  
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conception. Importantly, and most relevantly, there is a common core regarding what makes 
it the case that a piece of mathematics is a partially faithful epistemic representation with a non-
mathematical target. Tracing back the route from chapter 1, this is what is of relevance for 
shedding light on the debate regarding mathematical ontology. I admit that some of the ways 
that the representationalist nominalists characterise mathematics’ role makes it sound like 
they hold that mathematics merely denotes: this is true, perhaps, of Daly and Langford’s idea 
of indexing. Even if such commentators deny that mathematics is ever explanatory, I assume 
they will admit that mathematics does more than merely denote: it is the epistemic nature of 
mathematical representations that is most of interest.  Accordingly, in this section I will set 
out (what I take to be) the common core, what I will call the account of distinctively 
mathematical epistemic representation. It will be largely familiar from the discussion of 
Contessa’s account of epistemic representation in the previous chapter. 
 
For a given mathematical epistemic scientific representation, the representational vehicle is 
taken to be a mathematical structure and the representational target is a non-mathematical 
target system.179 The representational vehicle denotes the representational target in virtue of 
some collection of facts about the user(s) of the representation, which may or may not in 
particular instances be exhausted by an act of stipulation. Parts of the mathematical 
representational vehicle are taken to denote parts of the non-mathematical target system and 
in virtue of this interpretation inferences are licensed about the target system and, therefore, 
the vehicle is an epistemic representation of the target. A (partially) faithful epistemic 
representation licenses at least one sound inference about the target and the faithfulness of 
a given representation is grounded by structural similarity between the vehicle and the target. 
 
6.7.1. Worked example: the Lotka-Volterra equations 
 
In this section I work through an example of mathematical representation, making clear that 
light can be shed on it using the account of distinctively mathematical epistemic 
representation set out above. 
 
Consider, once again, the Lotka-Volterra equations. First, consider the denotational 
relationships. There are two kinds of denotation relation involved in a given mathematical 
epistemic representation. The first is between the vehicle and target and the second is 
																																																						
179 I will not discuss the possibility that mathematics could be used to represent other mathematical facts. 
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between parts of the vehicle and parts of the target. At the beginning of chapter 5, I gave a 
rough and ready characterisation, but more detail can be gone into here. What is denoted in 
this case? In the equations’ original context, Volterra was aiming to account for some 
particular facts about fluctuations of the Adriatic fish market that had been previously noted 
by marine biologist Umberto D’Ancona.180 Yet, it would seem a mistake to think that, 
whenever they are being used, what is being denoted is the Adriatic Sea prey-predator 
population systems: it is a platitude about the equations that they have been used to 
understand very many predator-prey populations, as well as predator-prey populations in 
general. The same mathematical structure, picked out by the same coupled equations, can 
denote different targets.181 Whatever story is ultimately told about how ‘the fish predator-
prey systems in the Adriatic Sea’ and ‘predator-prey system’ come to denote their respective 
targets will be told about how the denotational relationship is set up in the case of the Lotka-
Volterra equations. Given the crucial role assigned to user-input at the denotation stage, the 
fact that the same equations can be used to represent very many targets is easily 
accommodated: just as a salt shaker can be made to denote Madagascar at one moment (cf. 
Callender & Cohen: 73), a new act of stipulation can make it such that it denotes the Indian 
Ocean.182 
 
Next, consider the denotational relations set up between parts of the vehicle and parts of the 
target. The details can be gleaned from Volterra’s discussion (Volterra 1923). Mathematical 
properties are taken to denote physical properties: t denotes time, P denotes the size of the 
predator population, 𝑉 denotes the size of the prey population, 𝛽 denotes the capture rate 
of the prey, 𝛾 denotes the prey/predator birth conversion rate, 𝛼 denotes the growth rate of 
the prey and 𝛿 and death rate of the predators. With this second set of denotation relations 
																																																						
180 For a full account of this historical episode, see Kingsland 1995. For Volterra’s discussion see Volterra 1926. 
For recent philosophical discussion of the equations, see Weisberg 2007 and Weisberg 2013. Whilst the explicit 
incorporation of the equations into an account of distinctively mathematical epistemic representation here is 
my own, I draw on these discussions of the details of the equations. 
181 There is an interesting question, here, about exactly what the vehicle is in these cases. Pincock sometimes 
writes as if it is the equations (for example) that are the vehicle, rather than the phase space characterized by the 
equations: yet, on the face of it, this can’t be right. To do justice to this question here would require discussing 
fraught issues about the relationship between equations and the mathematical structures that they are taken to 
characterize.  
182 The account endorsed here requires only the weak claim that, whatever facts are involved in establishing 
denotational relationships, the intentions of a representation user will be amongst them, even if in some cases 
they are not sufficient. 
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established, once a set of inference rules are accepted, the equations are a representation qua 
epistemic representation of the predator-prey population (or a predator-prey population).183  
 
Finally, consider the fact that the equations were a (partially) faithful epistemic representation 
of the Adriatic sea predator-prey populations. That is, the equations were useful in Volterra’s 
goals because they licensed inference to facts about the relevant population. In virtue of 
being (partially) faithful epistemic representations of other targets, the equations can be used 
to infer to facts about other such target systems. For example, as Weisberg notes, the 
representations can be used to demonstrate the Volterra principle (Roughgarden 1979: 439): 
“the population of prey will increase relative to the number of predators upon application of 
a pesticide” (Weisberg 2006: 735). 
 
This, of course, is all very familiar. Yet, it is worth recalling what the above accommodation 
tells us. The above accommodation of the Lotka-Volterra equations is consistent with what 
Pincock says about the case (Pincock 2012: 58-60). The steps involved in setting up a 
mathematical representation, on the mapping account, have been taken. Yet, this is shown 
to be consistent, rather than opposed to, an account of representation that places inference 
at its heart. Working through this example, then, further reinforces the suggestion made 
above that both the mapping account and the inferential conception are in agreement, at 
least about what makes it the case that the equations represent the target, both qua denotation 
and qua epistemic representation. 
 
A natural question concerns how mathematical and non-mathematical epistemic 
representation differ. Given that the view endorsed above is anti-exceptionalist, it is 
unsurprising that the differences between mathematical and non-mathematical 
representation end up being more slight than might be thought at first, given the surface 
level dissimilarity between a mathematical representation and a map (for example). One 
interesting difference, however, involves the knowledge that the user has of the structural 
relation between vehicle and target that is responsible for the faithfulness of the 
representation. In the case of many non-mathematical epistemic representations, the user 
may be ignorant of what relationship between vehicle and target is responsible for the fact 
that many of the inferences they draw are sound inferences. If it is an isomorphism that 
																																																						
183 Although we are likely to find the term ‘denote’ far less commonly in the scientific literature (it already being, 
in this context, a slightly extended use of a philosophers’ term of art), listing mathematical terms alongside the 
aspects of the target system they represent, setting out an interpretation or stipulation, is very common.  
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grounds the faithfulness of the subway map, this need not be known by the user of the 
representation: one does not need a lesson in set theory in order to navigate their way around 
Glasgow, nor would it help.184 In contrast, in the mathematical scientific cases, a user of a 
given representation may be more conscious of the potential structural relations between the 
vehicle and the target. As in Bueno & Colyvan’s presentation, it is often the case that 
specifying a structural relation between vehicle and target will ‘double up’ as setting up the 
denotational relationships between (parts of) the vehicle and (parts of) the structure. This 
need not be a threat to the account, however: it is likely to be a consequence of the fact that 
the relevant mathematical and physical structures will be far more complex than the structure 
of the map and subway system, such that using heuristics in order to construct an epistemic 




Before returning to the metaphysical considerations that first led to the discussion of 
mathematical representation in this chapter, it is worth briefly making explicit once more the 
relationships between representations of different kinds. Recall six of the representations 
discussed in the preceding two chapters: the word ‘cat’, the hydraulic machine, the Glasgow 
subway map, an altered Glasgow subway map, the suspension bridge equations and the 
Lotka-Volterra equations.  
 
The first way to collect these representations is to form the collection of every representation 
simpliciter, where to represent in this sense is (more or less) just to denote. This collection of 
representations includes ‘cat’, the hydraulic machine, the Glasgow subway map, the altered 
Glasgow subway map, the suspension bridge equations and the Lotka-Volterra equations. 
Second, the epistemic representations can be grouped together: this collection of 
representations includes the hydraulic machine, the Glasgow subway map, the altered 
Glasgow subway map, the suspension bridge equations and the Lotka-Volterra equations. A 
third, slightly smaller, collection can be formed by grouping together the (at least) partially 
faithful epistemic representations: this collection includes the hydraulic machine, the 
Glasgow subway map, the suspension bridge equations and the Lotka-Volterra equations. A 
fourth, slightly narrower still, collection is the collection of (at least) partially faithful scientific 
																																																						
184 Nevertheless, if pressed to explain why a given subway map is a useful representation (in virtue of being (at 
least partially) faithful), a user is likely to offer up the suggestion that it is because it is similar to the subway 
system. 
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epistemic representations: this collection includes the hydraulic machine and the Lotka-
Volterra equations. The final, smallest, collection of representations are the (at least) partially 
faithful distinctively mathematical scientific epistemic representations: this collection 
includes the Lotka-Volterra equations. To borrow from what is now a familiar phrase: there 
is no special problem of mathematical representation.185 
 
6.8. The metaphysical and epistemic commitments of mathematical 
epistemic representation  
 
The aim of this section of the thesis has been to get at the core commitments of a view about 
distinctively mathematical scientific representation. I argued that this was required in order 
to shed light on representationalist nominalism: the combination of Representationalism (the 
view that mathematics merely plays a representational role in science) and the Representation 
Conditional (the view, roughly, that if Representationalism is true than our world-oriented 
uses of mathematics is not metaphysically committing). In this section I draw on comments 
from Bueno & Colyvan and Pincock in order to discuss this question, in light of the account 
of mathematical epistemic representation endorsed above.  
 
6.8.1. Bueno and Colyvan’s metaphysical neutrality 
 
Bueno and Colyvan suggest that the inferential conception is consistent with both realism 
and nominalism. They first note that: 
  
For the platonist, inferences used in the successful unification of different (mathematical) 
theories, or in the prediction of novel phenomena via the (indispensable) use of 
mathematical theories, or in the mathematical explanation of phenomena support the realist 
commitment to the corresponding mathematical entities. […] In every step of the application 
process, from the immersion through the derivation to the interpretation stages, 
																																																						
185 Here’s the small print (literally and figuratively). To say that there is no special problem of mathematical 
representation is to say that there is no special problem about in virtue of what a mathematical vehicle is a 
(partially) faithful epistemic representation of a non-mathematical target. There are parallels, then, with 
Callender and Cohen’s claim about there being no special problems about in virtue of what a scientific 
representation represents, qua denotation, its target. There will, of course, be remaining questions about 
mathematical representation: including, but not limited to, questions about what structural relations ground 
faithfulness in this or that representation (and how these relations are determined), what it means to say that 
the target system has a particular structure that allows it to enter into structural relations with the mathematical 
vehicle, and what the relationship is between faithfulness and usefulness.  
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mathematical entities are invoked, and thus, the platonist insists, we are ontologically 
committed to these entities. (Bueno & Colyvan 2011: 367) 
 
They also suggest that the account could be endorsed by the nominalist. They offer two 
suggestions along these lines. The first simply suggests that the nominalist endorse Azzouni’s 
distinction between quantifier and ontological commitment. The second is perhaps more 
interesting: 
 
[T]he nominalist may argue that, in applied mathematics, what is crucial is to make sense of 
the mathematical formalism in a physically significant way. For the nominalist, according to 
the inferential conception, both the immersion and the interpretation steps in the application 
process presuppose a particular physical interpretation of the mathematical formalism. […] 
Moreover, the nominalist can accommodate the derivation step without commitment to the 
existence of mathematical entities, by cashing out the notion of consequence in modal terms. 
(ibid: 367) 
 
It seems, then, that on Bueno & Colyvan’s quote, mathematics’ representational capacity 
does not generate any unique or special motivation for realism: the real action depends on, for 
example, whether or not the distinction between ontological and quantifier commitment can 
be made to work, and if the nominalist can make do with a modal notion of consequence 
(Field 1989).  
 
It’s worth briefly noting Bueno and Colyvan’s differing views. As is familiar, Colyvan is a 
Platonist whilst Bueno has made many contributions defending moves made in various 
debates by the nominalist (Bueno 2009; Bueno 2012). Given what Colyvan says in Bueno & 
Colyvan 2011 and elsewhere, it is clear that his Platonism is motivated by the explanatory 
considerations discussed in the first part of this thesis and not on the representational 
considerations discussed here.186 In a more recent discussion, Bueno briefly alludes to the 
discussion in Bueno & Colyvan 2011 in order to make the case that there is an equally 
plausible anti-realist understanding of mathematics’ representational capacity (Bueno 2016). 
Much as in the earlier discussion, however, his reasons for thinking that mathematics’ 
representational role is not ontologically committing do not flow from any of the details of 
the inferential conception. Instead, they are grounded by the claim that morphisms of various 
																																																						
186 Colyvan has been a noted critic of the kind of distinction that Azzouni tries to draw between ontological 
and quantifier commitment (Colyvan 2005; Colyvan 2010)  
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kinds can be construed in second-order logic, combined with an endorsement of the kind of 
teasing apart of ontological and quantifier commitment discussed by Azzouni (ibid: 2602).187 
Here are two worries about this strategy. First, as noted above, an outstanding question is 
whether or not there are cases in which the structural relationship between the mathematical 
and physical domain will be those that require mathematics to formulate (Pincock 2012: 27). 
This was recast as a debate about what features should be had by the account of mathematical 
epistemic representation rather than a debate between competing accounts, but it is a 
substantive debate nonetheless.  If Pincock is correct, then (at the very least) it becomes an 
open question whether or not these can be reconstructed in second-order logic in the same 
way that isomorphism, homomorphism and the partial analogues can. Second, the prospects 
of this account rise and fall with the plausibility of cleaving the two kinds of commitment 
apart, but in Bueno 2016 there is little discussion of the various objections to both this 
distinction and the independent grounds given for existence. It seems that these questions 
must be resolved before this particular route to a nominalist understanding of mathematics’ 
representational capacity can be fully defended. 
 
6.8.2. Pincock’s understanding argument 
 
Pincock, contra Bueno & Colyvan, holds that mathematical scientific representation is not 
philosophically innocent, as it were: he claims that the fact that mathematical scientific 
representations have the kind of content that they do, and the fact that we can understand 
these contents, entails (or, more accurately, presupposes) a view about mathematics. In 
particular, Pincock holds that our representational practices presuppose truth-value realism. 
Crucially, his reasons for thinking this do not go via an argument against, for example, the 
cleaving apart of ontological and quantifier commitment. Although this argument has been 
mentioned in passing in commentary on Pincock 2012 (Walsh, Knox & Caulton 2014: 466) 
it has not been scrutinised yet in the literature. I do so here. 
 
Pincock’s central claim is the following: 
																																																						
187 It’s not clear from Bueno’s presentation of these two options whether or not he thinks that one of these 
routes being viable is enough to secure a nominalist understanding, or whether he thinks both are. I can clarify 
this point here. It strikes me that if the distinction can sensibly be drawn between quantifier and ontological 
commitment, then it does not matter if the relations between vehicle and target can be given a construal in 
second-order logic. The same cannot be said for the situation in which the relations between vehicle and target 
can all be construed in second-order logic but the distinction between quantifier and ontological commitment 
is not viable, however: in such a situation, our representations still seem to involve mathematical structures 
standing in structural relations (construed in second-order logic!) with the (structure of) the target system. 
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Understanding thesis: in order to understand a mathematical representation, an 
agent must believe that the claims describing the mathematical structure are true. 
 
The passage in which Pincock introduces the thesis (and as far as I can tell, presents his 
reasons for thinking that it is true) is below: 
 
The content [of a mathematical scientific representation] involved the existence of a 
structural relation of this or that sort between a specified mathematical structure and the 
target system. So, for an agent to understand this sort of representation, he or she must believe 
that the claims describing this structure are true. The process of prediction and testing 
operates only on those representations that a scientist can understand. (Pincock 2012: 217) 
 
It seems right that a representation can only be used for the purposes of prediction if the 
representation is understood. However, it is not at all clear what reasons Pincock has for 
thinking that in order for a representation to be understood, it is necessary to believe the 
relevant claims about the mathematical structure involved. Pincock says very little about what 
notion of understanding he has in mind, which is inconvenient given that it is hardly a 
univocal term. It’s also hard to pin down the exact form that the argument takes. It seems 
that it should not be understood as taking as its premises certain claims about our 
representational uses of mathematics and its conclusion truth-value realism.188 Rather, the 
conclusion of the argument is (something like) the claim that everyone who understands a 
mathematical representation is a truth-value realist, because believing in the truth of the 
mathematical components of a representation is a pre-condition of this understanding.189 
 
6.8.2.1. Epistemic understanding and the understanding thesis 
 
																																																						
188 Pincock’s argument does not, therefore, precisely mirror the enhanced indispensability argument in arguing 
from the fact that mathematics plays a particular kind of role in our scientific theories to some form of realism. 
189 This has interesting parallels with the debate about whether or not non-realists of various kinds can have 
the attitudes of acceptance towards theories, rather than belief. Horwich has argued that those advising acceptance 
of theories of some kind, in describing what acceptance amounts to, end up merely describing belief – and, as 
such, such epistemic anti-realists do, in fact, believe those theories that they claim only to accept (Horwich 
1991). (See Leng 2010: 210-216 for discussion). Similarly, then, Pincock’s claim must be that those who 
understand a mathematical representation but claim not to believe its mathematical content (either explicitly 
espousing non-belief or remaining agnostic) are wrong, much in the same way that Horwich thinks that 
epistemic anti-realists are wrong about their own attitude towards scientific theories. 
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One natural thought is that Pincock is appealing (however implicitly) to views in 
epistemology where understanding is a form of epistemic success.190 It is common to think 
that many kinds of epistemic understanding are factive, suggesting this might be a good place 
to look to charitably reconstruct Pincock’s argument.  
 
Kvanvig has introduced a useful distinction between three different kinds of understanding. 
The first can be referred to as propositional understanding: understanding that something is 
the case (Kvanvig 2003: 191). The second can be referred to as explanatory understanding: 
where understanding why something is the case is associated with the possession of an 
explanation of the object of understanding (ibid: 200). The third is referred to as objectual 
understanding: “when understanding grammatically is followed by an object/subject matter, 
as in understanding the presidency, or the president, or politics” (ibid: 191). Discussions of 
understanding in the epistemology literature often draw on this distinction in order to make 
more specific claims about the nature of this or that kind of understanding (for example, 
debates about the factivity of understanding-why (Pritchard 2008; Baker 2003b) and 
objectual understanding (Zagzebski 2001)). 
 
Propositional understanding is standardly taken to be factive: to understand that something 
is the case just is to know it (Kvanvig 2003: 191).191 However, a dilemma emerges if Pincock 
pursues this unpacking. On the one hand, a representation doesn’t seem propositional in 
nature. On the account above (which I suggested was consistent with what Pincock says), a 
(partially faithful) epistemic representation is obtained if the two forms of denotational 
relationship hold between the vehicle/parts of the vehicle and the target/parts of the target, 
and if there is structural similarity between vehicle and target. None of this is 
straightforwardly propositional. A representation does not take the form of a proposition 
stating that such and such denotational and structural relations obtain – a representation is 
constituted by these representations holding between vehicle and target.192 If anything is a good 
																																																						
190 There are obviously thoroughly non-epistemic uses of ‘understanding’, such as Elgin’s examples: “I can say 
‘I understand’ to moderate the force of an assertion or hedge my claim. ‘I understand that you are angry with 
me’ may be a mild overture that gives you space to politely demur. This is a moderating use.” (Elgin 2009: 322).  
191 It is worth noting that commentators like Catherine Elgin take umbrage with the received wisdom that 
understanding (of various kinds) is connected to truth (Elgin 2004): given that I don’t think that any of these 
standard epistemic understanding-truth links can help bolster Pincock’s argument, I do not discuss this issue 
any further.  
192 Remember that, even though Suárez takes aim at views that (he says) reduce representation to this or that 
relation, the Suárez-Frigg objections more narrowly had ramifications for views of representation that reduce 
representation to (structural) similarity relations. On the account here, some of the relations involved are 
denotational relations, established (in part) by the user of the representation. 
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candidate for being the referent of the term ‘the representation’, it is the representational 
vehicle, which is (in almost all cases of representation, at least) not a proposition. If pushed 
to understand a representation as propositional, the two most natural ways to do so is to take 
it to either be the proposition that the representation is successful, or to be the set of 
propositions about the vehicle that are licensed by the representation.193 The first will not 
do, as I take it that Pincock thinks that we are perfectly capable of understanding unfaithful 
or inaccurate representations. I return to the second option below. The same kind of reasons 
carry over to explanatory understanding. Understanding-why must also, it seems, take a 
proposition as its object. It similarly will not do to think that the claim that in order to 
understand why a representation is a representation at all, it is necessary to believe the 
mathematical content. What grounds both of these is the fact that “if the primary unit of 
understanding is the proposition, then the difference between knowledge and understanding 
seems slight” (Elgin 2009: 333). Nor can the argument can be fleshed out appealing to an 
objectual reading of ‘understanding’. It is even more difficult to make sense of a given 
representation as an area, or subject matter, in the same way that politics is (given that one 
of the most natural ways to explicate understanding of a subject area is to take this to be 
understanding-that of a collection of propositions that make up the subject area). 
 
Initially, appealing to epistemic understanding seemed a promising way of making Pincock’s 
understanding claim plausible: but, on closer inspection, it seems that no attempt along these 
lines is workable. This is symptomatic of at least two things: the first, as signalled above, that 
it is unclear whether or not representation is propositional and at least two of the kinds of 
understanding discussed by Kvanvig seem like they must take a proposition as their object. 
Second, it is symptomatic of the fact that, for Pincock, the link between understanding and 
belief does not extend to the entirety of the mathematical representation. Although each 
mathematical representation expresses some facts about the non-mathematical system (or 
licenses inference to these purported facts), Pincock does not think it necessary to believe 
these in order to understand the representation – what we are required to believe is the 
mathematical component. It isn’t at all clear, though, what grounds this asymmetry for 
Pincock. He takes it that it is possible to understand a mathematical representation without 
believing what it says about the non-mathematical world (this follows merely from it being 
possible for a mathematical representation to be inaccurate and from it being possible to 
																																																						
193 Contessa comes close to this when he identifies the representational content of an epistemic representation 
as “the set of propositions about its target, t, that it is valid to infer from its vehicle, v” (Contessa ms: 13). 
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understand an inaccurate mathematical representation). Why, then, can we not understand a 
mathematical representation whilst similarly not believing in the literal truth of its non-
mathematical content?  
 
6.8.2.2. The understanding thesis and the export challenge, again 
 
Whilst noting accurately that Pincock offers no direct argument for the understanding thesis, 
Walsh, Knox & Caulton suggest that it might get “indirect” support from the export 
challenge (Walsh, Knox & Caulton 2014: 468). Recall that this can be understood as the 
challenge to the nominalist to characterise what our theories say about the non-mathematical 
world (or, relatedly, to tell us what we ought to believe, if not the literal truth of our theories) 
(see §1.5 for details and some different ways of understanding and motivating this challenge). 
It is possible to appeal to Kvanvig’s distinctions between kinds of understanding to make 
this suggestion precise. 
 
On the most charitable version of Pincock’s understanding thesis, I suggest, the object of 
understanding is not (contra the letter of Pincock’s suggestion) the representation itself. 
Rather, the understanding thesis should be recast as the claim that in order to understand 
what it is that is being expressed about the target system by the representation, a user of the 
representation must believe that the mathematical content of the representation is true. 
Understood along Kvanvig’s distinction, the kind of understanding involved is 
straightforward understanding-that, or propositional understanding. The object of the 
understanding is not the representation but rather is either the proposition ‘that x is (are) the 
fact (facts) about the target system expressed by this mathematical representation’ or this 
very collection of propositions about the target system. Even though, on this line, the kind 
of understanding involved is propositional understanding, it is not problematic that some 
representations will be inaccurate (or only partially faithful, or completely unfaithful): one 
can understand that a subway map with swapped labels licenses inference to the (purported) 
fact that Hillhead is one stop from Govanhill without having to understand that Hillhead is 
one stop from Govanhill.194 
 
																																																						
194 It is of course, on the standard line, impossible to understand that Hillhead is one stop from Govanhill, because 
propositional understanding is factive and Hillhead is not one stop from Govanhill on either circle of the 
Glasgow subway. 
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Appropriately, given the mention of the various circles of the Glasgow subway, the 
discussion has circled back round to the export challenge, discussed in §1.5. The response to 
the challenge articulated there also, therefore, counts as a response to Pincock’s 
understanding argument. 
 
What is it, exactly, that cannot be understood if the mathematics is not believed? It’s 
worthwhile running through the options again. In §1.5 I argued that the demand cannot be 
to take every claim expressed mathematically and express it without using mathematics: such 
a demand is to ask Pincock’s opponent to demonstrate the falsity of their view, (part of 
which is the claim) that there are facts about the world that would be ineffable if not for 
mathematics. On the construal of Pincock’s claim as involving propositional understanding, 
then it doesn’t make much sense for the demand to be told what attitude to have towards 
our scientific theories: but, even if it is, there is a ready response (that our theories ought to 
be held to be nominalistically adequate). Per the details of the mapping account, and of the 
account of distinctively mathematical epistemic representation, for each case of 
representation the user of the representation knows what the target system is, and they also 
know what the relevant objects and properties in the target system are: this is required in 
order to set up denotational relations between the vehicle and the target system, and between 
objects and properties in the vehicle and objects and properties in the target.  
 
One final possibility is that Pincock thinks that the understanding thesis is true because of 
his idiosyncratic way of articulating (what I have called) the common core of distinctively 
mathematical scientific representation. Recall that Pincock holds that it is part of the content 
of a mathematical representation that the (structure of) the vehicle and the (structure of) the 
target stand in this or that structural relation. On the reformulating here, this isn’t quite the 
role of the structural relation. On the account of distinctively mathematical epistemic 
representation endorsed above, the specified structural relation is not part of the 
representation. The representation, strictly speaking, consists of the specification of the 
vehicle and target and the establishing of the two levels of denotation relations. But, if the 
understanding thesis somehow falls out of this way of construing mathematical 
representation, then so much the worse for the understanding argument: I have suggested 
here that understanding the content of the representation to just be the establishing of the 
two levels of denotation relations and letting the structural relation be involved in grounding 
the faithfulness, or accuracy, of the representation loses nothing compared to Pincock’s 
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presentation. Furthermore, this understanding of the role played by structural relations is 
fully consistent with what Pincock describes as the role of the ‘content’ of the representation 




The conclusions of this chapter concern three main areas. The first is the relationship 
between theories of scientific representation simpliciter and theories of mathematical scientific 
representation. One live option was that mathematical representations function differently 
from other epistemic representations like maps: that is, exceptionalism about mathematical 
representation. Another live option was that recently articulated accounts of mathematical 
representation (the mapping account and inferential conception) fall into the trap of identifying 
the representation relation with a relation of structural similarity. I argued for the anti-
exceptionalist result that mathematical representation can be understood as a special kind of 
epistemic representation. A mathematical vehicle represents, qua denotation, its target in the 
same basic way that all representations do and the same sorts of facts are responsible for a 
map’s status as an epistemic representation and a mathematical vehicle’s status as an 
epistemic representation. This involved arguing, contra Pero and Suárez, that recent accounts 
of mathematical representation can be understood in a way such that they do not assign a 
problematic role to structural similarity. The core account suggested here inherits this 
property – via being understood using Contessa’s account of epistemic representation - and 
is therefore not vulnerable to the Suárez-Frigg objections. It is no part of the view that 
structural similarity is sufficient for representation. One might press that, given that a great 
deal of scientific representations are mathematical, it ought to be no surprise that accounts 
of mathematical representation can be accommodated by an existing account of scientific 
representation. This point is well taken. Consider first, however, that as the response to Pero 
& Suárez demonstrates, one can hold that mathematical representation will fit into an 
existing account of scientific representation whilst being mistaken about how existing 
accounts of mathematical representation relate to such existing accounts. Pero & Suárez took 
the mapping account to be of the same kind as naïve structural similarity accounts: but this, 
on closer inspection, is false. Consider second that Contessa’s account is an account of 
epistemic representation simpliciter rather than of scientific epistemic representation. Given 
the assumption that mathematical representations and maps are both the kind of 
representation that as well as denoting their targets also allow us to learn about them, it is 
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significant that the incorporation here allows these two forms of representation to be 
accommodated by the same general approach to representation, despite their surface level 
differences. Consider finally, as demonstrated above when briefly considering the 
permutation invariance case, thinking about some scientific mathematical examples can 
feedback into the more general account and suggest modifications. I will return to this in the 
thesis conclusion. 
 
The second area concerns the relationship between the two prominent accounts of 
mathematical representation. I argued that, just as functional and informational accounts of 
scientific representation end up being complimentary once we are careful to distinguish the 
means from the ends, Bueno & Colyvan’s inferential conception and Pincock’s mapping 
account perhaps approach the same core account from different perspectives. At the very 
least, there is agreement about what relations between vehicle and target make it such that a 
mathematical vehicle denotes its non-mathematical target, is an epistemic representation of 
the target and is a (partially) faithful epistemic representation.  
 
The third area concerns the conclusions about the metaphysics of mathematics that can be 
drawn from this core account. Pincock is one of the few commentators, if not the only to 
do so explicitly, to make an explicit argument that our representational use of mathematics 
commits us to a kind of realist view. However, I suggested some ways to make Pincock’s 
understanding thesis (the claim that one must have some mathematical beliefs in order to 
understand a mathematical representation), more precise and argued that none of the ways 
of doing so make it look like a plausible claim. The implausibility of Pincock’s understanding 
thesis (or, perhaps, its dependence on the plausibility of the export challenge) might suggest 
a rosy picture for the nominalist: the only direct argument from the representational capacity 
of mathematics to some kind of realism seems to fail. However, drawing out some of the 
details of how we represent using mathematics demonstrates that there is still work for a 
nominalist to do. After all, on the picture set out here, aspects of our representational 
practices make reference to mathematical structures: structures stand in denotation relations 
and structural relationships and it is in virtue of these relations that mathematical 
representation qua denotation and epistemic mathematical representation can be achieved. 
Bueno & Colyvan’s argument that the account should be understood as metaphysically 
lightweight recognises this fact, but reveals itself turn on contentious unresolved issues about 
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In the first two chapters of this thesis, I navigated the respective debates about the various 
forms of the indispensability argument. The purpose of doing so was to demonstrate that a 
fruitful way to move towards a resolution of questions of mathematical ontology was to 
develop accounts of two of our world-oriented uses of mathematics: explanation and 
representation. The aim of this thesis is not to argue for a particular position in the 
metaphysics of mathematics, but rather narrow the focus of the debate. A secondary aim is 
also to say some insightful things about mathematical explanation and representation that 
are independent of these ontological questions. In this conclusion, I will turn to these two 
aims for the final time. 
 
7.1. Explanation, representation and ontology 
 
One of the aims of developing the accounts of mathematical explanation and representation 
was to narrow down, and make more precise, the issues underpinning the realist’s contention 
that mathematics plays the kind of role that is ontologically committing and the 
representationalist nominalist’s contention that it does not. It is worth returning to the two 




Consider, first, Explanationism and the Explanation Conditional. According to 
Explanationism, mathematics sometimes plays an explanatory role in our scientific theories. 
According to the Explanation Conditional, if mathematics plays an explanatory role in 
science, then our world-oriented uses of mathematics justify (some form of) mathematical 
realism. I argued in favour of accommodating these special cases of explanation into 
Woodward’s account of explanation. An outcome of this anti-exceptionalist accommodation 
is to narrow the debate about explanation and mathematical ontology quite substantially.  
 
Take, first, Explanationism. The account defended in chapter 4 makes clear that mathematics 
does sometimes play an explanatory role. One common way of explaining in science involves 
offering counterfactual information about the explanandum, and in chapter 4 I suggested 
that in some cases a mathematical fact does exactly that. How about, then, the Explanation 
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Conditional? This is a much more fraught question. Still, the question has been narrowed 
significantly. Rather than turning on judgements about explanation, ontology and truth in 
general, the question should now be: what must mathematical objects be like in order to play 
the role of allowing a user access to information about counterfactual dependence? There is, 
thankfully, a distinction that has been drawn in the recent literature that can aid this question. 
In a recent discussion, Marcus distinguishes between the playing of a metaphysically 
explanatory role and an epistemically explanatory role (Marcus 2014: 347). Saatsi introduces 
what I take to be the same distinction, between “thick” and “thin” explanatory roles: for an 
object (or fact) to be thickly, or metaphysically, explanatory is for it to bear an “ontic relation 
of explanatory relevance to the explanandum in question” and for an object (or fact) to be 
thinly, or epistemically, explanatory is for it to “allow us to grasp, or (re)present, whatever 
plays a ‘thick’ explanatory role” (Saatsi 2016b: 1065).195 So, now, the question is: on the modal 
account of extra-mathematical explanation, does the mathematics play the kind of 
metaphysically, thick, ontologically-committing role? It seems as though there are two 
directions in this might pull, one towards realism and one towards nominalism. I’ll sketch 
both of these out. 
 
One option for the realist, if they agree with the claim in this thesis that the modal account 
of extra-mathematical explanation is preferable to its rivals, is to exploit its anti-exceptionalist 
character to provide an improved version of the claim about inferential conservativeness 
familiar from chapter 2. Recall that the discussion there ended with the suggestion that, even 
though the straightforward version of the argument from inferential conservativeness hinted 
at by Baker and Colyvan (see §2.2 and §2.3) fails, the realist might nevertheless quite fairly 
suggest that the extra-mathematical cases at least look like the sort of local cases that their 
opponent is willing to accept as perhaps involving an ontologically-relevant kind of 
explanation. The realist might therefore argue that the anti-exceptionalist modal account 
vindicates the suggestion (discussed in §2.6) that the extra-mathematical cases have lots in 
common with the local cases after all. This updated version of the inferential 
conservativeness claim amounts to the twin claims (i) the nominalist is willing to countenance 
																																																						
195 There are interesting questions about how this distinction maps onto Salmon’s distinction between 
epistemic, modal and ontic conceptions of explanation. Saatsi takes the thick/thin distinction to be a distinction 
drawn within the ontic conception (although given that he thinks that Salmon’s modal and epistemic kinds of 
explanation are unlikely to be ontologically committing, perhaps the thick/thin distinction can be applied in 
general and it maintained that all sorts of modal and epistemic explanation are thin). Finally, Yablo also 
introduces a similar sort of carving between three “grades of mathematical involvement” in an explanation, 
only one of which is even plausibly mathematically committing (Yablo 2012: 1020). 
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IBE in cases amenable to Woodward-style accommodation (assuming that many of the 
realist-accepted local cases will be such cases) and (ii) the extra-mathematical cases are also 
amenable to Woodward-style accommodation. On this line, the modal account is appealed 
to in order to provide evidence that the extra-mathematical cases are in fact a lot like ordinary 
cases of explanation and to therefore offer a version of the inferential conservativeness claim 
that doesn’t turn on very general, sketchy, abstract remarks about the nominalist opponent 
already being committed to thinking that whenever an object is appealed to in one of our best 
explanations ontological commitment is licensed to that object. 
 
Nevertheless, there is a convincing nominalist response, one that also draws on the details of 
the modal account offered here. The nominalist could rebut this line of thinking and point 
to one of the differences between the Woodward-style account of paradigmatic causal 
explanation and the modal account of extra-mathematical explanation offered here. Recall 
that in §4.6 I stressed that although the invariant generalization that plays a role in 
paradigmatic causal cases and the mathematical fact in extra-mathematical cases both do 
work by providing information about counterfactual dependence, they do so in different 
ways. The invariant generalization directly describes the world’s patterns of dependence whilst 
the mathematical fact does so more indirectly, structurally characterising the world in such a 
way that the world’s patterns of dependence are salient to us. A nominalist willing to appeal 
to the modal account offered here, therefore, could appeal to this difference in order to drive 
a wedge between paradigmatic causal cases and the extra-mathematical cases, and argue that 
it is the physical dependence relations that are (in some sense) doing some more fundamental 
explanatory work (cf. Saatsi 2016b: 1062). This is an attractive line of thought, but it is 
important to stress that its plausibility seems to turn crucially on the counterpossibles 
question discussed in §4.4 and Pincock’s appeal to a sui generis kind of dependence, abstract 
dependence, discussed in sections §3.5 and §4.5. After all, if the nominalist seeks to tie 
ontological commitment to the dependence relations that the explanandum stands in to the 
aspects of the world described in the explanans, arguing that the mathematics is used only in 
order to help us grasp these relations (again, cf. Saatsi 2016b: 1062), then a possible route to 
realism emerges if the case can be made that in order for the modal account to be plausible 
we must countenance the explanandum standing in dependence relations with an abstract 
entity of undetermined sorts (as per Pincock’s account) or explicitly with mathematical 
objects (as seems to be suggested by Baron, Ripley and Colyvan’s account of extra-
mathematical explanation). I think, then, that it should be concluded that appealing to the 
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modal account of extra-mathematical explanation significantly narrows down the questions 
relevant to assessing the Explanation Conditional: much ends up turning on the role (if any) 
played by dependence of the explanandum on mathematical facts/objects, rather than on 
other parts of the physical system. Nevertheless, if this distinction can be drawn between how 
the mathematical fact and the invariant generalization do their explanatory work, it seems as 
though the ball is in the realist’s court. The nominalist can use the resources of the account 
in chapter 4 to drive a wedge between mathematical and non-mathematical explanation, even 
though both kinds of explanation can be understood using a Woodward-style account and even 
though it is left open whether any of the extra-mathematical explanations are causal 
explanations. The realist ought to provide an account of why mathematical objects must exist 




Consider, second, Representationalism. This stated that mathematics merely plays a 
representational role. There is reason to think that this is a somewhat delicate question, 
turning on exactly what one draws the line on mathematics playing an explanatory role. One 
can imagine someone hard-headedly maintaining that unless mathematics plays a thick, or 
metaphysical, explanatory role then it is only representational. I am inclined to think that this 
is a terminological question and think that it ought to be granted that mathematics does play 
an explanatory role and, therefore, Representationalism (as stated in the introduction) is false. 
What, then, of the Representation Conditional? Even though it is, I have suggested, false that 
mathematics only plays a representational role, there is still reason to be interested in the 
ontological commitments of mathematics’ representational capacity. If the nominalist can 
make the case, as suggested above, that mathematics’ explanatory role does not 
straightforwardly license ontological commitment, the realist might still press that its 
representational capacity is committing (either to truth-value realism, as Pincock claims, or to a 
stronger form of realism). 
 
The central question, here, is what mathematical objects have to be like in order to play a 
role in representing. Recall that there are three relations involved in a case of mathematical 
representation. The two levels of denotation relation seem straightforward for the nominalist 
to accommodate: but what about the holding of a structural relation between the target 
system (suitably carved up into objects, properties and relations) and the mathematical 
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structure? There is, of course, the natural nominalist suggestion (discussed in chapter 1) that 
mathematics is being used here to express a claim about the target system (that it is structured 
in such a way) and that neither mathematical existence nor mathematical truth is required in 
order for this to take place (that expressing about the target system that it would stand in such 
and such a structural relation to a given mathematical structure if the mathematical structure 
existed does not require that the mathematical structure in fact exists). A full defense of this 
fictionalist line of thinking is beyond the current scope, which has been to shed light on this 
representational use of mathematics. However, I have considered two (truth-) realist lines of 
response that threaten this nominalist accommodation of mathematics’ representational 
function: the export challenge (§1.5 and §6.8) and Pincock’s understanding thesis (§6.8). It is 
worthwhile considering a second possible line of realist response to the account of 
mathematical representation endorsed here. One might press that, even if mathematics’ 
representational capacity does not generate commitment to the mathematical structures that 
seem to be involved (because they are only used to express information about the target 
system), there is nevertheless a commitment to the structures that the target system is taken to 
instantiate (those that are taken to stand in structural relations with the mathematics). 
However, this move seems to amount to moving the debate away from distinctly 
mathematical considerations and towards more general questions about the metaphysics of 
properties and universals: questions that must be addressed by anyone willing to take the 
world to be structured. Whether or not one can interpret talk of the world’s structure as just 
a way of talking about the objects, properties and relations that make up the world (as 
opposed to having to accept the existence of a structure, instantiated by the world, that exists 
over and above these components of the world) is a far more general, not distinctively 
mathematical, metaphysical question. 
 
7.2. Exceptionalism and anti-exceptionalism 
 
One of the secondary aims of this thesis was to make the case for anti-exceptionalism about 
mathematical representation and explanation. The best way to argue for anti-exceptionalism 
about some phenomena (be it the methodology of philosophy (Williamson 2007; Williamson 
2013a), theory choice in logic (Hjortland 2017; Maddy 2002) or mathematical explanation 
(chapter 4 of this thesis)) is to do the work and demonstrate that the phenomena can be 
accommodated by some existing, more general, account. In chapter 4, I discussed the 
extension of the modal account of explanation to extra-mathematical explanation and argued 
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that it is superior to rival accounts. In chapter 6, I argued that the common core of recent 
accounts of mathematical representation can fruitfully be accommodated by an existing 
account of representation: Contessa’s epistemic framework. These two arguments acted as a 
corrective to those who take extra-mathematical explanation to be sui generis and also to those 
who take recent accounts of mathematical representation to belong to a tradition that takes 
structural similarity to be sufficient for representation. 
 
However, anti-exceptionalist accommodations of phenomena can threaten to flatten and 
obfuscate features that are genuinely idiosyncratic. For example, the logical anti-
exceptionalist’s claim that simplicity is a norm that governs theory choice in both logic and 
science might hide the fact that the notions of simplicity in play in these two disciplines are, 
in fact, radically different and that they may differ in the extent to which they are truth-
conducive. In this case, a claim that is true at a sufficient level of abstraction and generality 
in fact hides important differences that become apparent once we attend to the phenomena 
at a more fine-grained level. 
 
The anti-exceptionalist accounts offered in this thesis do not flatten their respective 
phenomena in this way. Rather, the anti-exceptionalist accounts offered here respect what 
makes mathematical explanation and mathematical representation interestingly different 
from other kinds of explanation and representation, even though they end up sharing many of 
their core features with representation and explanation simpliciter.  One crucial aspect of the 
anti-exceptionalist account of explanation offered here is that even though the mathematical 
fact and the invariant generalizations play the same essential role they do so in different ways. 
Invariant generalizations directly describe a small part of the world’s patterns of dependence 
– even if it is described using mathematics. Mathematical facts played this core explanatory 
role in a slightly different way: a mathematical fact - expressing some claim about how things 
are mathematically, not directly describing the world’s systems of dependence – can 
nevertheless play the core explanatory role in virtue of the fact that the target system (suitably 
interpreted) can be understood as being an approximate instantiation of the axioms 
governing the mathematical system that is the subject matter of the mathematical fact. Rather 
than being a surface level difference, the unique way in which mathematics plays this role in 
fact generates interesting future questions and, as demonstrated above, can also play an 
important role in adjudicating metaphysical debates. 
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Furthermore, the discussion of some distinctively mathematical epistemic representations 
led to fruitful potential revisions of the general account under which they are subsumed. As 
seen when discussing the inferential conception, an idiosyncratic feature of mathematical 
representations may be that, in some cases, the user of the representation taking the target 
system to stand in a structural relation to the vehicle is what sets up the denotation relations 
– and that this very same structural relation plays a second role of grounding the 
representation’s faithfulness. Second, as will become apparent below when discussing the 
potential limits of the epistemic representation framework, the mathematical cases may 
require a bifurcation of the notion of an interpretation. 
 
7.3. The limits of anti-exceptionalism and the prospects of monism  
 
7.3.1. The limits of the epistemic representation framework 
The account offered of epistemic representation was originally intended to be fully general. 
If this is the case, then in any case of (partially) faithful epistemic representation, there will 
be a denotation relation between the vehicle and (purported) target, a set of denotation 
relations between parts of the vehicle and parts of the target (which jointly constitute an 
interpretation) and there will be structural similarity between the vehicle and target grounding 
the representation’s faithfulness. This is equally true for non-scientific epistemic 
representations, non-mathematical epistemic representations and mathematical epistemic 
representations. It, nevertheless, leaves open questions about the nature of denotation and 
the exact mechanism via which such representations might activate mental representations: 
it does not address Callender and Cohen’s question about the relationship between 
fundamental and non-fundamental representations (see §5.2). 
 
There is a more pressing open question, however. Recall that in cases of permutation 
invariance, it seemed less-than-straightforward to understand both levels of denotation 
relations obtaining: whilst the top-level denotation relation between the vehicle and target 
system may well obtain, facts about the non-individuality of the objects that make up the 
target system make reconstructing the representation as involving denotation relations 
between the vehicle objects and target objects look difficult. There are two options, as I see 
it. In his initial characterisations of epistemic representation, Contessa notes that (what he 
calls) analytic interpretations are only one kind of interpretation, and that other kinds are 
conceivable (Contessa 2007: 58). So, the first route to accommodating these permutation 
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invariance cases (and any other cases where object-level denotation relations are hard to 
locate) involves widening the notion of an interpretation such that it can be the case that the 
vehicle has been interpreted in terms of the target (and so can license inferences) without it 
being the case that object-level denotation relations have been established. This, for example, 
might be a kind of interpretation that only establishes denotation relations between 
properties and relations, but not between objects of the vehicle and target. The viability of 
this option, of course, turns on the details. If it fails, the second option involves giving up 
the interpretational account of epistemic representation as a fully general account: admitting 
that it breaks down when, for example, it is not straightforward to understand the target 
system as consisting of intrinsically individual objects. Although this question about the 
bounds of the epistemic representation account is left unanswered here, it is nevertheless an 
important lesson that some distinctively mathematical representations (like the symmetry 
representations) raise potential challenges for accounts of representation given at the level 
of generality of Contessa’s. In an important sense, the ‘direction-of-travel’ between accounts 
of scientific representation simpliciter and accounts of mathematical representation goes both 
ways: the epistemic framework sheds light on mathematical representation but mathematical 
representation also signals when the conditions of the epistemic framework are too strong. 
 
7.3.2. Explanation  
 
Extra-mathematical explanations are often taken to challenge the view that all explanations 
are causal – so it’ll be helpful to connect up the discussion in this thesis to this debate. In a 
recent survey paper, Reutlinger delineates three views about non-causal explanation 
(Reutlinger 2017a). According to causal reductionism, all explanations are causal 
explanations. According to monism, there is a general account that can accommodate both 
causal and non-causal explanation. Finally, the pluralist agrees with the monist that there are 
non-causal explanations but claims that there is not a fully general account and, accordingly, 
at least two accounts of explanation must be given.196 
																																																						
196 Reutlinger discusses reductionism, monism and pluralism as views about scientific explanation. There are 
reasons for thinking that these views are most interesting understood as views about explanation simpliciter. 
Many questions about explanation cut across the scientific/non-scientific divide (if there is a substantive divide 
at all). Theories of causal explanation, for example, are not offered as theories of scientific causal explanation but 
of causal explanation simpliciter: it is a mark against a theory of causal explanation if it cannot accomodate Billy 
breaking a window with a stone. Similarly, whether or not one must offer a unified account of intra-
mathematical explanation and extra-mathematical explanation is an interesting debate, but one that cuts across 
the scientific/non-scientific divide. 
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How does anti-exceptionalism about extra-mathematical explanation relate to these more 
general views? Recall that at the end of chapter 4, I suggested that whether or not the 
accommodation of the extra-mathematical cases into a Woodward-style account revealed 
that the explanations were in fact causal (contra the received wisdom) turned on delicate 
questions about the interventions involved. Indeed, it is possible that some extra-mathematical 
explanations are causal whilst some are not. If all the interventions involved in extra-
mathematical explanations should be understood as causal interventions, then it seems as 
though the account here is a piece of evidence in favour of reductionism, the most 
conservative of the three views. If, however, not all of the interventions can be given a causal 
reading, then it seems as though the account offered here is a piece of evidence that tells 
against reductionism and for monism. And, of course, the truth of the view here is consistent 
also with pluralism: pluralism will end up being true if there is another kind of explanation 
that does not yield to either a reductionist or a monist understanding. The case for monism 
ought to be built bit by bit. This raises another interesting question for future work: how far 
the modal account might go. In previous chapters I flagged up recent work that extends a 
Woodward-style account to different kinds of non-causal explanation (Bokulich 2011; 
Reutlinger 2014; Rice 2013; Saatsi & Pexton 2013), work that this thesis builds on – below I 
suggest two pieces of new ground. 
 
7.3.1 Intra-mathematical explanation 
 
I do not think there are any positive reasons to require our account of extra-mathematical 
explanation to also cover intra-mathematical explanation (as argued in §4.1). Nevertheless, 
the success of a Woodward-style account in shedding light on extra-mathematical 
explanation suggests that extending theories of causal explanation to the intra-mathematical 
case might not be so much of a dead-end as is often held. Indeed, some of what Steiner says 
in setting out his ‘characterizing properties’ account of intra-mathematical explanation has 
an interventionist ring to it: 
 
It must be evident, that is, that if we substitute in the proof a different object of the same 
domain, the theorem collapses; more, we should be able to see as we vary the object how 
the theorem changes in response. (Steiner 1978: 143)197 
																																																						
197 Thanks to Josephine Salverda for drawing my attention to this aspect of Steiner’s account. 
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A prima facie worry about extending Woodward’s account in this way (or, alternately, in 
modifying Steiner’s account in this way) is that unlike the extension of the modal account to 
mathematical explanations of non-mathematical facts, a modal account of mathematical 
explanations of mathematical facts will, it seems, necessarily appeal to counterpossibles. 
However, the proponent of a fully general modal account, though, would be able to draw on 
the work of Baron, Colyvan and Ripley discussed in chapter 4 in order to provide a basis for 
thinking about how manipulations of mathematical facts ramify to other facts (Baron, 
Colyvan & Ripley 2017). Even though, as I argued, such work isn’t required in order to 
extend the account into the extra-mathematical case, it will be invaluable in future attempts 
to extend it into the intra-mathematical case. This brief discussion is a long way from an 
argument that a unified account can be had of extra-mathematical and intra-mathematical 
explanation: however, this is a potentially fruitful avenue of future research. 
 
7.3.4. Social structural explanation 
 
Here’s another potential way to extend the account. Consider, social structural explanations: 
explanations that appeal to facts about social structures to explain phenomena. These 
explanations, only recently discussed in any detail, are ripe with interesting philosophical 
features: they sit on the line between scientific explanations and (something like) political 
explanations and, similarly, are offered up in both descriptive and normative contexts. Recent 
work on such explanations suggests that they may belong to a wider class of structural 
explanations (Haslanger 2015) but does not attempt to shed light on it by appealing to 
existing accounts of explanation. This, then, seems a natural novel extension of the approach 
to mathematical explanation taken in this thesis, given that mathematical explanations are 
naturally understood as structural explanations of a different kind. Clearly, it will not be trivial 
to apply the account. Nevertheless, a modal account along the lines of this thesis seems like 
it is well suited to cashing out the claim that some social phenomena can depend not only 
on micro-facts about the agents involved but also (or instead) on wider, structural, abstract 
features of the social world in which they live, much as characterising the structural features 




7.4. The world, structure, and the structure of the world 
 
In both the discussion of mathematical explanation and mathematical representation, the 
idea of the world having a structure played an important role. That the world is structured is 
what allows a structural relation between target and vehicle to ground a representation’s 
faithfulness: without the assumption that the world is structured, the suggestion that a 
mathematical vehicle and the world stand in a structural relationship seems like a category 
mistake. Remember, also, that the world being structured such that it instantiates a collection 
of axioms is what allows the mathematical fact to have explanatory power. It is common to 
find talk of the structure of the target system, or the structure of the physical domain. 
However, there are multiple ways of imposing structure onto the world and onto the target 
systems present in representations: the world can be carved up into objects, properties and 
relations in very many ways. For reasons familiar from the discussion in chapter 6, it is not 
at all straightforward to identify one such imposable structure as the world’s actual structure 
– even putting aside the myriad problems with natural kind talk, limiting the structures to 
those that carve up the system along natural kind terms does not yield one privileged 
structure. Nevertheless, as I stressed in chapter 6, there is little reason to think that 
proponents of accounts of mathematical representation that appeal to structural relations, 
nor those working in the partial structures tradition, are naïve regarding this point: Bueno & 
Colyvan explicitly raise this worry and Pincock, too, takes the specification step to involve 
selecting one particular way of carving up the target system into objects, properties and 
relations, implying acknowledgement that the world does not come readily-carved, as it were 
(see §6.2). 
 
So, this issue has not gone unnoticed: but is it harmless? Perhaps so, as long as it is kept in 
mind that the inferences generated are also to be relativized to the chosen structure. One 
remaining worry, though, was the role that the world being structured plays in grounding the 
faithfulness of a given representation. Recall that, for example, the faithfulness of the 
Glasgow subway map was explained by the fact that the map (the vehicle) and the subway 
system (the target) are structurally similar. Yet, as is now familiar, talking of the map and the 
system being structurally similar is only meaningful once one possible way of imposing 
structure on the system is privileged. A possible outcome is that all inferences generated by 
epistemic representations are relative to a chosen imposition of structure on the target 
system. Prima facie, this is not yet an objection to the account rather than a feature of it. The 
relevant structure that the target system is taken to instantiate is relevant because it has been 
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taken to be relevant by the user of the representation: there is no intractable question about 
what makes it such that this structure of the target system is that which is appealed to in this 
representation. There will be those who are unhappy, of course, with this state of affairs: 
those who will still demand a way to privilege some of the structures that the target system 
could be taken to instantiate that does not appeal to the interests and choices of the user of 
the representation. This has become, then, an instance of a more general and fundamental 
worry. Someone who seeks an answer to this question can be directed to the literature on 
Newman’s objection: especially those responses that try to carve out some privileged 
structures (Psillos 1999; Votsis 2004), although see Ainsworth 2009 for critical discussion of 
these and other strategies. 
 
7.5. Some lessons  
 
Here, then, are the lessons of this thesis. The first is that, if one is invested in the debates 
about mathematical ontology that take as their lead our world-oriented uses of mathematics 
(as opposed to so-called ‘easy-arguments’), it is crucial to turn first to descriptive questions 
about how mathematical explanation and representation function. It is only with these 
accounts in hand that it is possible to discern whether claims like the Explanation 
Conditional and Representation Conditional are true. I have also suggested that this project 
ought to be carried out by attending to the ontological ramifications of the two accounts 
endorsed here: the modal account of extra-mathematical representation and the account of 
distinctively mathematical epistemic representation. The second lesson is that reasons given 
for not extending accounts of causal explanation to purportedly non-causal explanations 
often reveal themselves to be unconvincing on closer inspection: and that whether or not a 
kind of explanation is causal or not may not turn on the properties of the objects appealed 
to in the explanation but on the nature of the interventions involved in the explanation. Both 
of these lessons have consequences for the emerging debates about the existence of non-









Appendix A: Inference rules Contessa’s 
interpretational account of epistemic 
representation 
 
In this appendix I set out Contessa’s inference rules.  
 
In addition to interpreting the target in terms of the vehicle (which amounts to establishing 
denotation relations between parts of the former and parts of the latter), epistemic 
representation also requires inference rules. Contessa (Contessa 2007; Contessa 2011; 
Contessa ms) sets out some inference rules, making explicit that different sorts of 
interpretations may come with their own set of inference rules. He offers the following rules 
for analytic interpretation. 
 
Rule 1: If, according to the analytic interpretation of v in terms of t, oVi denotes oTi it 
is valid for the user to infer that oTi is in the target if and only if oVi is in the vehicle. 
 
Rule 2: If, according to the analytic interpretation of v in terms of t, ov1 denotes oT1, 
…, oVn, and nRVk denotes nRVk it is valid for the user to infer that the relation nRTk 
holds among oT1, …, oVn if and only if nRVk holds among oV1, …, oVn. 
 
Rule 3: If, according to the analytic interpretation adopted by the user, ov1 denotes 
oT1, ov1 denotes oT1, …, oVn and nFVk denotes nFTk, it is valid for the user to infer that 
the value of the function nFTK for the arguments oT1, …, oTn is oTi if and only if the 





Appendix B: The partial structures framework 
 
In this appendix I set out the partial structures framework, which is appealed to in Bueno & 
Colyvan 2011. More detail about the framework is given in work by its proponents (da Costa 




Let relations be understood by specifying the n-tuples for which they hold. The partial 
structures approach introduces a third class of n-tuples: in addition to the classes for which 
the relation holds and for which they do not, a third class is introduced that is made up by 
the n-tuples for which it is not defined whether or not the relation holds. 
 
A partial structure is an ordered pair < 𝒟, 𝑅M >M∈P , where 𝒟 is a non-empty set, 𝑅M, 𝑖 ∈ 𝐼 is 
a family of partial relations (where I is an index set).  
 
A partial relation 𝑅M, 𝑖 ∈ 𝐼 over 𝒟 is a relation which need not be defined for all n-tuples 
made from elements of 𝒟. Each partial relation 𝑅 can be understood as an ordered triple <𝑅A, 𝑅B, 𝑅C>. 𝑅A, 𝑅B and 𝑅C are mutually disjoint sets, with 𝑅A ∪ 𝑅B ∪ 𝑅C	= 𝒟V, such that 𝑅A is the set of n-tuples that belong to 𝑅, 𝑅B is the set of n-tuples that do not belong to 𝑅 
and 𝑅C is the set of n-tuples for which it is not defined whether or not they belong to 𝑅.  
 
Partial isomorphism and homomorphism 
 
The partial structure framework allows for the definition of partial isomorphism and partial 
homomorphism in a way that is analogous to the standard notions of isomorphism and 
homomorphism. The below definitions are taken from Bueno & Colyvan 2011. 
 
Let 𝑆 =	< 𝒟, 𝑅M >M∈P and 𝑆′ =	< 𝒟′, 𝑅′M >M∈P be partial structures, where 𝑅M and 𝑅′M are 
(for simplicity) binary partial relations. A partial function f: 𝐷 → 𝐷′ is a partial isomorphism 
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between 𝑆 and 𝑆′ if (i) f is bijective and (ii) for every x and y ∈ 𝐷, 𝑅A𝑥𝑦 ↔ 𝑅]A𝑓 𝑥 𝑓(𝑦) 
and 𝑅B𝑥𝑦 ↔ 𝑅]B𝑓 𝑥 𝑓(𝑦). 
 
Let 𝑆 =	< 𝒟, 𝑅M >M∈P and 𝑆′ =	< 𝒟′, 𝑅′M >M∈P be partial structures, where 𝑅M and 𝑅′M are 
(for simplicity) binary partial relations. A partial function f: 𝐷 → 𝐷′ is a partial homomorphism 
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